9/11: Other Warnings to the U.S. Government Prior to the Attacks of September 11th, 2001

By: Dr. Matthew Robinson
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice

Appalachian State University

Then National Security Advisor (and now Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice has repeatedly said that although the White House received numerous threats about terrorism against the United States, almost all of the threats mentioned possible attacks against American interests overseas. She even testified to this effect to the 9/11 Commission.

Yet, dozens of threats against targets within the US, including some that specifically mention targets in New York City and Washington DC (even including the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) were also received over the years by our government. Among them were these:

•    November 1990: Captured Egyptian assassin El Sayyid Nosair is found with files that provide details of a terrorist cell, mention of al-Qaeda, and discussion of the destruction of tall US buildings.

•    As noted by White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke, the World Trade Center was attacked in 1993 by people affiliated with al Qaeda and numerous warnings came into US intelligence showing al Qaeda had designs to finish the job. Further, other attacks in the US and abroad showed an al Qaeda presence in the US and a willingness and ability to hit us at home. For example, in 1992, a Pakistani named Mir Amil Kansi shot and killed three people in Virginia while waiting to enter CIA headquarters (al Qaeda was formed by UBL with assistance from the Pakistani intelligence services – the ISI). Also, al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole, two US embassies in Africa, assassinated the Jewish Defense League leader Rabbi Meir Kahane (by al Qaeda agent El Sayyid Nossair in 1992), and supported Somalian leader Hussein Mohamed Aideed (where the “Black Hawk Down” incident occurred in 1993). In other words, we should have known they were coming for us. After all, CIA Director George Tenet’s Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs) for President Bush mentioned al Qaeda 40 times prior to 9/11.

•    In 1995, Clarke asked the FAA to ground all US flights over the Pacific because of a terrorist threat against airliners. This “Bojinka Plot” was discovered by Philippine police responding to a fire in an apartment building in Manilla.

•    In 1996, while preparing for the Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, Clarke asked the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta FBI Field Office and the head of FAA security, “What if somebody blows up a 747 over the Olympic stadium, or even flies one into the stadium?” Admiral Cathal Flynn, head of FAA security, replied, “... we could ban aircraft from over the stadium during the events ...”. The FBI agent also added: “Don’t let them hijack an aircraft in the first place.” (pp. 106-107). The preparations made to prevent this kind of attack became the “Atlanta Rules.” These rules were used in several CSG designated “National Security Special Events.” Clarke says: “The Secret Service and Customs had teamed up in Atlanta to provide some rudimentary air defense against an aircraft flying into the Olympic Stadium. They did so again during the subsequent National Security Special Events and they agreed to create a permanent air defense unit to protect Washington.” The Treasury Department did not want to pay for the permanent air defense unit so it was not established (p. 131).

•    In 1996, President Clinton established new security mechanisms at the nation’s airports. They included not allowing passengers to board planes without a government issued photo ID that matched the name on the ticket, increases in random passenger and cargo searches, a temporary ban on parked cars near terminals, and temporary discontinuation of curbside check-in. Also Vice President Al Gore would head a Commission on Aviation Safety and Security that would recommend permanent changes to airport security. According to Richard Clarke this Commission “requested and got funding for programs involving baggage screening, carry on luggage checks, passenger profiling, screener training, research on aircraft hardening, and to hire more FAA security agents.” It did not “agree to recommend that the federal government assume the role of airport passenger and luggage screening ... It was clear even at the time that the Gore Commission had not been sufficiently ambitious about the job of airport security and passenger screening” (p. 130).

•    Richard Clarke ultimately set up a program on Transportation Security (to implement the recommendations of the Gore Commission on Aviation Safety and Security) and a program to look for terrorist cells in the US, along with eight others.

•    September 1998 – US intelligence learns of a possible plot by UBL to crash an aircraft loaded with explosives into a US airport.

•    December 21, 1998 – Intelligence sources “have evidence that UBL may be planning his boldest move yet – a strike on Washington or possibly New York City in an eye-for-an-eye retaliation.” One State Department aide says: “We’ve hit his headquarters, now he hits ours.”

•    Spring 1999 – US intelligence learns of a planned UBL attack on a US government facility in Washington DC.

•    June 1999 – Chief of CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center reports in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (and to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in July 1999) that UBL is planning attacks in the US.

•    July 14, 1999 – Randy Glass, a US informant, records a conversation at a restaurant overlooking World Trade Center with arms dealers Siaa Mohshen, Mohammed Malik, former Egyptian judge Shireen Shawky, and Pakistani ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas. Abbas wants to buy weapons in US to ship to UBL. Abbas points to World Trade Center and says “Those towers are coming down” and makes two other references to attacking the World Trade Center. He also says Americans should be killed because they are the enemy. The conversation is recorded and parts are shown on TV in 2003.

•    March 2000 – US intelligence learns UBL targets may include Statue of Liberty, skyscrapers, ports, airports, and nuclear power plants.

•    May 2001 – Defense Department learns seven people associated with UBL have departed from locations in US, Britain, and Canada in preparation for martyrdom.

•    May 2001 – An Iranian in New York City tells police of a plot to attack World Trade Center.

•    June 2001 – US intelligence learns that KSM wants to send terrorists to US and will assist them in carrying out attacks here once they arrive.

•    June 2001 – German intelligence warns CIA, Britain’s MI6, and Israel’s Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists are planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.”

•    June 2001 – US intelligence issues a terrorist threat advisory warning US government agencies that there is a high probability of an imminent terrorist attack against US interests. Possible targets include Italy, Israel, and the Arabian Peninsula.

•    June 2001 – Richard Clarke gave National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice a checklist of what to do in case the United States was attacked by terrorists.

•    June 28, 2001 – CIA Director George Tenet issues a warning indicating a high likelihood of attack against US and/or Israeli interests in coming weeks. In part, the warning reads: “The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.” The warning is given to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. This warning probably came about because of a significant increase in information received by the intelligence community indicating that bin Laden and al-Qaeda intended to strike against US interests in the very near future. According to former Senator Bob Graham, this occurred during the summer and spring of 2001. Graham says that during the summer and spring of 2001, a modest but steady stream of intelligence indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the US. It was the general view of the intelligence community that the threatened attacks would most likely occur against US interests abroad, even though they knew UBL wanted to strike within the US.

•    July 1, 2001 – Senators Dianne Feinstein and Richard Shelby appear on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer and say an attack is highly probable within three months

•    July 16, 2001 – British spies send information to Tony Blair that al Qaeda is in final stages of preparations for attack in the West. Part of information came from the CIA and NSA.

•    July 2001 – India warns US intelligence of a possible terrorist attack against the White House

•    July 2001 – Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil warns the US consul general and United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) of an imminent attack inside America that will kill thousands.

•    August 6, 2001 – President Bush receives memo titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The memo reads in part: “bin Laden wanted to hijack US aircraft to gain the release” of Oman Abdul Rahman and others” and tells of “suspicious activity in the US consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”

•    August 15, 2001 – Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested in Minneapolis, MN with letters that connect him to Malaysia (where a meeting of al Qaeda operatives occurred under the watch of the CIA in 2000) and some of the hijackers. He also has an unexplained $32,000 bank balance, two knives, fighting gloves, shin guards, and has prepared for violence through physical training. He paid $8,300 for flight training, mostly in cash, to use a 747 aircraft simulator. He asked “how much fuel is on board a 747 and how much damage could it cause if it hit anything”? He has no aviation background, little previous training, and no pilot’s license, he wants to fly only as an ego-boosting thing, he is extremely interested in the operation of the plane’s doors and control panel, and wants to know how to communicate with flight tower. He is evasive and belligerent when asked about his background. He mostly practices flying in the air rather than taking off or landing. The flight school sends information to the FBI and receives little interest, so it contacts them again as says: “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon.”

•    August 15, 2001 – CIA Counter Terrorism Center leader Coffer Black says, in speech to the Defense Department annual Convention of Counterterrorism: “We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the US.”

•    August 21, 2001 – Jordanian inmate Walik Arkeh warns the FBI of an impending terrorist attack. He had befriended three men in a British jail in 2000-2001, each of whom had connections to UBL and al Qaeda and were indicted co-conspirators for the August 1998 US embassy bombings. His warning included “something big is going to happen in New York City” and that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center is “unfinished business.” He also mentioned targets in Washington, DC but he did not know the date or method of the attacks. Arkeh is later deported to Jordan.

•    August 23, 2001 – Israeli Mossad gives the CIA list of 19 terrorists living in the US and claims they appear to be planning to carry out attack in near future. Four of the names on the list are known and they are four hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. CIA does not share information with FBI but on this same day the names of Alhazmi and Almihdhar are added to TIPOFF terrorism watch list. Another vague warning allegedly comes from Mossad on September 4, 2001.

•    August 30, 2001 - September 4, 2001 – Egyptian intelligence warns the US that al Qaeda is in advanced stages of a significant operation against American targets.

•    August 2001 – CIA issues a report warning White House, Pentagon, and State Department that UBL intends to launch terrorist attack soon, possibly inside the US.

•    August 2001 – US informant Randy Glass contacts the staff of Senator Bob Graham and Representative Robert Wexler of plan to attack the World Trade Center. Graham confirms this information was shared with his office prior to 9/11.

•    August 2001 – Moroccan Hassan Dabou, who has penetrated al Qaeda, reports to the US that UBL is disappointed about failed attack on World Trade Center in 1993 and is planning another attack in New York in the summer or fall of 2001.

•    Summer 2001 – NSA intercepts a call from KSM and Mohammed Atta, al Qaeda’s head of operations in the US. The call is still classified.

•    September 2001 – An Iranian inmate in a German jail calls the US to warn of an imminent attack against the World Trade Center in September 2001. He also calls the White House 14 times and tries to fax a warning letter to the White House but is denied permission. Other warnings come from Moroccan man held in a Brazilian jail.

•    September 10, 2001 – KSM gives final approval to Mohammed Atta to launch the attacks on telephone call being monitored by US intelligence. It is unknown when the call was translated and what was said since it is classified.

I believe these warnings suggest that Condoleezza Rice, now Secretary of State, has some explaining to do! They also provide a more developed picture of the degree of failures that led to the attacks of 9/11.

The bottom line is that even US intelligence agencies knew this was coming. For example, on 9/11, at around 8:50 am during the attacks, CIA Director George Tenet was eating breakfast with former Senator David Boren (D), his mentor. When told of the first WTC crash, Tenet said: “You know, this has bin Laden’s fingerprints all over it … I wonder if it has something to do with the guy who trained for a pilot’s license.”