9/11: Wow,  Incompetence


By: Dr. Matthew Robinson

Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
Appalachian State University

robinsnmb@appstate.edu


Here are some of the unbelievable, yet widely reported, examples of incompetence in the Bush Administration and US intelligence agencies that allowed the attacks of 9/11 to occur.  Others are examples of incompetence in the September 11th investigations and America’s global war on terror.

 

These examples do not suggest President Bush, anyone in his Administration, or anyone in US intelligence agencies is solely to blame for 9/11.  After all, they did not carry out the attacks.  The point is that the hijackers made enough mistakes to have been caught.  Yet, because of the failures outlined in this document, the hijackers were not caught.

 

The document is organized around the following issues:

·         Suggestions that President Bush and members of his Administration were not concerned about al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden (UBL), and Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11 (in spite of all the warnings received);

·         Failures of US Intelligence Agencies; and

·         Failures of other US Agencies.

 

Overall, these failures show clearly what led to 9/11.  That is, these failures help explain why 9/11 was not prevented.

 

1) Suggestions that President Bush and members of his Administration were not concerned about al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden (UBL), and Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11 (in spite of all the warnings received):

·         Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke had a plan to deal with al-Qaeda, UBL, and Islamic terrorism that was broad in scope and ambitious in action.  Yet, his plan was delayed in December 2000 by the election of a new President who did not understand nor feel an urgent threat by terrorism.  For example, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton said terrorism was relegated to the back burner until 9/11.  Clarke’s plan was to increase aid to the Northern Alliance, attack financial support of terrorists, give support to nations fighting al-Qaeda, and use military action in Afghanistan. 

·         The US offered little assistance to Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.  Ahmed Shah Massoud, the head of the Northern Alliance, tells US officials in April 2001 that his was against the Taliban is faltering and unless the US helps, the Taliban will take over Afghanistan.  Massoud also says: “If President Bush doesn’t help us, these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon.”  Further, in May 2001, the US gives the Taliban $43 million in aid, as well as $113 million in 2000.  This was during the time al-Qaeda was operating Ariana Airlines and training pilots on Afghanistan’s national airline!  One former National Security Council official claims the US was aware of this at the time.

·         When President Bush took office, Richard Clarke briefed the new team, saying: “al Qaeda is at war with us, it is a highly capable organization, probably with sleeper cells in the US, and it is clearly planning a major series of attacks against us; we must act decisively and quickly, deciding on the issues prepared after the attack on the Cole, going on the offensive” (Clarke, 2004, p. 227).  According to Clarke, Vice President Dick Cheney attended Principals meetings, something no Vice President had ever done.  Clarke assures us that Cheney was told repeatedly about the threat of al Qaeda.  Clarke says: “I hoped he would speak up about the urgency of the problem, put it on a short list for immediate action.  He didn’t” (Clarke, 2004, p. 228).  Clarke also says Colin Powell was surprised at the unanimity of the perceived threat by al Qaeda among the members of the Principals Committee.

·         Clarke developed a plan to attack al-Qaeda in January 2001 but never was allowed to brief the President on it and there was no meeting until September 4, 2001 where Clarke talked to Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

·         Clarke’s request in January 2001 for an urgent meeting with President Bush was denied.  Clarke had outlined that al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the US were a “major threat in being.” After President Bush took office, Clarke was demoted from the Principals’ Committee in January 2001 and was no longer able to directly send memos to the President. This is why the meeting never took place.  This was during a time when there were dozens and dozens of warnings pouring into the White House about al-Qaeda and terrorist attacks against American interests … according to the 9/11 Commission, the system was blinking red and it could not have gotten any worse (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 257). 

·         Clarke says that within a week of Bush’s Inauguration, he wrote to Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley asking urgently for a Principals meeting to review the threat of al Qaeda.  Rice said the Principals would not meet to discuss it until the issue had been framed by the Deputies Committee.  This led to months of delay, and the Deputies Committee met in April for the first time.  When Clarke gave his plan to take on the Taliban, al Qaeda, and UBL, Paul Wolfowitz (Donald Rumsfeld’s deputy at the Defense Department) said: “Well, I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden.”  After being told by Clarke that al Qaeda posed a direct threat to the US, Wolfowitz responded: “Well, there are others that do as well, at least as much.  Iraqi terrorism for example.”  Clarke replied: “I am unaware of any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed at the United States ... since 1993, and I think FBI and CIA concur in that judgment ...” CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin said: “Yes, that is right Dick.  We have no evidence of any active Iraqi terrorist threat against the US.”  Wolfowitz then said: “You give bin Laden too much credit.  He could not do all these things like the 1993 attack on New York, not without a state sponsor.  Just because FBI and CIA have failed to find linkages does not mean they don’t exist” (Clarke, 2004, pp. 231-232).  A compromise was eventually reached to study more on al Qaeda before any action was taken.  The delay continued into the spring of 2001 ... other issues took precedence over terrorism, including the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto environment agreement, and Iraq, and so Clarke asked to resign.  He said: “Perhaps I have become too close to the terrorism issue.  I have worked it for ten years and to me it seems like a very important issue, but maybe I’m becoming like Captain Ahab with bin Laden as the White Whale.  Maybe you need someone less obsessive about it” (Clarke, 2004, p. 234). 

·         In June 2001, frustrated by his inability to get a meeting with high level Bush Administration officials with regard to the al Qaeda threat, Richard Clarke asked for a transfer to start a program on cyber security.  He said later: “My view was that this administration, while it listened to me, didn’t believe me that I thought there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem. And I thought, if the Administration doesn’t believe its National Coordinator for Counterterrorism when he says there’s an urgent problem, and if it’s unprepared to act as though there’s an urgent problem, then probably I should get another job.”

·         Clarke was to begin his new job on October 1st, and Clarke maintains he was intent on pushing hard on al Qaeda to get a Bush Administration policy in place before he left.  He and his deputy Roger Cressey rewrote the Pol-Mil Plan as a draft National Security Presidential Decision document for the President’s signature with the goal of eliminating al Qaeda.  He and CIA Director George Tenet wanted to push Bush to focus on al Qaeda. 

·         Bush said to Rice that he wanted to stop swatting at flies with al Qaeda and eliminate them once and for all.  Rice thus asked Clarke how the document was preceding in the Deputies Committee and Clarke said he could have it ready in two days.  Rice said she would set up a meeting, and time just passed without it.  Meanwhile, George Tenet said that the CIA was getting more and more threats and more and more evidence that an attack was rapidly approaching. 

·         In late June 2001, Tenet said to Clarke: “It’s my sixth sense, but I feel it coming, This is going to be the big one” (Clarke, 2004, p. 235).  More and more intelligence suggested that the attack was going to be in Israel or Saudi Arabia, but Clarke suspected otherwise based on the Millennium threats.  So Clarke emailed Condoleezza Rice that al Qaeda was trying to kill Americans and wanted to have hundreds of dead in the streets of America. 

·         He also convened a meeting of the CSG in July to ask each agency to put itself on full alert.  The FBI was asked to send a warning to all 18,000 police agencies, the State Department was asked to send a warning to all the US embassies in the world, the Defense Department was alerted to go to Threat Condition Delta, and the Navy was asked to move its ships out of Bahrain.  The FAA was instructed to send a special security warning to the airlines and airports and to set up special security at the ports of entry.  Clarke was animated: “You’ve just heard that CIA thinks al Qaeda is planning a major attack on us.  So do I.  You heard CIA say it would probably be in Israel or Saudi Arabia.  Maybe.  But maybe it will be here.  Just because there is no evidence that says it will be here does not mean it will be overseas.  They may try to hit us at home.  You have to assume that is what they are going to try to do.  Cancel summer vacations, schedule overtime, have your terrorist reaction teams on alert to move real fast.  Tell me, tell each other, about anything unusual” (Clarke, 2004, p. 236).

·         Of course, there was evidence they were planning to attack us in the United States.  And Clarke acknowledges that the CIA knew there were al Qaeda terrorists in the US, and the FBI knew there were Arabic people, including suspected terrorists, taking lessons at flight schools, including some asking strange questions about crashing planes.  Clarke says “red lights and bells should have been going off.  They had specific information about individual terrorists from which one could have deduced what was about to happen” (Clarke, 2004, p. 237).

·         During this time, some members of the team did not receive important information about relevant threats to the US.  For example, the Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIB) received by non-Principals (which now included Clarke) did not contain all the relevant information.  As noted by Bob Graham, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) on August 6th received by senior members of the intelligence community did not contain information on contemporary intelligence findings found in the August 6th PDB.  Thus, “Congress and other senior intelligence officials were left ignorant of the chilling information about the potential attacks.  These people were therefore unable to correct erroneous information or act on information that would have surely rung alarm bells had they seen it” (Graham, 2004, p. 83).  The FAA thus never saw the words: “FBI information ... indicates a pattern of activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”  Graham asserts that at least three of the hijackers would not have been able to get on their planes if increased surveillance of passengers had occurred. 

·         Instead of putting Clarke’s plan into place, a presidential directive focusing on covert action to deal with terrorism is discussed among Bush Administration officials in March 2001, but there is little urgency about putting the plan into effect.  In May 2001, Bush told National Security advisor Condoleezza Rice that he is tired of swatting at flies and wants a comprehensive plan to fight al Qaeda and terrorists.  This plan, created by Richard Clarke, has been in existence since January but Bush has not yet seen it.  Clarke says he had been urgently asking for a meeting with President Bush since January 25, 2001 but that Bush would not meet with him. 

·         In May 2001, intercepts from Afghanistan suggest al Qaeda might attack American targets in June or July.  The White House Counterterrorism and Security Group does not meet to discuss it.  Nor does the group meet after a threat to kill President Bush is picked up from an al Qaeda cell in Milan. The group rarely meets, whereas under President Clinton the group met three times a week. 

·         In May 2001, Bush opted to put Vice President Dick Cheney in charge of further study of domestic security against terrorism.  Cheney did not immediately focus on it and his office responded to draft counterterrorism legislation in July 2001 from two Senators that it would be another six months until he could get to it.  Cheney’s Office of National Preparedness (part of FEMA) was supposed to develop a coordinated, national effort to respond to a domestic attack.  Instead, it focused on state-funded terrorism using weapons of mass destruction and neither UBL not al-Qaeda is mentioned by Cheney when he speaks to the press about the office in July 2001.  Cheney’s task force is due to report to Congress by October 1, 2001 after a review by the National Security Council.  The task force does not hire staff until September 2001. Counterterrorism legislation had already been created by a bi-partisan committee co-chaired by Senator Gary Hart. Draft legislation forwarded by two senators is greeted with the claim that Cheney would not get to it for six months. 

·         In June, 2001, President Bush outlined his five top defense issues with NATO heads of state in Brussels, Belgium.  Missile defense is the top issue and terrorism is not mentioned at all.  Bush only mentions terrorism once in a speech prior to 9/11 (May 2001) except for when he was promoting missile defense. 

·         Clarke’s plan is further developed between late June to mid-July, 2001, and is finally approved by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on August 13.  Next it will go to Cabinet level officials and then President Bush.  The Cabinet level meeting is planned for August but too many officials are on vacation (including President Bush), so the meeting is moved to September 4, 2001.

·         In early July, 2001, Bush’s national security team meets and discusses terrorism for only one of two times ... the other meeting will occur on September 4, 2001.  The topic is mentioned only briefly. 

·         From August 4 - 30, 2001, President Bush is on vacation in Crawford, Texas.  At the end of the trip, Bush has spent 42% of his presidency on vacation or on route to vacation spots. During this time, Bush receives the August 6th warning titled “Bin Laden Determined To Strike in US.”  The memo reads in part, “FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York” (see 9/11 Commission report, pp. 260-262).  Also during this time, Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and foreign policy advisor to Bush says his concerns are Saddam Hussein, North Korea, and Iran (which would become the “axis of evil” in January 2002) rather than UBL or al Qaeda. 

·         According to Bob Graham, President Bush continued to receive PDBs six times a week..  President Bush did not take executive action to alert the FAA, the Department of Defense, or other agencies that might have used this information to harden commercial aviation against attack.  Bob Graham says if President Bush “had taken the not unreasonable step of notifying the Federal Aviation Administration of the possibility that aircraft might be hijacked, that agency could have been on higher alert for suspicious passengers.  If someone had take a further step and considered the fact that hijackings as al-Qaeda saw them not the same as ‘traditional’ hijackings, the FAA could have modified its protocols requiring pilots not to resist” (Graham, 2004, p. 83).

·         On August 30, 2001, the Bush Administration finally had its first Deputy Secretary level meeting on terrorism. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the US should not focus on al Qaeda but instead is concerned about Iraqi terrorism.  Also on August 30, 2001, the State Department’s annual report on terrorism de-emphasized al Qaeda and UBL.  This was part of a plan to take some attention away from UBL.

·         According to Richard Clarke, the first Principal’s Committee meeting did not occur until September 4, 2001, one week to the day prior to the attacks of 9/11, a meeting that had been requested by Clarke on January 25, 2001!  Clarke gave the Principals a choice and said they could treat al Qaeda as a nuisance or as a real terrorist threat.  He said to Rice that she should imagine herself in her own shoes when in the very near future al Qaeda had killed hundreds of Americans.  “What will you wish then that you had already done”? (Clarke, 2004, p. 237).  According to Clarke, the Principals Committee meeting was largely a non-event.  No one disagreed with Clarke and Tenet about the threat posed by al Qaeda.  Yet, Donald Rumsfeld noted there were other terrorist concerns such as Iraq.

·         On September 4, 2001, Clarke sent a warning letter that said the “real issue is are we serious about dealing with the al Qaeda threat?  Is al Qaeda a big deal? … decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qaeda attacks and hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US” (see 9/11 Commission report, pp. 212-213). 

·         Because of the lack of focus on terrorism, the next three successors as White House CSG Counterterrorism Czar to Richard Clarke also quit in frustration.  First, Wayne Downing (a retired four star Army general and leader of Special Operations Command), quit within months out of frustration due to the Bush Administration’s “continued bureaucratic response to the threat” posed by terrorists (Clarke, 2004, p. 240); second, John Gordon (a commander of nuclear armed missiles in Wyoming, CIA deputy, and the first Commander of the National Nuclear Security Administration) and Randy Beers (Deputy Assistant Secretary, National Security Council Director, Assistant Secretary of State, and Special Assistant to the President, who also worked for Presidents Reagan, Bush the first, and Clinton) both also quit.  Clarke says Beers told him, “I think I have to quit ... They still don’t get it.  Instead of going all out against al Qaeda and eliminating our vulnerabilities at home, they wanna’ fucking invade Iraq again.  We have a token military force in Afghanistan, the Taliban are regrouping, we haven’t caught bin Laden, or his deputy, or the head of the Taliban.  And they aren’t going to send more troops to Afghanistan to catch them or to help the government in Kabul to secure the country.  No, they’re holding back, waiting to invade Iraq.  Do you know how much it will strengthen al Qaeda and groups like that if we occupy Iraq?  There’s no threat to us now from Iraq, but 70% of the American people think Iraq attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.  You wanna’ know why?  Because that’s what the Administration wants them to think!” (Clarke, 2004, pp. 241-242). [Randy Beers, after he quit, went to work for the campaign of John Kerry, as Kerry’s top planner and consultant on national security issues.] 

·         The lack of focus and concern extended beyond President Bush to other members of his Administration.  For example, Richard Clarke says President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, had almost no discussions about al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists prior to 9/11.  Compare this with President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, who held dozens of meetings on al Qaeda.  According to Clarke: “He knew their names, their modus operandi, and he feared they would strike again before we could cripple their organization.  He convened the Principals in crisis mode [saying] ‘We have stopped two sets of attacks planned for the Millennium.  You can bet your measly federal paycheck that there are more out there and we have to stop them too.  I spoke with the President and he wants you all to know, this is it, nothing more important, all assets.  We stop this fucker’” (Clarke, 2004, pp. 211-212).  Finally, in June and July, 2001, Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin felt great tension regarding President Bush consistently not feeling an urgent threat about terrorism ... McLaughlin is frustrated by Bush officials questioning the intelligence about al Qaeda. 

·         Condoleezza Rice, according to Clarke, clearly had never heard of al Qaeda before.  In fact, Rice wanted to change the mission of the Counterterrorism Security Group and decided that the position of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism would be downgraded.  Clarke says: “No longer would the Coordinator be a member of the Principals Committee.  No longer would the CSG report to the Principals, but instead to a committee of Deputy Secretaries.  No longer would the National Coordinator be supported by two NSC Senior Directors or have the budget review mechanisms with the Associate Director of OMB.  She did, however, ask me to stay on and to keep my entire staff in place” (Clarke, 2004, p. 230). 

·         On September 6, 2001, Senator Gary Hart met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to see if the Bush Administration is implementing the recommendations from his bi-partisan terrorism commission.  He says she did not feel urgent about it and said she would talk to Vice President Cheney about it.

·         September 11, 2001 – National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to give a speech regarding threats to America. The speech promotes missile defense and terrorism committed by rogue nations like Iraq.  There is no mention of al Qaeda, UBL, or Islamic extremist groups.  This suggests, on the day of the attacks, the top foreign policy official in the Bush Administration is not concerned enough about UBL or al Qaeda to mention them in a speech about threats to the US.

·         Additionally, Attorney General John Ashcroft did not feel an urgent threat about terrorism and allegedly said he did not want to hear about it anymore.  Ashcroft’s budget requests did not match his verbal claims about counterterrorism.  In his list of 7 priorities stated in May 2001, counterterrorism is not listed.  Ashcroft even opposed a proposed budget increase for counterterrorism on September 10, 2001!  In May, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft documents the Justice Department’s new agenda.  There are seven goals, and counterterrorism is not included.  Yet, on May 9, 2001, he testified to Congress that there is no higher priority for the Department. 

·         In mid-July, 2001, the CIA and acting FBI Director Tom Pickard brief Attorney General John Ashcroft about an imminent terrorist attack by al Qaeda.  Pickard later swears under oath that Ashcroft says he does not want to hear about this anymore. Ashcroft denies this, under oath, but Ruben Garcia, head of the Criminal Division, corroborates Pickard..  Pickard later asks for more counterterrorism funding but Ashcroft says no on September 10, 2001. 

·         On September 10, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft rejected $58 million in increased funding for counterterrorism. His budget request to the White House covers 68 programs, none of them related to counterterrorism.  His memorandum sent to heads of departments that outlines seven goals also does not mention counterterrorism. In a July speech he said “Our #1 priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks.” 

·         Richard Clarke also says that not only was President Bush not really concerned with terrorism, he also did little to nothing about terrorism prior to 9/11.  Instead, he was obsessed with missile defense after being sworn in.  Further, in February, 2001, Paul Bremer, who chaired the National Commission on Terrorism formed during the Clinton Administration (and who is later appointed as US Administrator of Iraq in 2003), said that the Bush Administration is “paying no attention” to terrorism: “What they will do is stagger along until there’s a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn’t we be organized to deal with this?’”  Additionally, former Bush Administration Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill’s book, The Price of Loyalty also asserts that President Bush was focused on Iraq and regime change in Iraq early in his first term and that he was not at all concerned with al Qaeda or UBL (O’Neill, 2004).  O’Neill described Bush as a "a blind man in a room full of deaf people." On the eve of the book's release, O'Neill said he did not believe the White House would punish him "for telling the truth" and he was "too old and too rich" to be threatened.  An investigation of O'Neill was immediately announced by the Treasury Department.  O'Neill then told NBC's Today program he regretted the blind-deaf comment.  O’Neill reported that President Bush was, after becoming President, immediately focused on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and that all the advice he received about the matter came from like-minded individuals.  His claims were based not just on his personal experiences in the White House but also on 19,000 government documents. 

·         Two example of President inaction: 1) President Bush did not follow the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission (US Commission on National Security / 21st Century).  As noted by Bob Graham, in January 2001, the Hart Rudman Commission (US Commission on National Security/21st Century), which was formed in 1998, predicted a large scale attack against the United States where large numbers of Americans would die in the next 25 years.  It also proposed a Department of Homeland Security.  These recommendations conformed to a report by the National Commission on Terrorism chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer.  2) President Bush also did not follow recommendations of the Gore Commission (White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security) regarding air security (February 1997 final report), which referenced Operation Bojinka, the failed al Qaeda plot to blow up airliners.  The report says it “believes that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at the United States, and that there should be an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats that they pose.” 

·         Keep in mind that the US military had already been attacked by al-Qaeda, giving us legal authority to launch a war on al-Qaeda.  There was no response to the USS Cole bombing that killed 17 military personnel (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 193).  Bush had said on the campaign trail that “I hope we can gather enough intelligence to figure out who did the act and take the necessary action … There must be a consequence.”  Yet, by the time President Bush took office, both Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz felt too much time had passed to respond.  That al-Qaeda carried out the USS Cole bombing was confirmed in January 2001.  al-Qaeda had also tried to sink USS The Sullivans in 2000.  Note: After the attack on the USS Cole, Richard Clarke advised President Clinton to pressure the Taliban to close terrorist facilities, expel UBL, and attack the Taliban if necessary.  Clinton did not order the directive because there was not enough evidence to launch a war (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 195).  The Blue Sky memo was promoted instead (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 197). 

·         In fact, CIA Director Tenet declared war on al-Qaeda in December 1998 and yet there was no shift in resources for it until after 9/11.  Counterterrorism resources were simply inadequate prior to 9/11.  A Department of Defense position of Deputy Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (the position most dealing with counterterrorism in the Defense Department) even went unfilled!

2)      Failures of US Intelligence Agencies:

 

·         Senator Bob Graham, who co-chaired the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11, says that the main failures that led to 9/11 were these:

a)      Intelligence agencies often failed to focus on relevant information regarding the 9/11 attacks or consider its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack.

b)      Intelligence agencies were not well organized or equipped to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the US.

c)      Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage provided by US foreign and US domestic intelligence capabilities.

d)     US foreign intelligence agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for domestic attacks ... the CIA’s failure to watch list suspected terrorists was due to a lack of emphasis on protecting the US homeland.

e)      The counter terrorism effort at home was hindered by ineffective domestic intelligence ... the FBI was unable to identify and monitor the extent of activity by al Qaeda and other groups operating in the US.

f)       Neither the US government nor its intelligence agencies had a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy for combating the threat posed by UBL.  The Director of Central Intelligence was unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of intelligence agency resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the US.  Note: Richard Clarke characterized George Tenet as unable to do this but very willing and capable.

g)      Counter terrorism funding increased through the 1980s and 1990s but was uncertain since there were also growing priorities for intelligence agencies.

h)      Technology was not fully utilized in support of counter terrorism efforts.

i)        The intelligence community’s understanding of al Qaeda was inadequate because of insufficient analytic focus and quality ... analysts were inexperienced, unqualified, and undertrained, and were often not given critical information.

j)        Translations were backlogged due to inadequate numbers of translators.

k)      The US government did not bring together in one place all terrorism-related information from all sources ... intelligence agencies did not adequately share relevant counter terrorism information.

l)        The intelligence community did not effectively use human sources to penetrate al Qaeda.

m)    The FBI failed in its understanding of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) process, especially during the summer of 2001 when it had access to an al Qaeda operative in the US (Zacarias Moussaoui).

n)      The US military was reluctant to use military assets in Afghanistan to conduct offensive counter terrorism efforts or to support or participate in CIA operations directed against al Qaeda.

o)      The intelligence community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for counter terrorism information. [And some of these told us that al Qaeda terrorists were coming to the US to attack the US using planes as weapons]

·         Graham’s joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 blamed six people in US intelligence agencies for having “failed in significant ways to ensure that this country was as prepared as it could have been …”.  They include:

 

a)      CIA Director George Tenet

b)      Former CIA Director John Deutch

c)      Former FBI Director Louis Freeh

d)     NSA Director Michael Hayden

e)      Former NSA Director Kenneth Minihan

f)       Former Deputy Director of NSA Barbara McNamara

 The following sections outline the specific failures of the CIA, FBI, and other US agencies.  The CIA and FBI, in particular, shared in two key failures that allowed 9/11 to occur.  These are identified as their “most important failures.”

 Failures of the CIA:

·         The CIA learned of al-Qaeda in 1996 from Jamal al-Fadl, who was an al-Qaeda operative from the late 1980s until 1995.  Based on his information, the CIA confirms UBL is a terrorist not just a financier.  It does not take al-Qaeda seriously until after they attack the US embassies in Africa in 1998 and the State Department does not recognize al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization until 1998.

·         The CIA Unit on UBL is very small … formed in 1999, the unit has 10-15 people assigned to it and it grows to 35-40 by 9/11.
 
·         The CIA did not acquire UBL or other al-Qaeda leaders such as Khlaid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) when it was given chances to do so.  For example, in 1996, Sudan offers UBL to the US, as well as the files they have on al-Qaeda, and the US declines.  Reports suggest some federal agency interfered with a possible US effort to begin monitoring UBL.  Also in 1996, when Sudan expels UBL, his flight to Afghanistan, known about by the US, is not captured.  Elfaith Erwa, Sudan’s minister of state for defense, says the US simply did not want UBL in Somalia but otherwise did not care where he went.  Sudan also offers the files in 2000 but is turned down by the US.  In November 2000, the Taliban supposedly offers to hand over UBL to a third country or the International Court of Justice in exchange for lifting of US sanctions.  In March 2001, the Russian Permanent Mission at the UN submits a detailed report to the UN Security Council about UBL and his whereabouts, as well as his connections to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistani connections.  The US fails to act [Note: Richard Clarke says he is unaware of any such chances to acquire UBL and he cannot imagine that the US would have turned down such chances.  However, Clarke does acknowledge that the US turned down a few chances to kill UBL, and he justifies those on questionable intelligence]. 

·         In November 1998, UBL and Mohammed Atef are indicted in the US for the US embassy bombings in Africa.  Yet, UBL is never caught, in spite of knowing his whereabouts on more than one occasion and in spite of being on the FBI’s most wanted list since 1999.  Atef’s location is discovered in late 1998 (Khartoum, Sudan).  The CIA and the Defense Department oppose White House efforts to get him.  By the time they get ready to get him, he has already fled.  He is later killed in November 2001 by an armed Predator drone.  In August 2001, US intelligence receives information that UBL’s main assistant, Ayman al-Zawihiri, is receiving medical treatment in Yemen.  White House officials reject a plan to try to capture him because they are not 100% sure it is he.  Previously in 1996 and 1997, the US knew KSM was living openly in Qatar yet did not go get him.  When the CIA learns he was being sheltered by Qatar’s Interior Minister (Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani) it takes no action against him.  Even after 9/11, when Qatar sheltered him for two weeks, the US did not freeze al-Thani’s assets or take action against Qatar.

·         The CIA did not authorize or support use of armed Predator drone even though it was ready in February 2001 and had demonstrated effectiveness in taking out replica of UBL house in June 2001.  Under President Clinton, the unarmed Predator flies successfully in Afghanistan 16 times and shoots a two-minute clip of UBL crossing a street and heading into a mosque, as well as on two other occasions.  In July 2001, National Security Advisor Steven Hadley directed the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1, 2001. 

·         The CIA was reluctant to help the Northern Alliance for it thought it was no match for the Taliban, so perhaps it was unaware???  CIA Director Tenet was obsessed with al Qaeda, according to Clarke, but members of Congress did not take it seriously. 

·         The CIA did not recognize the assassination of Northern Alliance leader in Afghanistan on September 9, 2001 as a warning sign that something was about to happen.  Congressman Dana Rohrabacher ® who has experience with Afghanistan and mujahedeen, makes an appointment with the White House and National Security Council to discuss the implications, and the meeting is scheduled for 2:30 pm on 9/11.  Richard Clarke also notes that the 9/11 attacks were only one day after the assassination of the leader of the Northern Alliance leader Massoud by a group of Arabic men posing as news reporters wanting to interview the leader but who instead blew themselves up in his presence [a similar assassination attempt was reportedly made against President Bush in Sarasota Florida on September 10th!].

CIA’s Most Important Failures:

·         According to former Senator Bob Graham, the CIA did not share information with German intelligence while they were monitoring KSM and several of the 9/11 hijackers in Germany.  The CIA even monitored Atta from January through May 2000 there while he met with terrorists and contacted flight schools, but did not tell the Germans about it.  Further, Atta got a visa into the US on May 18 and some reports say he was monitored even after coming to the US.

·         A report from August 2005 also shows that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) trailed Mohamed Atta and other men in a group they knew to be an al-Qaeda cell operating in the US. 

·         When al-Mihdhar flies from San Diego to Germany in June 2000, the CIA does not tell the Germans about their suspicions of him, and German police do not monitor them. In March 1999, German intelligence passed on name of “Marwan” to CIA along with a phone number in UAE.  They asked the CIA to track him, but the CIA did not follow up.  This was hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi.

·         According to Bob Graham, from at least January 2000 until 9/11, the CIA and FBI did not share information with each other and with state and local law enforcement that if shared would have cracked the 9/11 plot.  Graham describes this as historical in nature (and it goes back to Hoover’s days as Director of the FBI).  This includes not telling the FBI in June 2001 why suspected terrorists were photographed in Malaysia in January 2000, and not telling them anything about al-Midhdar’s visas or al-Hazmi’s travel to the US.

·         The Malaysia meeting in January 2000 was not bugged because the CIA allowed the Malaysians to monitor the meeting.  One attendee of the meeting was KSM, the mastermind of 9/11.  Newsweek writes: “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater.  It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched – and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind … doing the planning.”  Thompson identifies four chances to break open the plot from that meeting (Graham, 2004, p. 164).  Although Cofer Black (head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center), George Tenet (CIA Director), Sandy Berger (National Security Advisor), and Louis Freeh (FBI Director) are updated about this meeting, the US did not track two of the terrorists from that meeting to the US.  After flying to Bangkok, Thailand, the men are lost and then they fly to LA.  The CIA is told that Nawaf al-Hazmi has flown to the US in March 2001, yet it takes NO action.

·         Bob Graham gives this account of the January 5, 2000 meeting.  Hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhdar took part in gathering of al-Qaeda operatives in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  Both had already been identified by US intelligence as terrorist operatives for US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (the National Security Agency [NSA] had located this al-Qaeda safe house and logistics center in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from a captive involved in the bombings). 

·         The US asked Malaysia to put its security service – Special Branch – there to watch the meeting, but it was unable to place a listening device inside the meeting place!  Special Branch did send photos of the meeting to CIA headquarters, and al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar were there. 

·         The NSA knew al-Hazmi was affiliated with al-Qaeda since at least 1999, but it did not tell the CIA (also, in April 1999, the State Department recorded that Nawaf al-Hazmi and his brother Salim, another of the hijackers, had been issued visas at our consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia). 

·         The CIA did get a photo of al-Midhdar’s Saudi passport in January 2000 but they did not watch list al-Midhdar to the State Department so that he could be denied entry into the US.  CIA Director George Tenet said to the Joint Inquiry: “We had at that point the level of detail needed to watch list [al-Midhdar] — that is to nominate him to the State Department for refusal of entry into the US or to deny him another visa.  Our officers ... did not do so” (various agencies have their own watch lists, and they are not integrated even with the State Department’s TIPOFF system).  State and local law enforcement also had no access to the TIPOFF list so even if they were on it, law enforcement would not have known to look for them.

·         Al-Mihdhar is watched when he leaves the safe house in January 2000 and tracked by agents from EIGHT CIA offices and SIX friendly foreign intelligence services.  UAE officials make copies of his passport and pass one onto the CIA.  So, when he reaches Malaysia, the CIA knows his name and that he has a multiple entry visa to the US that is valid from April 1999 to April 2000.  Yet, they do not watch list him and the FBI is not informed that a known terrorist has a valid US visa.  One FBI officials says: “They purposely hid it from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau … The thing was, they didn’t want John O’Neill and the FBI running over their case.  And that’s why September 11 happened … They have blood on their hands.” 

·         When Nawaf al-Hazmi traveled to Malaysia, the CIA and Pakistani intelligence planned to have his passport scrutinized at the airport, but he changes his departure date twice, and officials are not there on the right date!

·         The CIA also did not alert Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) so they could be denied entry at the borders.  The CIA says it notified the FBI so that these men could be put under surveillance if they entered the US, but the FBI says it never got any information from the CIA on these men (Graham suspects the CIA did tell the FBI but the FBI simply lost the information).  Graham asserts that if al-Midhdar and al-Hazmi would have been put on the State Department watch list, both would have been denied entry into the US and could have been interrogated when they tried to enter the country, and if the FBI would have been alerted, it could have located the men in the US.  Both men entered the US on January 8, 2000 through the LA Airport.  And al-Hazmi’s address and phone number were listed in the San Diego phone book!

·         Al-Midhdar could not fly well so he left the country and started recruiting the muscle hijackers.  While out of the US for 13 months, his multiple-entry visa expired and thus he applied for a new one at the consular office in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  Since he had not been watch listed yet, he was stamped a new visa.  Yet, the CIA knew he was a “major league killer who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly the African bombings” (according to an email sent by a CIA officer to Director of Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorism Center in July 2001).

·         According to Richard Clarke, the CIA did not tell the FBI regarding the two hijackers who traveled to the US in January 2001 (Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar), both of whom lived here openly using their own names on rental agreements, driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, credit cards, a car purchase, and a bank account (one of which was listed by his name in the San Diego phone book). 

·         As noted by Clarke, the CIA took months to tell the FBI that known terrorists were in the country, and the FBI failed to find them or alert the FAA or even America’s Most Wanted about them.  Further, the CIA for years failed to acknowledge al Qaeda for what it was, instead choosing to see it as a “Veterans of Foreign Wars for Arabs” (Clarke, 2004, p. 96).

·         The CIA also could not track UBL effectively ... CIA assets in Afghanistan could only tell them where UBL had been days earlier ... even when information came in about his immediate whereabouts, getting the info. up the chain of command to authorize attacks took time ... Clinton was presented with three opportunities to launch attacks on UBL, but “there was reason not to fire the missiles each time.”  Twice, CIA Director George Tenet recommended against the attacks due to unreliable information, and once Tenet and Clarke recommended against it based on satellite photos of the alleged camp (Clarke, 2004, p. 200).  On only one occasion was UBL actually at the location where it was said he was, and that location was close to a hospital that would have been damaged by a missile attack.  Clarke suggested bombing all the terrorist training camps but the idea was rejected in part because the US was already bombing Iraq regularly and in part because of the poor quality hut targets.

·         In June 2001, during a joint meeting between the CIA and FBI about the USS Cole investigation, the CIA shows photos taken at the Malaysia meeting to the FBI to ask if anyone can identify anyone in the photos for a different investigation.  The FBI agents recognize the men in the pictures and ask what this is about, but the CIA agent says he does not have clearance to share the information.  He does not tell the FBI agent that he knows al-Mihdhar has a US visa, that al-Hazmi was an experienced terrorist and had traveled to the US in March, that another al-Qaeda leader had been recognized in one of the photos, but he shares none of this with the FBI.  Two days later, al-Mihdhar gets a new visa to the US.  This was eventually discovered on August 21, 2001 by an FBI agent assigned to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, when he is investigating CIA cables about the Malaysian meeting.  When he works with immigration officials, he learns that al-Mihdhar entered and left the US in 2000 and then entered again on July 4, 2001, and that al-Hazmi is still in the US.  This is why they are finally watch listed in August 2001!  Yet, the FAA, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the FBI’s Financial Review Group are not notified.  The first could have stopped them from getting on planes and the latter two have the ability to tap into credit card records and bank data. 

·         The CIA did not request that the two hijackers in the US be watch listed by the State Department until August 2001.  Further, nothing stops these men from flying on domestic flights!  The CIA’s Counterterrorism Center sends a cable reminding all personnel about obligations to report suspicious people to the list in December 1999, but the instructions are not followed for these men.  The CIA later tells the Joint Congressional Inquiry investigating 9/11 that the guidelines did not exist and CIA Director George Tenet does not mention them.  The Saudi Intelligence Minister Price Turki al Faisal tells the media that they watch listed these two men in late 1999 for previous al-Qaeda activities, but the US denies this. 

·         The terrorists had at least five run-ins with law enforcement while in the US.  Amazingly, Mohamed Atta was stopped by police for a traffic violation in Broward County, Florida in April 2001 (at which time he had already overstayed his visa ... but the police did not know this!).  Then in July 2001, when stopped for speeding, there was a bench warrant for Atta’s arrest for not appearing in court for his previous violation, yet the police did not have that information!

·         A bench warrant issued for Atta in April 2001 was not pursued by the courts or local law enforcement when he failed to show up for a traffic ticket.  When he later got a speeding ticket, he would have been arrested and possibly deported. 

·         The CIA did not tell President Bush about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in Minneapolis in August 2001 and no one connected his training to the previous reports and investigations of Arabic pilots training in the US 

·         CIA Director George Tenet and senior CIA staff are told about Moussaoui’s arrest in a briefing titled, “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly” yet President Bush and the White House Counterterrorism Group are not told about it, nor is the acting Director of the FBI. 

·         There was also no questioning of Ahmed Ressam, who trained with Moussaoui in Afghanistan, about Moussaoui, while Ressam was being held in Seattle after he was arrested for plotting to blow up LAX Airport.

Failures of the FBI:

 
·         In 1993, the FBI received reports that Osama Bassnan had hosted a 1992 party in DC for Omar Abdul Rahman, the “Blind Sheikh” who is now in prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and a plot to blow up the tunnels leading to Manhattan.  The FBI did not investigate the reports!  Bassnan would go on to assist at least two hijackers in San Diego by providing them with money from Saudi Arabia.

·         In 1999, when the FBI learns that a terrorist organization is planning to send students to the US for aviation training, FBI headquarters issues a notice instructing 24 filed offices to Islamic students from a certain country who are involved in training.  No investigation is conducted.

·         In 2000, Niaz Kahn, a British citizen from Pakistan, is recruited into an al-Qaeda plot and trained in Pakistan in plane hijacking in a mock 767 cockpit.  He is then flown to the US and told to meet a contact.  He says: “They said I would live there for a while and meet some other people and we could hijack a plane from JFK and fly it into a building.”  He turns himself into the FBI in Newark, New Jersey, and they believed him because he passed a polygraph test,  Yet, FBI headquarters told them to return him to London and forget about it!  He is released after two hours there and no investigation is ever done! 

·         In 2001, during a trial of defendants charged with involvement in the US embassy bombings in Africa, testimony reveals two UBL operatives received pilot training in Texas and Oklahoma and another was asked to take lessons.  No investigation is made of UBL’s pilot training program!

·         The FBI Unit on UBL is very small … formed in 1999, the unit has only 17 to 19 people assigned to it on 9/11.  President Clinton’s National Security advisor Sandy Berger says that the FBI basically thought al-Qaeda had a limited presence in the US and that it had it under surveillance.  Further, the FBI did not search for KSM, did not attempt to get him, and did not put him on their top 10 most wanted list until one month after 9/11, even though it knew he was linked to the 1993 WTC bombing and the 1995 Operation Bojinka plot and that they searched worldwide for his nephew Ramzi Yousef.  Further, a call intercepted by KSM to Atta in the summer of 2001 and another on September 10, 2001 giving final approval for the attacks led to no action. 

·         The FBI underestimated al-Qaeda’s presence in the US, even though it was monitoring some of them!  On some occasions, the FBI simply did not pursue potential investigations against them.  One agent, Robert Wright, wrote a memo to the FBI in June 2001 alleging there was no effort to go after known and suspected terrorists living in the US.  Further, FBI failed to infiltrate an al-Qaeda camp even when given the opportunity to do so in the Summer of 2001.  A confidential informant told an FBI agent that he had been invited to join a camp in Afghanistan for training, yet the FBI headquarters rejects the idea. 

·         According to Richard Clarke, he, FBI agent John O’Neill, and others believed strongly al Qaeda cells were in the US and tried to get the FBI to look for them.  The CIA knew that al Qaeda was planning attacks for the Millennium, and considered possible targets here.  In fact, Ahmed Ressam was caught entering the US by an alert US Customs officer.  In his car were explosives and a map of the Los Angeles International Airport that he planned to attack.  The investigation led to an arrest of a man in Pakistan and another American who had lived close to the airport.  Yet, the FBI did not look for them and denied they were here. 

·         FBI agent John O’Neill, who was obsessed with al Qaeda, resigned from the FBI out of frustration that the FBI would not more actively target al Qaeda and its funding sources and presence in the US.  Ironically, O’Neill had taken the job of Director of Security at the World Trade Center in the week prior to 9/11 and was killed on that day. 

·         On September 20, 2001, FBI Middle Eastern languages translator Sibel Edmonds alleges a pattern of deliberate failure in her translation department.  She is told by her boss: “Let the documents pile up so we can show it and say that we need more translators and expand the department.”  Senator Charles Grassley ® says: “She’s credible and the reason I feel she’s very credible is because people within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.”  Edmonds files a whistleblower lawsuit against the FBI in March 2002 but the case is dismissed because the evidence is classified by the Bush Administration (and in the months following 9/11, nine Army linguists are fired for being gay, including six trained to speak Arabic!).

·         There were too few linguists with skills needed to interpret Arabic, Farsi, and Pushto working in the FBI
 

      FBI’s Most Important Failures:

 
·         In 2000-2001, an FBI asset, Abdussatta Shaikh, lived with two of the hijackers in San Diego and he gave the FBI inconsistent statements that were never investigated.  Allegedly, both Mohamed Atta and Hani Hanjour visit in 2000.  His handler, Steven Baker, says Shaikh let Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid Almihdhar live with him.  Shaikh tells Butler they are good, religious Muslims who are legally in the US to study.  When Butler asks him for their last names, Shaikh says no.  Although Shaikh tells Butler they are apolitical and have done nothing wrong, al-Hazmi has contacts with “at least four individuals he knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom he had previously reported to the FBI.”  Three are being actively investigated at the time the hijackers are there.  One is Osama Mustafa and another is Omar al-Bayoumi.  The FBI tried to stop both Butler and Shaikh from testifying to the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11; only Butler testifies. 

·         According to former Senator Bob Graham, al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar met Abdussatar Shaikh in San Diego, a retired English professor from San Diego State University.  When al-Midhdar left the US in April 2000, al-Hazmi noticed that Shaikh had posted on the Mosque bulletin board that he had quarters in his home for a committed young Muslim.  So al-Hazmi moved into his house.  According to Graham, “Shaikh was on the payroll of the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an agency asset.  His job was to monitor the Saudi community in San Diego and report to the FBI any suspicious behavior he observed” (Graham, 2004, p. 20).  As Graham says, incredibly, “Two future terrorists, both of whom would later be placed on the government’s watch list, were living under the nose of an FBI informant, and one would later actually live with him, yet the informant was never asked to draw more information from them, get closer to them, or gain their confidence” (Graham, 2004, pp. 20-21).    In September 2000, according to Graham, Hani Hanjour was seen in San Diego with Nawaf al-Hazmi by FBI informant Abdussattar Shaikh.  Yet, since al-Hazmi was not known to the FBI as a person of interest, Shaikh was never asked by the FBI about al-Hazmi or his associates. 

·         In August 2001, when the FBI learned the two hijackers were here, they did not tell the FAA or INS or the State Department, they did not list them on a domestic watch list, they did an inadequate search for them with no checks of drivers’ licenses, bank accounts, credit cards, car registrations, etc., and they did not put them on their most wanted list or announce them to citizens.  In August 2001, when New York City’s FBI office recommended that an investigation be launched to determine if al-Mihdhar was still in the US, FBI headquarters turns it down.  They cite the “wall” between criminal and intelligence matters.  The New York office opens an intelligence case, thereby excluding all criminal case investigators from the search for him.  An FBI agent sends an email saying: “Whatever happened to this – some day somebody will die – and wall or not – the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’  Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most ‘protection.’” 

·         On August 21, the FBI learns that al-Mihdhar arrived in the US in July 2001, it determined he said he would be staying at the Marriott hotel.  So it goes there and finds no one.  The LA FBI office also received a request on 9/11 to search the LA Sheraton hotels because that is where al-Mihdhar said he would be staying when he entered the country the previous year. 

·         Bob Graham adds that, on August 21, 2001, an FBI analyst assigned to the CTC reviewed CIA cables and learned that the CIA knew that al-Midhdar had a multiple-entry visa to the US and that al-Hazmi was already here!  This put the men under serious suspicion.  On August 23, the men’s names were put on the State Department’s TIPOFF watch list (this was 18 months after the CIA had obtained information identifying al-Midhdar and al-Hazmi as suspected terrorists carrying visas for travel to the US). 

·         On August 28, 2001, the FBI’s UBL unit sent the New York field office a document recommending it open an intelligence investigation to determine if al-Midhdar is still in the US.  The FBI did not ask the State Department to track down visa violators to help locate the two, nor did the FBI canvass its own counterterrorism sources (including the FBI informant in San Diego who knew both them men and who had housed one of them). 

·         On September 5, the FBI determined al-Midhdar was not staying at any New York Marriott hotel and on September 10, the FBI New York City field office asked the LA office to check registration records at hotels they thought the two might be staying.  It also asked the airlines United and Lufthansa for travel and alias information (the two men had entered and departed the US on these companies’ planes before).

·         In August 2001, FBI headquarters was uninterested in the Zacarias Moussaoui case (see 9/11 Commission report, pp. 272-275).

·         It advised against the FISA warrant process even though the FISA Court had never turned down a Justice Department request, and it never pursued a criminal search warrant.

·         On August 21, 2001, the Minneapolis FBI field office sends a note to FBI headquarters saying it is imperative that the Secret Service be warned of the danger of a plot involving Zacarias Moussaoui.  Yet, the FBI does not warn President Bush.

·         FBI agents did not connect Moussaoui’s training to the previous reports and investigations of Arabic pilots training in the US including in Oklahoma in 1998 and 1999. 

·         Bob Graham explains the Moussaoui failure by the FBI.  From June to July 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) noted an increase in threat activity (the third such rise since the winter).  The US military declared ThreatCon Delta and all ships in the Persian Gulf were sent to sea.  And Attorney General John Ashcroft began traveling only on government jet.  Graham says this was “opposed to the commercial aircraft Attorneys General normally take, despite the fact that senior FBI and CIA officials knew of no specific threat against the Attorney General” (Graham, 2004, p. 72).  In July 2001, when the FBI’s Phoenix office sent a memo voicing concern that UBL might be using US flight schools to infiltrate America’s civil aviation system, it was ignored by superiors and never reached the FBI’s Minneapolis office (which arrested Zacarias Moussaoui one month later for suspicious activities at a flight school).  This is called stove-piping (when information did not move across FBI field offices).  This “Phoenix memo” was sent by Kenneth Williams, who first became concerned with Libyans with suspected terrorist ties working for US aviation companies in the 1990s. 

·         Williams was later told about Arabs in a local mosque involved in aviation training.  In April 2000, Williams watched a man name Zakaria Mustapha Soubra, a Lebanese national studying aeronautical safety in Arizona.  Williams interviewed Soubra at his apartment and Soubra was defiant.  He had photos of UBL and injured mujahedeen fighters on his wall.  Soubra’s car outside had a license plate on it that came back of a man named Mohammed al-Qudhaeein who had been detained in 1999 for trying to get into the cockpit of an America West flight from Phoenix to Washington, DC.  Al-Qudhaeein was traveling to a party at the Saudi embassy and his ticket had been paid for by the Saudi government.  The FBI did not even investigate the case! 

·         In 2000, al-Qudhaeein was put on the State Department’s TIPOFF terrorist watch list after US intelligence learned he might have received explosives and car bomb training in Afghanistan.  In August 2001, al-Qudhaeein applied for a visa to reenter the US but was denied entry!  Perhaps he was an additional hijacker?
 

·         Williams was taken off of counterterrorism to work an arson case in early 2001.  The arson case was closed in April 2001 and he wrote an electronic communication (EC) to FBI headquarters in Washington, DC (this is the Phoenix memo).  The continuing investigation of Soubra found six associates also involved in aviation training.  While Williams did not know it, it was discovered that Soubra knew Hani Hanjour through a local religious center and carpooled with him to flight school.  On at least five occasions, they were at the same flight school on the same day and at least once, they flew together! 

·         In July 2001, Williams finished his EC and sent it to the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters (see Graham, 2004, pp. 44-45).  Williams’ recommendations, if followed, would have prevented 9/11.  Graham says that “had William’s recommendations been acted upon promptly, liaisons with the flight schools would have found at least one and perhaps as many as three other hijackers still developing their flying skills” (Graham, 2004, p. 47).  ECs are sent to the specified units and then forwarded to the individual assigned to the lead.  Williams sent the EC and requested that both the Radical Fundamentalist Unit and the Usama bin Laden Unit consider his recommendations. 

·         Both of these are operational units (that investigate specific crimes) but it did not go to an analytic unit (which considers long-term, strategic issues).  It was ultimately forwarded to an FBI intelligence analysts in Portland, Oregon along with a note specifying Williams’ theory.  The agent did not take any action or share it more widely and the lead was closed by officers in the RFU and UBLU on August 7, 2001. 

·         As it turns out, way back in 1983, the INS asked the FBI for assistance in locating Libyan nationals engaged in aviation or nuclear-related education!  In 1998, the head of the FBI Oklahoma City Field Office contacted headquarters to express concern about the large numbers of Middle Eastern males at Oklahoma flight schools.  In 1999, the FBI received word that a terrorist organization was planning to send students to the US for aviation training. 

·         In response, the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters sent a communication to twenty-four field offices asking them pay close attention to Muslim students from the country who were engaged in aviation training in their areas.  No FBI field offices followed up on this instruction. 

·         The investigation was dropped in November 2000 when the INS failed to respond to an FBI letter asking them to search databases for individuals from the target country studying in the US! 

·         Graham asserts that had the Minneapolis FBI Field Office seen these memos and requests, it might have broken the 9/11 plot when it arrested Zacarias Moussaoui.  Moussaoui was not a typical flight school student for he did not have a pilot’s license, was not employed by an airline, and had not logged any flight hours. 

·         His suspicious activities concerned flight school employees – he had extreme interests in operation of the plane’s doors and control panel, he repeatedly said he would love to fly from London’s Heathrow Airport to JFK Airport in New York, and he paid $6,800 in cash.  Employees say he discussed how much fuel is on a Boeing 747 and the damage such a plane could do if it were to hit something.  A flight manager contacted a friend at the FBI and Moussaoui was arrested for being “out of status” (overstayed his visa).

·         Minneapolis informed FBI headquarters of Moussaoui’s detention by the INS and it asked the CIA and the FBI’s legal attache in Paris for any information they could get on him.  The FBI and INS went to his hotel and seized his laptop computer and belongings, yet they were told they need a warrant to search them.  The FBI could have gotten a FISA warrant but it decided against this route!  So they decided for the French to search his belongings and not get a FISA warrant. 

·         According to Graham, the FBI’s legal attache in Paris reported that Moussaoui had been in Chechnya assisting Chehen rebels which could have been enough to secure a FISA search warrant.  The FBI mistake was thinking that Moussaoui had to be connected to an organization that the State Department listed as a foreign terrorist organization (which was not a FISA requirement).  FISA does not require it be a “recognized foreign power” just a foreign power.  So they spent about 3 weeks trying to connect the Chechen group to al-Qaeda! 

·         The FBI did not even try for a normal criminal search warrant and did not even make his presence public, which could have disrupted the plot!  According to Graham, Minneapolis sent a memo to FBI headquarters stating that Moussaoui’s “possession of weapons and his preparation through physical training for violent confrontation” gave them reason to believe he “and others yet unknown” were conspiring to take control of an airplane.  Minneapolis contacted the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center for more information on Moussaoui and a Minneapolis case agent sent an email on August 21, 2001 to the supervisory special agent in the RFU who was handling the matter.  It said: “It is imperative that the [US Secret Service] be appraised of this threat potential indicated by the evidence ... if [Moussaoui] seizes an aircraft from Heathrow to NYC, it will have the fuel on board o reach DC.” 

·         On August 23, two FBI agents visited the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma City where Moussaoui first learned to fly ... one of the agents had visited the school in 1999 to investigate the training there of UBL’s personal pilot!

·         Ultimately, a search of Moussaoui’s lap top links him to a plot involving crop-dusters but not to the 9/11 plot.  They also find phone numbers and an alias for Ramzi bin al-Shibh (Atta’s former roommate) who also wired Moussaoui money.  They also find a document connecting him to the Malaysian Yazid Sufaat, a lead that might have led investigators to hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.

·         Richard Clarke adds that part of the FBI’s problem was it felt its hands were tied.  The Attorney General’s Guidelines required agents to have probable cause of criminal activity before they could monitor a mosque or attend a student group, or even print pages from a web site.  According to Clarke: “The Attorney General’s Guidelines were initially adopted in the wake of the Watergate era scandals of the early 1970s.  During that period it had been revealed that the FBI had kept files on people and groups for no reason other than J. Edgar Hoover’s whim.  To correct that kind of abuse, the Justice Department put the FBI in a straitjacket and they were still in it” (Clarke, 2004,p. 216). [If I read this correctly, it suggests to me that J. Edgar Hoover had a hand in the attacks of 9/11.  It is because of past abuses that current investigators could not gain access to vital information that may have stopped the attacks of 9/11.  Ironically, the US has passed laws after 9/11 such as the USA PATRIOT Act that allow new abuses to occur.]
 

3)         Failures of Other US Agencies:

 

·         FAA: Security lapses were long known about at American airports by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and airline industry.  FAA Red Teams in the 1990s successfully smuggled in guns and bombs through airport checkpoints up to 85% of the time! 

·         FAA: When Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi took advanced instruction at a Boeing flight simulator in Opa-Locka, Florida in December 2000 (a week after getting their pilots’ licenses), both men requested training on executing turns and approaches but not takeoffs or landings ... no alarm bells were sounded! 

·         FAA: There was no investigation of a stalled plane left on runways by Atta and al-Shehri in Miami in December 2000.  The men, who were not supposed to be using the airport in the first place, simply got out and walked away.  When the FAA threatens to investigate the two students and the flight school they are attending, the flight school sends records to the FAA but no investigation was conducted.

·         FAA: The FAA did not investigate five reports by the flight school of bad pilot Hani Hanjour in early 2001 other than to validate he had a license. 

·         FAA: FAA did not institute security procedures in face of large number of threats (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 264)      

·         NSA: The National Security Agency (NSA) did not share information with the CIA or FBI, including what it learned in early 1999 while tracking communications at an al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen.  They learn of hijackers al-Mihdhar and Salem and Nawaf al-Hazmi as the best sources of information about al-Qaeda.  Since the NSA did not share the name Nawaf al-Hazmi with the CIA, when the CIA monitored the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia, it did not know the last name of the “Nawaf” attending the meeting.  When the CIA learned his full name (from an airline manifest in January 2000), it asks the NSA to watch list him.  Yet, the NSA does not! 

·         NSA: When Khalid al-Mihdhar lived in San Diego, he called the al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen in the spring and summer of 2000 and they are monitored by the NSA.  Yet, the NSA does not realize the call is being made from within the US.  The section of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11 dealing with these calls is heavily censored 

·         INS: The INS admitted al-Shehi and Atta despite having overstayed their visas.  As it turns out, visa failures were many!  Al-Shehhi is admitted into US in January 2001 despite having overstayed his previous visa by five weeks … the visa applications of all 15 of the Saudi hijackers should have been rejected due to irregularities, and according to the General Accounting Office (GAO), at least 13 of the 19 hijackers were never interviewed by US consular officials before getting visas to enter the US.  For the 15 hijackers whose applications could be found, NONE had filled in the documents correctly.  Four were accidentally destroyed (for examples of criminal negligence on Thompson, 2004, p. 517). 

·         Department of Agriculture: Efforts by hijackers to get crop-dusters in April and May 2000 went unreported by the US Department of Agriculture. 

·         State Department: State Department was not focused on UBL and did not list Afghanistan or Pakistan as State sponsors of terrorism.

·         Treasury Department: Treasury Department did not go after terrorism funding / money laundering in the Bush Administration.  According to Time magazine in February 2001: “The US was all set to join a global crackdown on criminal and terrorist money havens [in early July 2001].  Thirty industrial nations were ready to tighten the screws on offshore financial centers like Liechenstein and Antigua, whose banks have the potential to hide and often help launder billions of dollars for drug cartels, global crime syndicates – and groups like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization.  Then the Bush Administration took office.”  In 2000, President Clinton created the National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center, but when Bush takes office, no money is provided in the budget for it and thus tracking slows down.  As it turns out, UBL’s financial and operational networks were “completely mapped” and known to the State Department, CIA, and Treasury Department by February 2001 at the latest.  In fact, in March 2001 when the UN and EU directed their members to freeze the assets of some al-Qaeda leaders including the head of UBL’s finances, the US does not do so (until after 9/11).  There was no also investigation by US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of suspicious money ($69,985) coming to the US from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in June 2000. 

·         Treasury Department: Treasury Department also refused to grant funds to Richard Clarke in January 2000 to investigate and stop UBL (see 9/11 Commission report, p. 179). 

·         Local law enforcement: There was no action taken regarding the hijackers’ shenanigans and suspicious activities while living in the US, including reports to the police and the CIA … complaints were of a van parked outside at all hours with a man monitoring a scanner or radio inside, very nice cars parked along the streets at all hours, loud parties, men always outside talking on cell phones, and a woman shooting a gun into the air during a party.

Given all of the above, can you tell me why not a single person anywhere has been fired or otherwise held accountable for the failures that led to 9/11?  The American people were failed by their President, his Administration officials, and US intelligence agencies funded in the hundreds of billions of dollars every year to protect us from such attacks.  What else can be said, other than WOW, INCOMPETENCE!!!???