Prior to the start of the US war on Iraq, tens of millions of people around the world and millions of people in the US took to the streets to protest the war.  Yet, although people in nearly every country in the world opposed a US invasion of Iraq, a large majority of Americans supported the war on Afghanistan.

A smaller portion of the country protested the war against Afghanistan.  This is likely because (as we’ve been told), the Taliban housed and sponsored al-Qaeda, the group that attacked us on 9/11.  Most Americans wanted to get even and to stop al-Qaeda there so they could not attack us again.  Unfortunately, this is not what happened.  And needless to say, the war on Iraq has not gone well.

Former White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke calls the Iraq war a major national mistake and an “unnecessary tangent.”  He says Iraq posed no threat to the US.  The right war, according to Clarke, was “to fight for the elimination of al Qaeda, to stabilize nations threatened by radical Islamic terrorists, to offer a clear alternative to counter the radical ‘theology’ and ideology of the terrorists, and to reduce our own vulnerabilities at home” (p. 239).  Clarke already had laid out a plan to do this, but it never did reach President Bush.  Clarke claims President Bush made Iraq the “central front in the war on terror.”  Clarke says: “He turned it from a nation that was not threatening us into a breeding ground for anti-American hatred.” (p. xviii).

Former Senator Bob Graham, who would later co-chair the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 intelligence failures, agrees with Clarke that the war on Iraq is a folly that left the war on terrorism incomplete “and a battered al-Qaeda … able to regroup and recruit” (p. xv).  Graham says the war on Iraq is a diversion and his best proof is that we obviously cannot fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan and another war in Iraq because we diverted military and intelligence resources from Afghanistan to prepare for the war in Iraq in as early as February 2002.

According to Graham, President Bush (in early 2002) directed intelligence and military resources necessary to win the Afghanistan war to Iraq, which at the time was still unauthorized.  This includes most of the armed Predator aircraft even when UBL was surrounded in Tora Bora.  Graham reports on a meeting with General Tommy Franks (Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command from July 2000 through July 2003) where Franks said: “Senator, we are not engaged in a war in Afghanistan ... Military and intelligence personnel are being redeployed to prepare for an action in Iraq.  The Predators are being relocated.  What we are doing is a manhunt.  We have wrapped ourselves too much in trailing Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.  We’re better at beating a meat axe than finding a needle in a haystack.  That’s not our mission, and that’s not what we are trained or prepared to do.”  Franks also said: “We can finish this job in Afghanistan if we are allowed to do so.  And there is a set of terrorist targets after Afghanistan.  My first priority would be Somalia – there is no effective government to control the large number of terrorist cells.  Next, I would go to Yemen.  Its president is willing to help in the war on terrorism, but has no capabilities to do so.  Iraq is a special case.  Our intelligence there is very unsatisfactory.  Some Europeans know more than we do on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction ...”  Note: Tommy Franks reportedly denies this, and this is not the account Franks provides in his book, American Soldier.  Keep in mind, however, Bob Graham’s 2,500 notebooks (every experience and conversation he has is documented in his notes each day).

 This document provides some evidence suggesting the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq were planned in advance and that each may have different goals than those officially stated.  It also identifies some of the key problems plaguing each war.  Look for the references, all prior to 9/11, of the need for a “Pearl Harbor” attack to transform the US military and US foreign policy in line with the ideology of the neo-Conservatives in the White House.

Afghanistan

·         In 1992, Colin Powell tells members of Congress that we should develop significant power to assure that no one will ever challenge us again on the world stage … this shows he is a supporter of US global hegemony.
 
·         August 1996 -- UNOCAL and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia reach an agreement with state companies in Turkmenistan and Russia to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.  UNOCAL is hopeful that the Taliban will stabilize the country for a pipeline through Afghanistan.  Some State Department officials are even ok with the Taliban because they think they will bring stability to the country, thereby allowing the pipeline to go through. 

·         October 1997: Former National Security Advisor to President Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski publishes his book, The Grand Chessboard, where he says Eurasia is the key to determine world dominance and Central Asia is the key to that.  He says that for the US to maintain its place in the world order, it must prevent any adversary from controlling that region.  He writes: “The attitude of the American people toward the external projection of American power has been much more ambivalent.  The public supported America’s engagement in World War II largely because of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.”  He says Americans will not accept the Central Asian strategy “except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat.” (Pearl Harbor reference #1).  Yet, in a later book, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (2004), he sharply criticizes President Bush’s foreign policy.  In this book, Brzezinski still argues in favor of hegemony, but a co-optive form of it.  Although he still comes across as a foreign policy hawk, he says we must address the root causes of terrorism and not engage in pre-emptive war unless as a last resort.  As a result of his government service, Brzezinski was widely acknowledged as an advocate of peaceful engagement, human rights, and forming & utilizing peaceful alliances instead of unilateral, go-it-alone policies.  He was, however, intimately involved in planning for support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, a policy he feels today is justified based on the collapse of the Soviet Union.

 ·         December 1997, Members of the Taliban traveled to Texas to visit UNOCAL while George W. Bush was governor.  The Taliban agree to the deal will do so only if the US officially recognizes the Taliban regime. (Keep in mind that Bush, Cheney, and Rice are oil people … Rice had been on Chevron’s Board of Directors since 1991 and has an oil tanker named after her … Cheney still gets deferred payments from Halliburton, his oil company … Bush headed Harken oil, a failed company until it was funded by Saudis and awarded a contract in the Persian Gulf).

 ·         November 1998 -- former President George Bush meets with the bin Laden family on behalf of the Carlyle Group in Jeddah Saudi Arabia.  They also meet in January 2000.

 ·         March 1999: Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Andrew Krepinevich testifies before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities and says: “There appears to be general agreement concerning the need to transform the US military into a significantly different kind of force from that which emerged victorious from the Cold and Gulf Wars.  Yet this verbal support has not been translated into a defense program supporting transformation … the critical mass needed to effect it has not yet been achieved.  One may conclude that, in the absence of a strong external shock to the United States – a latter-day ‘Pearl Harbor’ of sorts – surmounting the barriers to transformation will likely prove a long, arduous process.”  (Pearl Harbor reference #2)

 ·         April 2000: The US is given permission to expand its US Qatar military base … From September–December 2001, the US military is building up forces in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and makes permanent bases there too, as well as in Kyrgyzstan (which is only 200 miles from China) … In January 2002, the US improves bases in 13 locations in nine countries in Central Asia. … All of the countries are led by corrupt dictatorships, and plagued by social and economic problems.  Some speculate the US presence is increasing Muslim resentment.

 ·         April 2001: An “Independent Task Force,” Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations, publishes The Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges For The 21^st Century where it writes “[T]he United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma, suffering on a recurring basis from the negative consequences of sporadic energy shortages. These consequences can include recession, social dislocation of the poorest Americans, and at the extremes, a need for military intervention.”  The document is on-line (http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/jaa01/jaa01.pdf).

 ·         September 11, 2001 – On the night of the worst terrorist attacks against this country, President Bush writes in his diary, “The Pearl Harbor of 21^st Century took place today … We think it’s Osama bin Laden.”

 ·         September 15, 2001 – CIA Director George Tenet briefs President Bush on a plan to take out the Taliban in Afghanistan and take over the country.  He also presents the “Worldwide Attack Matrix” that outlines covert operations in 80 countries that are underway or recommended.

 ·         America’s war on Afghanistan began October 2001 and is ongoing.  Afghanistan was a failed state prior to our war there, due to its long war with the Soviet Union and the subsequent civil wars that followed.

 ·         The war began only after President Bush made demands to the Taliban that were unmet.  These included delivering al-Qaeda leaders and terrorists to the US, releasing all foreign nationals, protecting foreign aid workers and diplomats, closing terrorist training camps, and giving US access to the training camps to make sure they were closed.  The Taliban ultimately agreed to meet to talk about convincing their leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to hand over UBL to the US, but President Bush felt the offer was insincere.  The war also began after the Taliban refused to abide by a UN Security Council resolutions from December 2000 and September 2001 calling for the Taliban to hand over UBL.  As of this writing, the US war on Afghanistan has killed between 1,000 and 5,000 civilians, and 20,000-50,000 total people in Afghanistan.

 ·         Former Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke says that the US was slow to put ground forces in Afghanistan where al Qaeda was, and allowed them to escape ... we knew Tora Bora was a good place to hide for al Qaeda leaders and we had photographed it and mapped its caves, yet we did not stop UBL from going there and escaping ... UBL is still at large, as is the leader of the Taliban ... Afghanistan is still unstable ... warlords affiliated with the Taliban and mujahedeen are still in power in most of Afghanistan.

 ·         Clarke also asserts that America should have established a security presence in Afghanistan but did not, so Hamid Kharzi was given little authority outside of the capital city of Kabul.  Plus our economic and development aid to the country was slow and inadequate.  Heck, we even forgot to include them in the 2004 budget one year forcing Kharzi to come to the US and request money!

 ·         Clarke says that the US response to al Qaeda was slow and small.  He says Bush “began by again offering the Taliban a chance to avoid US occupation of their country and, when that failed, he initially sent in only a handful of Special Forces.  When the Taliban and al Qaeda leaders escaped, he dispatched additional forces but less than one full division equivalent, fewer US troops for all of Afghanistan than the number of NYPD assigned to Manhattan” (Clarke, p. 245) ... no US troops gave chase of the Taliban when they fled ... we relied on the Northern Alliance to do this for us.  Not until November 25 (seven weeks after we started our war there) did the US insert ground forces (one Marine unit) to take and hold a former al Qaeda and Taliban facility near Kandahar.  This did not include any effort to seal the border with Pakistan or to cut off the al Qaeda escape routes.

 ·         Richard Clarke also points out that al Qaeda has grown since 9/11 ... recruitment of al Qaeda is up ... there were more terrorist attacks in the 30 months after 9/11 than before it!  In June 2004 the State Department claimed that attacks were down but it had to withdraw its annual report on terrorism and re-release it when it found its numbers were inaccurate – terrorism had actually increased!  Senator Bob Graham agrees with Clarke and says it is the war on Iraq that let “and a battered al-Qaeda left able to regroup and recruit” (p. xv).

 ·         February 2002 -- it is reported that US bases in Afghanistan have been placed along the proposed pipeline route.

 ·         Zalmay Khalizad is President Bush’s Ambassador to Kabul, Afghanistan.  He previously worked under Paul Wolfowitz and conducted a risk analysis for UOCAL for the proposed $2 billion gas pipeline.  He also wrote op-eds in the Washington Post in 1997 in defense of the Taliban.

 ·         Afghanistan’s new leader, Hamid Kharzai, was a paid consultant for UNOCAL and had also been a Deputy Foreign Minister for the Taliban.

Iraq:

·         March 1992: The Defense Planning Guidance is written by now Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and now Vice President Chief of Staff Lewis Libby.  It calls for pre-emptive attacks against threatening regimes in order to protect against terrorism and assure access to raw resources.  According to Bernard Weiner, the document called for “a new order” that accounts “sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership” and a military power capable of “deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”  According to the document, military intervention in Iraq is necessary to assure “access to vital raw material, primarily Persian Gulf Oil” and to prevent the spread of WMDs.  Excerpts from the document include:

“The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and military strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival superpower.

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

Another major U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values.

… The U.S. should aim "to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems."

The draft outlines several scenarios in which U.S. interests could be threatened by regional conflict: "access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking."

The draft relies on seven scenarios in potential trouble spots to make its argument -- with the primary case studies being Iraq and North Korea.

 If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action.  There is no mention in the draft document of taking collective action through the United Nations.  The document states that coalitions "hold considerable promise for promoting collective action," but it also states the U.S. "should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies" formed to deal with a particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the crisis.  The document states that what is most important is "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that calls for quick response.

 ·         These excerpts are on-line (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html).  A New York Times analysis is also online (http://www.911truth.org/readingroom/whole_document.php?article_id=86). 

·         According to PBS’s Frontline: “Controversy erupts after the draft is leaked to the press. The White House orders Defense Secretary Cheney to rewrite it. In the new draft there is no mention of preemption or U.S. willingness to act alone.”  This suggests our nation’s leaders were not quite ready for such a major shift in foreign policy.  The election of George W. Bush to the White House provided the rationale for the shift.    (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html)

 ·         January 1993: Dick Cheney, while Secretary of Defense, releases his “Defense Strategy for the 1990s” which reasserts the case for US global domination.  Bill Clinton’s inauguration means the plan is not put into place.  The document is on-line (http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/naarpr_Defense.pdf).

 ·         1996-1998: When US intelligence was tracking UBL’s satellite phone calls, he made 260 calls to 27 numbers in Britain, more than 200 calls to Yemen, 131 calls to Sudan, 106 calls to Iran, 67 calls to Azerbaijan, 59 calls to Pakistan, 57 calls to Saudi Arabia, 13 calls to a ship in the Indian Ocean, 6 calls to the US, 6 calls to Italy, 4 calls to Malaysia, and 2 calls to Senegal.  But he makes ZERO calls to Iraq!

 ·         July 1996: Richard Perle (who later would become chairman of President Bush’s Defense Policy Board), then a member of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), authors a paper “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” which calls for a hard line Israel headed by Binyamin Netanyahu aimed at a restoration of Zionism.  The plan starts with the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which would then destabilize the Middle East, including, it is hoped, new governments in Syria, Iran, and Lebanon.  The document is on-line (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/860941/posts).

 ·         June 1997: The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) issues its statement of principles, which include shaping the new century to be favorable to American principles and interests, achieving a foreign policy that does the same, increasing defense spending significantly, challenging regimes hostile to our interests and values, and accepting our role in the new world as the sole superpower.

 ·         January 1998: PNAC sends a letter to President Bill Clinton calling for war against Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein because he is a hazard to the world’s oil supplies.  It calls for the US to go it alone and says the US should not be crippled by the UN.  Ten of the 18 signatories end up in George W. Bush’s first administration (including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowtiz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky, Presidential Advisor for the Middle East Elliot Abrams, and Special Iraq Envoy Zalmay Khalizad).

 ·         In part, the letter reads:

 “Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate.  The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction.  In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing.  In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.  That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy … We believe the US has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf.  In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.”

 The letter is on-line (http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm).

 ·         According to former Senator Bob Graham, who co-chaired the 9/11 Joint Congressional Inquiry, in 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer (who would later head the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq) advised targeting states that support terrorism (Afghanistan, Syria, and North Korea were mentioned but Iraq was not).

 ·         September 2000: “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” is published by PNAC.  It is commissioned by future VP Dick Cheney, future Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, future Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Florida Governor Jeb Bush, and future Chief of Staff for Vice President Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby.  It calls for maintaining US global dominance, a military force in the Middle East, military control of space, regime change in China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and other countries, the development of forms of biological warfare that can be used to target specific genotypes, and preparations for multiple theater wars. 

 ·         The report essentially calls for Pax Americana, an American empire, with a greater emphasis on “Homeland Defense,” preparation for multiple wars, and transformation of the US armed forces.  It asserts the US right to secure global hegemony, and this depends, in no small part, to a US presence in the Middle East.  For example, the document states … “the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security.  While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein” (p. 14).

 ·         The report puts forth the “axis of evil.”  For example, it states “… adversaries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are rushing to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American intervention in regions they seek to dominate” (p. 4).  Further, the report states: “The current American peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction.  We cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or other similar states to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself” (p. 75).

 ·         The report also states the US right to topple hostile regimes: “American military preeminence will continue to rest in significant part on the ability to maintain sufficient land forces to achieve political goals such as removing a dangerous and hostile regime when necessary” (p. 61).

 ·         The report also explicitly calls for the militarization of space and the implementation of “Star Wars” type programs to achieve this goal, as well as increased defense spending to the tune of $15 to 20 billion per year.

 ·         The report also calls for the establishment of more US military bases overseas to serve as “deployment bases” and “forward operating bases,” as well as expansion of US nuclear weaponry.

 ·         The report says the desired changes will take a long time, “absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.”  (Pearl Harbor reference #3) 

 ·         The report is on-line (http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf).

 ·         A comparison of this document with President Bush’s National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) is telling.  In it, President Bush asserts the US right to prevent any nation from challenging us economically, politically, or militarily.  According to Bernard Weiner, the similarities include:

 1) the policy of "pre-emptive" war – i.e., whenever the U.S. thinks a country may be amassing too much power and/or could provide some sort of competition in the "benevolent hegemony" region, it can be attacked, without provocation. (A later corollary would rethink the country's atomic policy: nuclear weapons would no longer be considered defensive, but could be used offensively in support of political/economic ends; so-called "mini-nukes" could be employed in these regional wars.);

 2) international treaties and opinion will be ignored whenever they are not seen to serve U.S. imperial goals;

 3) The new policies "will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia." 

In short, the Bush Administration seems to see the U.S., admiringly, as a New Rome, an empire with its foreign legions (and threat of "shock & awe" attacks, including with nuclear weapons) keeping the outlying colonies, and potential competitors, in line. Those who aren't fully in accord with these goals better get out of the way; "you're either with us or against us."

 The Strategy is on-line (http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf).

 ·         January 30, 2001: First National Security Council meeting is held ten days after Bush’s inauguration.  It was focused on Iraq, including finding a way to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

 ·         February 1, 2001: Second National Security Council meeting in President Bush’s Administration is held and regime change in Iraq is a central topic.  Rumsfeld talks in depth about what a post-Saddam Iraq would be like.  Memo titled “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq” is discussed.

 ·         February 2001: Documents planning regime change for Iraq in the Bush Administration are created, including one titled “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq” and another “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oil Contracts.”

 ·         February 2001 – According to reporter Greg Palast: “The State Department's Pam Quanrud organizes a secret confab in California to make plans for the invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam. US oil industry advisor Falah Aljibury and others are asked to interview would-be replacements for a new US-installed dictator. On BBC Television's Newsnight, Aljibury himself explained, ‘It is an invasion, but it will act like a coup. The original plan was to liberate Iraq from the Saddamists and from the regime.’”

 ·         March 2001 – Palast also reports that Vice-President Dick Cheney meets with oil company executives and reviews oil field maps of Iraq … Cheney refuses to release the names of those attending or their purpose.  In March 2003, some of this information is discovered by Judicial Watch and posted on its web site.  The materials are located on-line (http://www.judicialwatch.org/071703.c_.shtml).

 ·         April 30, 2001: First Deputies Meeting on terrorism is finally held in the Bush Administration.  The discussion was focused on Iraq, not UBL or al-Qaeda!

 ·         April 2001: A report titled Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21^st Century commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations and former US Secretary of State James Baker is submitted to Vice President Cheney.  It says the central dilemma for the US is that “the American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience.”  It warns that the US is running out of oil and that “the United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma” with one of the consequences being that there is a “need for military intervention” to secure our oil supply.  It argues that Iraq should be overthrown so that we can control its oil.

 ·         Spring 2001: An article in the Army War College’s journal by Jeffrey Record, a former staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee says it is legitimate to shoot in the Persian Gulf on behalf of lower gas prices.  He also says it is all right to use Presidential subterfuge in the promotion of a conflict. … in April 2001, Tommy Franks, Commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, says to Congress that his command’s key mission is “access to the region’s energy resources.”

 ·         August 6, 2001 -- Richard Perle, head of the Defense Policy Board, says there are three challenges to the US after the cold war: Saddam Hussein, North orea, and Iran.  This becomes President Bush’s “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address.

 ·         August 2001 – Deputy Executive Director of PNAC Thomas Donnelly tells the Washington Post that the US should embrace its role as the world’s only superpower.  During the summer of 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a study of ancient empires including Macedonia, Rome, and the Mongols to see how they maintained dominance.

 ·         September 4, 2001 – Bush cabinet members meet to discuss terrorism for only the second time.  Neither Bush nor Cheney is there … CIA Director George Tenet stresses al-Qaeda, Secretary of State Colin Powell outlines a plan to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting them, but Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is only interested in Iraq.

 ·         September 11, 2001 – Donald Rumsfeld is given information hours after the attacks that three of the names on the airplane passenger manifests are suspected al-Qaeda operatives. Notes from people in the National Military Command Center with Rumsfeld show he wanted “the best info. Fast.  Judge whether good enough to hit SH at same time.  Not only UBL.”  … “Go massive.  Sweep it all up.  Things related and things not.”  He also sets up a small team of defense officials to focus on connecting Iraq with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.  In fact, it is reported that by May 2002 Rumsfeld has asked the CIA on ten occasions to find evidence linking Iraq to the terror attacks of 9/11. 

 ·         September 12, 2001 – Officials discuss attacking Iraq … Rumsfeld says Iraq should be part of the first round of the war on terrorism and that Iraq has better targets than Afghanistan … Colin Powell agrees with Richard Clarke that the focus should now be on al-Qaeda but also says: “Public opinion has to be prepared before a move against Iraq is possible.”  Bush says the goal should be to replace the Iraqi government and the military warns him it will need a large force and months to prepare.

 ·         September 12, 2001 – President Bush says to Richard Clarke, see if Saddam did this.  This is now not denied by the White House, who says it probably happened … Bush was told that there was no cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda but he still wanted another report to examine it anyway.

 ·         Clarke claims that after 9/11, President Bush was explicitly not concerned with international law.  After Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said war could not be pre-emptive, Bush said: “No!  I don’t care what the international lawyers say.  We’re going to kick some ass!” (p. 24).

 ·         In the early morning hours of 9/12, the day after the attacks, Clarke walked into a White House meeting expecting to talk about “what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term.”  Instead, he “walked into a series of discussions about Iraq.”  According to Clarke, he had heard from friends in the Pentagon that word was we would be invading Iraq some time in 2002!  Clarke claims that on 9/12, Paul Wolfowitz insisted the attacks were too coordinated to have been conducted without a state sponsor, and that Iraq had to be involved.  In fact, Wolfowitz made the same argument in April 2001 at the first Bush Administration Deputies meeting on terrorism, saying that the first attack on the World Trade Center also was assisted by Iraq.  By that afternoon, according to Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld also was talking about Iraq.  Rumsfeld said there were no decent targets in Afghanistan and that Iraq had better targets.  President Bush said we needed to change the government of Iraq, not just bomb it! (pp. 30-31).

 ·         President Bush also directed Clarke on September 12^th: “Look, I know you have a lot to do and all ... but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything.  See if Saddam did this.  See if he is linked in any way.”  Clarke responded that al Qaeda attacked us the day before and Bush replied: “I know, I know but ... see if Saddam was involved.  Just look.  I want to know any shred.”  Clarke said he would look again, but then pointed out: “But, you know, we have looked several times for state sponsorship of al Qaeda and not found any real linkages to Iraq.  Iran plays a little, as does Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, Yemen.”  Bush replied: “Look into Iraq, Saddam” (p. 32).  A meeting the next day looked into the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda and found that there was no cooperation between the two.  A memo was drafted and sent to President Bush.

 ·         Paul Wolfowitz, then assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, insisted all along that Iraq also attacked us in 1993 the first time the World Trade Center was attacked.  In spite of overwhelming evidence against the convicted bomber Ramzi Yousef, Wolfowitz followed the logic of American Enterprise Institute writer Laurie Mylroie that the real attacker worked for Saddam Hussein and was safely in Baghdad.  Clarke insists he wanted there to be evidence linking the first attack to Iraq, so that a war on Iraq might even be justified, but no such evidence exists.

 ·         Ironically, according to Clarke, it is Iran that played a role in the 9/11 attacks and that funds and encourages attacks against us.  Iran also funds Hezbollah, who historically has attacked US ally Israel.  In 1995, when Vice President Dick Cheney was CEO of Haliburton, Cheney opposed US sanctions against Iran!  The 9/11 Commission also reported that Iran played a role in the 9/11 attacks.

 ·         Mid September 2001 – Retired General Wesley Clarke says there is a concerted effort to pin 9/11 on Iraq.  He says he got a phone call from an overseas think tank urging him to push an Iraq connection on his TV appearances.

 ·         After 9/11, former White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke points out that President Bush claimed on numerous occasions, as did other members of his Administration, that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda, yet the 9/11 Commission concludes there is no evidence of this link.

 ·         Mid September, 2001 – A report tries to link Iraq and al-Qaeda by saying Mohamed Atta met an Iraqi spy in the Czech Republic in April 2001.  This is based on a single informant in the local Prague Arab community.  In fact, the story is false and there is no meaningful connection (see Thompson, pp. 321-322).  Not only has the 9/11 Commission dismissed it, so too have the French and the British in October 2002.  Britain says Iraq has purposely distanced itself from al-Qaeda not embraced it.

·         September 13, 2001 – According to PBS Frontline: “Wolfowitz expands on the president's words [where the President said to the nation that he would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them"] at a Pentagon briefing. He seems to signal that the U.S. will enlarge its campaign against terror to include Iraq: ‘I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained campaign.’ Colin Powell and others are alarmed by what they view as Wolfowitz's inflammatory words about "ending states." Powell later responds during a press briefing: "We're after ending terrorism. And if there are states and regimes, nations that support terrorism, we hope to persuade them that it is in their interest to stop doing that. But I think ending terrorism is where I would like to leave it, and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for himself." (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html)

·         September 15, 2001 – Paul Wolfowitz claims a 10-50% chance Iraq was involved in 9/11.  He, Donald Rumsfeld, and  Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith argue in memos over the next days that Iraq should be included in the first round of responses to 9/11.

 ·         September 17, 2001 – A top secret document signed by President Bush outlines a plan for going to war on Afghanistan and that directs the Pentagon to begin preparing for an invasion of Iraq.  The document orders the military to be ready to occupy Iraq’s oil fields if the country acts against US interests.  According to the media, Iraq becomes the central focus of the Bush Administration for the next nine months.  Richard Clarke asserts that President Bush claimed on numerous occasions, as did other members of his Administration, that war on Iraq was a last resort, yet he began planning for the Iraq war early in his first term.

 ·         September 19, 2001 – The Defense Policy Board has 19 hours of discussion on Iraq … attendees include Chairman Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi … Secretary of State Colin Powell is not invited!  The attendees write a letter to President Bush calling for the overthrown of Saddam Hussein, which is published as a letter from PNAC on September 20, 2001.  Secretary of State Colin Powell delays an attack on Iraq by stating there is no link between Iraq and 9/11.  According to Richard Clarke, President Bush relied on Iraqi exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi for intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and paid them millions of dollars for it, even though much of it turned out to be false.  In fact, Bush admitted on ABC News to Diane Sawyer that he invaded Iraq because Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990! (Clarke, p. 266!)

 ·         September 20, 2001 – President Bush says to Prime Minister Tony Blair that Afghanistan would be first and then Iraq would be next.

 ·         Late September 2001 – Former CIA Director James Woolsey and Paul Wolfowitz fly to London to look for evidence that would support President Bush’s goal of regime change in Iraq.   Colin Powell and George Tenet are kept out of the loop.

 ·         September-December, 2001 -- President Bush says he wants UBL dead or alive.  “If he thinks he can hide and run from the United States and our allies, he will be sorely mistaken.”  “I want justice.  And there’s an old poster out West, I recall, that says, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’”.  Then on December 18, 2001, Bush says: “Our objective is more than bin Laden.”  His January 2002 State of the Union speech lays out an axis of evil with no mention of UBL.  On March 8, 2002, Bush says: “We’re going to find him.”  On March 13, Bush says: “He’s a person who’s now been marginalized … I just don’t spend that much time on him … I truly am not that concerned about him.”  On April 6, 2002, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers says: “The goals has never been to get bin Laden.”  Finally, Bush starts answering questions about UBL by talking about Saddam Hussein!

 ·         October 2001 – The Counterterrorism Evaluation Group is created by Douglas Feith … it creates analysis at odds with years of CIA data that concludes there are links between al-Qaeda and Iraq … compare with Office of Special Plans, also created by Feith, which was specifically intended to second-guess CIA and DIA data.  The office relied on data gathered by other intelligence agencies and also on information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, or I.N.C., the exile group headed by Ahmad Chalabi, and was led by Abram Shulsky, a scholarly expert in the works of the political philosopher Leo Strauss.  The Straussian movement has many adherents in and around the Bush Administration.  In addition to Paul Wolfowitz and Abram Shulsky, they include William Kristol, the editor of the Weekly Standard, and Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, who is particularly close to Donald Rumsfeld.

 ·         Ahmad Chalabi was convicted in Jordan for crimes associated with his bank and sentenced in absentia to years of hard labor in prison.  The information he provides is typically false, and thus his code name is “Curveball”!  America paid Chalabi’s National Iraqi Congress $33 million.  During the Iraq war, he allegedly told Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence that we had broken its top secret communications code.

 ·         October-November 2001 – According to reporter Greg Palast, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz convinces the Bush administration to invade and occupy Iraq.  His plan scopes out the "sale of all state enterprises" -- that is, most of the nation's assets, "… especially in the oil and supporting industries."

 ·         November 21, 2001 – President Bush directs Donald Rumsfeld to devise a secret plan to attack Iraq.

 ·         President Bush said in February 2002: “We have totally routed out one of the most repressive governments in the history of mankind, the Taliban.”  But the Taliban still exists, even today.  More recently President Bush said Iraq was on its way to becoming a free nation like Afghanistan ... but Afghanistan is still not free from the Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters.

 ·         February 7, 2002 – President Bush signs an Executive Order saying that members of al-Qaeda will not be afforded protections of the Geneva Conventions, but that: “The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.”  Yet, it also says: “I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the secretary of defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.”  This means when not appropriate and inconsistent with military necessity, captured enemy combatants may be tortured.  This Executive Order is on-line (http://lawofwar.org/Bush_torture_memo.htm).  An analysis of the memos that led to this Order, including that by now Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, can be found at: http://lawofwar.org/Torture_Memos_analysis.htm

 ·         February 16, 2002 – National Security Council directive signed by Bush establishes goals and objectives for going to war with Iraq, which is in opposition to what Bush and his officials had been saying publicly about no plans for war on Iraq.  This is a diversion from al-Qaeda as resources are shifted from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf.

 ·         April 2002 – March 2003 – the State Department begins its “Future of Iraq” project which is intended to develop plans for post-Saddam Iraq.  It is made up of 17 working groups, yet the project is underfunded ($5 million).  Still, it produces 13 volumes of reports and 2,000 pages.  Media accounts suggest none of the report was used in post-war Iraq.

 ·         April 2002 – British Prime Minister Tony Blair visits President Bush in Crawford, Texas and tells Bush that the UK intends to support military action to bring about regime change.  First, however, a coalition will have to be constructed, public opinion will have to be shaped, and people will have to be convinced that all efforts to eliminate WMDs through weapons inspections were exhausted.

 ·         May 2002 – US military increases bombing of targets in no-fly zones in Iraq, dropping 7.3 tons of ordinance this month, compared with 0.3 tons the prior month.

·         June 2002 -- According to PBS Frontline, in a speech to West Point, President Bush “cites the realities of a new post-Cold War era and outlines a major shift in national security strategy -- from containment to preemption.  "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." The president also calls for an American hegemony: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge." Both strategic aims -- preemption and hegemony -- echo the recommendations Paul Wolfowitz made back in 1992 in his controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft.” (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html)

 ·         June 2002 – March 2003 – Operation Southern Focus is initiated, where bombing of no-fly zones increases tremendously.  US and British planes flew 21,736 sorties over Southern Iraq and dropped 606 bombs on 391 targets.

 ·         June 2002 – US and British planes drop 10.4 tons of ordinance on targets in Iraq no-fly zones.

 ·         July 2002 – The US military releases its new Defense Planning Guidance which lays out a plan to prevent any other power from challenging the US.  It even says preemptive use of nuclear weapons is justified.  A news briefing and slides associated with the document are on-line (http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t05102002_t0510dpg.html).

 ·         August 2002 – President Bush’s advisers advocate attacking Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, Burma.  …

·         According to PBS Frontline, Colin Powell “reports trouble getting U.S. allies on board for a war with Iraq and wants to consult the U.N. At a private dinner with Bush on Aug. 5, Powell warns the president that the U.S. should not act unilaterally and must fully consider the economic and political consequences of war -- particularly in the Middle East.  Powell's view is championed by Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser in the Bush I administration, who publishes an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on Aug. 15 in which he argues that Bush is moving too quickly on Iraq, and advocates pressing for the return of U.N. inspectors.  Soon after, Vice President Cheney emerges as the administration voice advocating action against Iraq.  In a Nashville speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Cheney warns that ‘a return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam's] compliance with U.N. resolutions.’  Cheney also outlines a larger, long-term strategy whereby regime change in Iraq could transform the Middle East: ‘Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab 'street,' the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are 'sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.' Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.’  As Bush leaves for an August vacation in Crawford, Texas, he agrees to take his case to the U.N. and asks his advisers to start preparing the speech. (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html).  Bush’s speech to the UN on September 12, 2002 seems to favor the Powell approach to resolving the Iraq problem, but only five days later President Bush’s National Security Strategy is released, which reifies the PNAC vision of preemptive and unilateral war.

 ·         August 2002 – US and British planes drop 14.1 tons of ordinance on targets in Iraq no-fly zones.

 ·         August 5, 2002 – US military planners decide that the operation to depose Saddam Hussein will begin with an air offensive in the no-fly zones, and with special forces operations aimed at weakening air defenses.  The US and British also build up forces in Kuwait in preparation for an invasion.  In September 2002, planes drop 54.6 tons of ordinance, in October, they drop 17.7 tons of ordinance, in November, they drop 33.6 tons of ordinance, and in December, they drop 53.2 tons of ordinance.

 ·         August 2002 – Donald Rumsfeld’s Defense Science Board recommends the creation of a super-intelligence support group it calls “Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group” or P2OG, to bring together CIA and military covert action, information warfare intelligence and cover-up and deception.  The body would launch secret operations aimed at stimulating reactions among terrorists (that is to provoke terrorism) and states possessing WMDs so that the US could respond quickly to threats and attacks.

 ·         Senator Bob Graham says that: “In the fall of 2002, the President allowed intelligence agencies under his control to present erroneous, misleading, and incomplete information to the Congress, our allies, and the American people in support of the war in Iraq” ... “The President further adulterated that intelligence by selective use and presentation of the evidence to justify a preemptive war to the American people and the Congress, and to the world community at the United Nations” (p. 231).  He achieved this through secret agencies such as the Office of Special Plans.  According to Senator Bob Graham, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans in 2002.  According to Graham:

 “the Office of Special Plans circumvented the standard processes for reviewing intelligence and operated free of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has supplied operational intelligence information to Secretaries of Defense for over forty years.  If you set up competing intelligence collection agencies, the users will simply take information from the agency whose conclusions are closest to what the user wants to hear, especially if one of those agencies is created simply to validate pre-formed opinions.  Therefore, it was no surprise that the Office of Special Plans came up with some of the most terrifying – and inaccurate – claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and some of the most wildly optimistic pictures of the reception Americans would be given should we invade” (p. 158).

 ·         Dick Cheney, for example, alleged: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.  There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us ... Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon” (Graham, p. 178).  This logic made the case for war with Iraq a “slam dunk” according to CIA Director George Tenet.  Amazingly, a study by the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform found that in October 2002, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had made nearly 100 misleading or inflated statements about the threat posed by Iraq.  Yeah, like the mushroom cloud!!!  Bush said: “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us.  Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

 ·         Graham alleges that when President Bush approached Congress on September 12th, 2001 for authorization to use force (against Afghanistan presumably), he actually left the language so broad that it would have justified any attack against any nation preemptively – it was a blank check.  See p. 105 for the wording ... it ends with “and to deter and preempt any related future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.”  Thus, Senators concerned with the language drafted an alternative and “granted the President the authority to use force against those nations, organizations, and persons that were learned to be connected to the tragedy of September 11" (p. 105).  So, since Iraq was NOT connected to 9/11, the war on Iraq was NOT justified by the use of force resolution passed by Congress.

 ·         The “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” (passed October 16, 2002) was based on the foll