9/11: Efforts to Hide the Truth about 9/11?

By: Dr. Matthew Robinson
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
Appalachian State University
robinsnmb@appstate.edu

Here are some of the unbelievable, yet widely reported, examples of efforts by some in the Bush Administration and US intelligence agencies to obfuscate or hide the truth about the attacks of 9/11.  While some of these entries may mean little, most suggest a consistent effort to inhibit investigations into what occurred on 9/11.  The document also identifies alleged efforts by Saudi Arabia to obstruct the truth, as well (about 9/11 and other terrorism investigations by the US).

∙   September 11, 2001, 9:37 am – FBI confiscates film from a security camera located across the street from the Pentagon, and a video from security camera from a hotel close to the Pentagon which records the impact also is also confiscated by the FBI. The impact of Flight 77 into the Pentagon occurs close to the heliport, which is under 24 hour security surveillance, including video monitoring. No video footage from the crash is ever shown.

∙   Mid-September, 2001 – According to former Senator Bob Graham, who would co-chair the Joint Congressional Inquiry into intelligence failures and 9/11, immediately after 9/11, Saudis were allowed to fly out of the US, which was denied by the Bush Administration for 3 years until reported by the 9/11 Commission.  More than 140 Saudis (including several members of the bin Laden family) were flown out by September 19.  At least one was thought to have terrorist ties and NONE were interviewed by the FBI.  The FBI says it did not grant permission for those planes to leave but Prince Bandar (Saudi Ambassador to the US) says it did.  White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke says he was approached by someone in the White House about the departures and that he approved it after saying to be sure no one was needed for interviews first.  According to Clarke, he told the FBI they needed to make sure they did not let anyone affiliated with the attacks leave the US, like they did after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. [So, why did the Bush Administration let a group of Saudis including several bin Ladens leave the US shortly after 9/11, even though all air traffic was grounded at the time?]

∙   September 29, 2001 – Two airports used by hijackers do not release photos of them using the airport. Boston’s Logan airport does not have any cameras.  Photos have been shown from only one of the airports that captured photos of any of the hijackers on 9/11.

∙   October 4, 2001 – British Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly presents a paper claiming al Qaeda is responsible for 9/11. Secretary of State Colin Powell promises a US paper too, but it is never released. Blair says “One of bin Laden’s closest lieutenants has said clearly that he helped with the planning of the September 11 attacks and admitted the involvement of the al Qaeda organization” and that “there is other intelligence, we cannot disclose, of ever more direct nature indicating guilt.”  

∙   October 10, 2001 – US government asks television networks not to show unedited videotapes of UBL

∙   October 27, 2001 – Government officials claim NSA destroys data relevant to 9/11 investigation and claim that possible leads are not being followed due to lack of cooperation by NSA.

∙   November 10, 2001 – President Bush gives a speech to United Nations General Assembly and says: “We must speak the truth about terror.  Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists, themselves, away from the guilty.”  Many wonder why Bush would mention this since it is widely reported that Bush does not read anything and therefore would be unaware of any conspiracy theories being written about.

∙   November 20, 2001 – Five Israelis who filmed the 9/11 attack and allegedly cheered about it are released and deported to Israel. At least two of the men are Israeli Mossad officers.

∙   December 12-15, 2001 – Officials with the DEA, INS, and FBI tell Fox News that pursuing Israeli spying is career suicide. Evidence linking Israeli spies to the 9/11 attacks is classified.

∙   December 25, 2001 – The New York Times claims that some of the nation’s leading structural engineers and fire-safety experts believe the World Trade Center collapse investigation is inadequate and want to see an independent and more thorough investigation.  Some of the experts are conducting the investigation. They claim the team has no subpoena power, little financial support, and little staff support.  It is not allowed to interview some witnesses and cannot often examine the site and the blueprints of the buildings. Steel columns, beams, and trusses from the World Trade Center are taken away and recycled before they can be investigated.

∙   January 2002 – In spite of an FAA email instructing officials to safeguard all records, a quality assurance manager at the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center destroys the taped recollections of sixteen people including six air traffic controllers who dealt with two of the hijacked airliners.

∙   January 4, 2002 – A fire fighter magazine calls the collapse investigation a half-baked farce. It says that fire protection engineer experts have theorized that “the structural damage from the planes and the explosive ignition of jet fuel in themselves were not enough to bring down the towers.”

∙   January 22, 2002 – A member of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, representing the FBI, Thomas Kelley, has been previously recognized within the FBI as an obstructionist for his efforts to block a prove into the FBI’s handling of Waco.

∙   January 24, 2002 – Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle claims Vice President Dick Cheney calls him to urge him that no 9/11 inquiry be made.
∙   February 20, 2002 – Pentagon announces a new office called Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to plant false stories in the foreign press, phony emails from disguised addresses, and other covert activities to affect public opinion.  It is closed within a week but the temporary Office of Global Communications is made permanent and continues with the missions of the OSI.

∙   May 16, 2002 – Vice President Dick Cheney warns Democrats in Congress not to question handling of pre-9/11 warnings by saying: “My Democratic friends in Congress ... need to be very cautious not to seek political advantage by making incendiary suggestions, as were made by some today, that the White House had advance information that would have prevented the tragic attacks of 9/11.” He says this is “thoroughly irresponsible ... in a time of war” and that any serious probe of 9/11 foreknowledge would be equivalent to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

∙   May 23, 2002 – President Bush opposes an independent commission to investigate how the government dealt with warnings prior to 9/11.  He changes his mind later in the face of pressure but sabotages an agreement reached by Congress about the Commission.  Ultimately, the Commission will not examine how intelligence was used by the Bush Administration to justify attacks on Afghanistan or Iraq.

∙   May 30, 2002 – FBI agent Robert Wright announces he is suing the FBI for banning his book that says the FBI deliberately stopped investigations into terrorism funding, especially involving Saudi Arabia.

∙   August 25, 2002 – Former CIA agent Bob Baer claims that the White House implicitly orders that no intelligence be collected on Saudi Arabia.

∙   September 5, 2002 – Senate Intelligence Committee member Richard Shelby says: “You know, we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation, and I question that. I think that most of the information that our staff has been able to get that is real meaningful has had to be extracted piece by piece.”  He also says “I think there are some more bombs out there ... I know that.”

∙   September 18, 2002 – Legislators from both parties complain that the Bush Administration is not cooperating with the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry.

∙   September 20, 2002 – President Bush decides to back efforts to form an independent commission into 9/11. Yet, he does not allow the commission to look for everything but the intelligence failures. The White House refuses to turn over documents showing what President Bush knew prior to 9/11.

∙   October 2002 – State Department reopens its Counter- Misinformation/Misinformation Team, closed in 1996, to run overseas only?

∙   October 5, 2002 – FBI refuses to allow Abdussattar Sheikh, an FBI informant who lived in San Diego with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in late 2000 to testify to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry.  It also tries to prevent his handler, Steve Butler from testifying, although Butler does testify.

∙   November 1, 2002 – Relatives of 9/11 victims hold a rally at the US Capitol to protest Bush Administration plans to block or delay lawsuits against Saudis allegedly involved in 9/11 plot.  Some claim Bush officials are pressuring them to pull out of the lawsuit so not to damage US Saudi relations.

∙   November 5, 2002 – It is reported that a Pentagon study of the damage to the Pentagon structures is completed in July 2002 but will not be released.        

∙   November 15, 2002 – Congress finally approves legislation to create an independent commission to study 9/11 – 13 months later!  Bush originally opposed the legislation and commission and threatened to create one by executive order if certain powers of the commission were not limited (such as subpoena power). Bush gets to appoint the chairperson of the commission and he sets an 18 month time frame. The commission also is only allocated $3 million originally. A 1996 commission to study gambling was given 2 years and $5 million.  In March 2003, funding is increased to $12 million after President Bush initially resisted increasing it.

∙   November 27, 2002 – President Bush names Henry Kissinger to head the 9/11 Commission, a man wanted for questioning for alleged war crimes when he was National Security Advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford in Latin America, Vietnam, Cambodia, etc., and who was a consultant for Unocal and had been working on pipeline construction through Afghanistan.  The Democrats name former majority leader George Mitchell, whose lobbying firm represents the UAE and Yemen and a wealthy Saudi, Mohammed Hussain al-Almoudi, who is under investigation for alleged terrorism involvement.

∙    December 11, 2002 –Bob Graham says he is surprised at the evidence that there were foreign governments (mostly Saudi Arabia) involved in the attacks of 9/11. And early in 2003, Graham says there has been a cover-up of this.

∙   December 16, 2002 – It is revealed that 9/11 Commission Chairperson Thomas Kean will remain President of Drew University and will devote only 1 day per week to the investigation. He is appointed by President Bush.

∙   December 16, 2002 – Certain potential conflicts of interest are revealed by both Democratic and Republican members of the 9/11 Commission, including members with ties to Boeing, American and United Airlines, the US military, a Pentagon defense contractor – United Technologies, Lockheed Martin, and the CIA.     

∙   January - July 2003 – President Bush delays the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry because he wants 2/3 of the report classified. The delay allows the Bush Administration to launch the war on Iraq prior to the report’s release.

∙   According to former Senator Bob Graham, who was on the Senate Intelligence Committee and who co-chaired the Congressional Inquiry into the intelligence failures of 9/11, President Bush repeatedly hindered full investigation into 9/11.  Graham says he supported the idea of a Joint Inquiry, as did Cheney and Rice, but not an independent 9/11 Commission.

∙   Graham also alleges that the White House covered up important facts of 9/11 to protect intelligence agencies and our relationship Saudi Arabia [consider that President George Bush the first was Director of the CIA and consider the relationships between the Bush family and the Saudi royal family, as well as the bin Ladens!]

∙   According to Graham, the White House denied the Joint Inquiry access to the August 6th Presidential Daily Briefing that read in part “bin Laden wanted to hijack US aircraft to gain the release” of Oman Abdul Rahman and others and tells of “suspicious activity in the US consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.”  Intelligence representatives accurately described the PDB and once the White House learned this, the CIA refused to tell the American people what information had been given to the President, claiming this would disclose classified information.  Thus, it would be allowed to see the information but not say the President had seen it!  Graham says: “This decision flew directly in the face of the rules regarding classification: protection of sources and methods is a reasonable rationale for keeping something classified; but protecting an individual from embarrassment is not.  Only in 2004 was another commission, the independent 9/11 Commission, officially given the PDB.  Even then, the White House delayed releasing the information to the public, declassifying it only after much of it had been previously released” (p. 84).

∙   Even the story being publicly by President Bush is false, according to 9/11.  Graham says: “The first was that it was a surprise, a bolt from the blue.  The second was that no one could have imagined such an attack carried out in such a manner.  The third, that since no one could have envisaged the use of commercial aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction, no one could be held accountable.  The forth was that for all of the devastation, the attack was basically quite simple, requiring nineteen people and a sum of money estimated between $175,000 and $250,000" (p. 112).  These are all false!  In fact, the threats were many, and we knew it was coming ... there were at least 12 instances in which intelligence found information outlining terrorist plans to use airplanes as weapons, there were at least 12 instances in which the plot could have been interdicted but mistakes by individual people assured it did not happen (and yet not a single person has been held accountable for their failures), and the plot was very complex and resilient.  In fact, as Graham notes: “I find a pattern of substantial logistical, personnel, and kills development and financial support consistent with what the President was told in his fateful August 6 briefing.  I further suspect that the pattern of such support was more pervasive than is currently known or acknowledged” (p. 113).  Graham also says this structure of support was maintained by a nation-state [and no he does not say it was Iraq!].  Graham asserts that “after September 11, members of the Bush administration would claim that nobody could have imagined that planes might be used as weapons, during the course of our inquiry, we found that the possibility had been imagined, investigated, and interdicted more than once, and that in one case the Pentagon had been a target”!  His examples include: 1) Algerian terrorists who in 1994 tried to fly an Air France plane into the Eiffel Tower; 2) Project Bojinka in 1995 to blow up 11 planes simultaneously and crash a twelfth into CIA headquarters and thirteenth into the Pentagon; 3) an August 2001 plot to fly a plane into a US embassy in Nairobi or bomb it from a plane (p. 81).  Senator Graham alleges that these false claims are part of efforts by President Bush to change the story of 9/11.   

∙    Graham asserts that as the Joint Inquiry got more specific in requests for witnesses and documents, the White House and intelligence agencies resisted.  The White House classified materials and information, even that which was already known about by the media.  For example, the contents of the August 6th PDB had already been broadcast and the name of an al Qaeda leader involved in the attacks had already been reported in the media, yet both were classified.

∙   Graham also says the White House dragged its feet by classifying too much information ... to get access to the classified material, the Joint Inquiry had to go to CIA Director George Tenet, who simply deferred to President Bush.  The White House simply kept the materials classified until they could not be used in a public hearing.  Graham says that “the more we learned, the less curious the administration seems about what had happened on September 11.  The more we pressed for information, the more resistant the White House became to giving it up.  In my view, this behavior bore all the hallmarks of a cover-up” (p. 202).

∙   According to Graham, the President opposed the “establishment of a homeland defense coordinator or the creation of a separate department with the mission of protecting the homeland ... On June 6th, the President announced that he was switching his position, proposing a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security ...” (p. 174).  Bush drafted the homeland security proposal in secret over the course of seven weeks using only four inside aides and got no outside input.

∙   Graham also points out that the White House leaked Ambassador Joe Wilson’s wife’s name (CIA agent Valerie Plume) to the media to get back at Wilson for writing an editorial in the New York Times showing that Bush’s claims about Iraq obtaining yellow cake uranium from Niger were false.

∙   According to Graham, after having the Joint Inquiry report for months, the CIA still had only read 200 pages of the 800 pages.  Once they finished with it, huge parts of the text were blacked out: “Some of the very pieces of information that the CIA had declassified for the public staff statements of the Joint Inquiry were now reclassified ... the argument being that although the individual pieces of information were unclassified, assembling them as we had created a ‘mosaic’ that now had to be classified” (p. 214).  The report was finally released with all the blacked out material at least left in so that the public could see how much was left out.  The final report was finally released on July 24, 2003 (more than seven months after it as submitted) ... Yet: “Significant portions of virtually every section of the report had been censored” (p. 215).  Graham says “there was one area that did not need to be kept secret, and it was the one area that the White House simply refused to relent.  This was, not surprisingly, the section of the report that related to the Saudi government and the assistance that government gave to some and possibly all of the September 11 terrorists.  This section had been redacted in its entirety, all twenty-seven pages.  Senator Shelby and I, after rereading those twenty-seven pages, independently concluded that 95 percent of that material was safe for public consumption, and that these pages were being kept secret for reasons other than national security” (pp. 215-216).

∙   Graham points out the irony: “It was ironic to me that a President who had initially thought Iraq must have been the perpetrator of September 11, because only a nation-state could have carried out such a sophisticated and violent attack and avoid detection for twenty-one months, had now concluded that a nation-state had aided the terrorists should not be held publicity to account” (p. 216).  Although the pages still have not been declassified, Graham asserts: “I can say unequivocally that the information they contain raises serious questions about Saudi Arabia’s governmental support for at least some of the terrorists” (p. 228).

∙   Graham also asserts that President Bush directed the FBI (through 2002) to restrain and obfuscate the investigation of the foreign government support that some and possibly all of the September 11 hijackers received.

∙   Graham asserts that: “The President has engaged in a cover-up, withholding from the American people the evidence that supplies the basis [for Graham’s charges] ... by misclassifying information as national security data.”  While the information may be embarrassing or politically damaging, its revelation would not damage national security” (p. 231).

∙    In addition to these allegations, Graham also asserts that someone instructed the FBI to withhold information from the Joint Inquiry.  The discovery that two of the hijackers lived with an FBI asset in San Diego came five months after the Joint Inquiry had asked the FBI for all the information it had on 9/11.  The Joint Inquiry wanted to interview Shaikh, but the FBI resisted.  It said it has already interviewed him and found him to be innocent of having any knowledge about the 9/11 plot.  Graham asserts: “The FBI could not, however, explain a number of inconsistencies in the informant’s statements, inconsistencies that our staff – not the FBI – had uncovered in reading the files” (p. 162).  So the Joint Inquiry decided to depose him and make him testify under oath.  And the FBI refused to serve him the subpoena!  Further, both the FBI and the Justice Department refused access to him!  So the Joint Inquiry delivered questions to him, weeks after they were prepared, and by the time he received them, he had secured a lawyer (a former Justice Department attorney).  Graham says: “It challenges belief that a man who is so debt-laden that he has to take in boarders would just by chance find a former federal prosecutor who happened to have a strong relationship with the FBI” (p. 165).  The lawyer said he would not answer questions unless he was given immunity!  Graham says: “It seemed strange that an individual who claimed to have done nothing wrong, who the FBI was claiming had done nothing wrong, and who the FBI argued continued to be a valuable source of information, would request immunity” (p. 165).  The FBI has never conducted a follow-up investigation.  And the FBI insisted that the American people never be told about the relationship between the FBI informant and the hijackers.  The FBI opposed public hearings on the subject and deleted any references to it from drafts of the unclassified reports.  It was a year later that the FBI agreed to a heavily redacted version of the story to appear in the report.

∙   According to Graham, on November 18, 2002, a senior member of the FBI’s congressional affairs staff sent a letter to Graham and Goss explaining why the FBI had been so uncooperative.  The letter said: “the Administration would not sanction a staff interview with the source.  Nor did the Administration agree to allow the FBI to serve a subpoena or a notice of deposition on the source.”  Graham says: “We were seeing in writing what we had suspected for some time: the White House was directing the cover-up” (p. 166).

∙   January 27, 2003 – The 9/11 Commission finally starts - 16 months later! The Commission decides it will be forward looking and not assess blame.

∙   March 26, 2003 – Bush Administration turns down a request for an additional $11 million for the 9/11 Commission. Three days later, Bush reneges but only allows an additional $9 million.

∙   March 27, 2003 – Most members of the 9/11 Commission still do not have security clearance to review documents. It cannot even read the classified pages of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry!

∙   April 24, 2003 – 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer tries to review the transcripts of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, of which he was a member, and yet he is told he does not have the security clearance to read them (even though he has read them before!).

∙   July 8, 2003 – The 9/11 Commission denounces the CIA, Justice Department, and Defense Department for failing to turn over requested documents. It says it has gotten no response whatsoever to its requests for national air defense response documents. President Bush also insists on having a Justice Department official present during interviews with officials. The 9/11 Commission eventually has to subpoena documents from the Defense Department and FAA.

∙   July 28, 2003 – Bush opposes the release of full 9/11 Congressional Inquiry.

∙   August 1-2, 2003 – 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report is due to be released and it is leaked that 28 pages outlining Saudi support for terrorism are being blocked by the Bush Administration.  The pages allegedly show high level support for even the hijackers by members of the Saudi royal family.

∙   October - November 2003 – The 9/11 Commission unanimously votes to subpoena the FAA and NORAD for documents related to the fighter response on 9/11.  It says it was told by the FAA and NORAD that it had received all the available documents and yet discovered that this was not the case.

∙   November 12, 2003 – The 9/11 Commission agrees with White House to allow only some of the ten members to review Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs) and their notes will be subject to White House review.

∙   November 14, 2003 – Former Bush Administration spokesperson James Baker’s law firm represents Prince Sultan bin Abdul Azai, the Saudi defense minister from lawsuits filed by 9/11 victims’ relatives.  

∙   March 21, 2004 – 9/11 victims’ relatives demand the 9/11 Commission Executive Director, Philip Zelikow, resign. He was present when Richard Clarke briefed National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on threats posed by al Qaeda from December 2000 to January 2001.

∙   March 24, 2004 – White House Counter terrorism Czar testifies to 9/11 Commission. Prior to his testimony, White House lawyer Alberto Gonzalez calls two members of the Commission to inform them of alleged inconsistent statements by Clarke about his testimony.

∙   March 2004 – Republicans attack Counter terrorism Czar Richard Clarke after the White House violates its confidentiality policy by authorizing Fox News to air remarks favorable to Bush that Clarke had made anonymously at an administration briefing in 2002.  Clarke said he was asked to accentuate the positive in the comments, and says he had voted for Bush in the 2000 election.  Yet, Clarke stands by his assertions.

∙   April 8, 2004 – National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testifies to the 9/11 Commission. The Bush Administration originally opposed her testimony and said sitting National Security Advisors historically did not testify in such hearings (which was false).

∙   April 29, 2004 – President Bush and Vice President Cheney meet privately with 9/11 Commission, but not under oath, not recorded, and the White House submits a list of questions to the Commission beforehand. All notes of the Commissioners are subject to White House censoring.

∙   May 11, 2004 – White House gives 9/11 Commission permission to interview two captives – Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.  Both men have been in US custody and have allegedly been tortured.

So, why would patriotic Americans do this?  Why would strong leaders do this?  What are they trying to hide?

The Saudi government has also allegedly attempted to block US efforts to learn the truth about 9/11 and other acts of terrorism.  These are some of their efforts to obstruct US investigations over the years:

•    June 1996: Saudi Arabia executes suspects from the Khobar Towers bombings (Dharhran, Saudi Arabia) without first giving the FBI access to them for interrogation purposes.  The attack kills 19 American soldiers and wounds 500.  The Saudis blame Hezbollah, but in a 1998 interview UBL admits responsibility for it.  Thus, al-Qaeda operatives (who may have had information about other coming attacks) were executed prior to any American interrogation.  In 1997, Canada apprehends an additional suspect, who is sent to the US.  Yet, the US sends him back to Saudi Arabia.  In June 2001, a US grand jury indicts 13 Saudis in the attack, and also names Iran and Hezbollah as involved.

•    1998: Saudi Arabia beheads witnesses to the US embassy bombings in Africa before FBI agent John O’Neill has a chance to interrogate them

•    August 2002: A picture of a Saudi man named Saud al-Rashid is found on a CD-ROM that also has pictures of four of the 9/11 hijackers in an al-Qaeda safe house in Pakistan.  As the US is trying to find him for his suspected involvement in 9/11, he flies from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and turns himself into Saudi Arabia and the Saudis do not let the FBI question him.  Al-Rashid’s father is Hamid al-Rashid, a Saudi government official who paid a salary to Omar al-Bayoumi in Saudi Arabia (who then helped two of the hijackers in San Diego).

•    August 2002: The Saudi government does not give permission to US intelligence to talk to any family members of the Saudi hijackers.   

•    Bob Graham asserts that in March 2004, an AP story said Osama Basnan and Omar al-Bayoumi had been cleared as possible Saudi intelligence agents, yet the FBI told Graham that the story was not true and that no one had yet been cleared.  Meanwhile, Prince Bandar uses the story as evidence that the allegations are false when he is asked about $27 million in suspicious transactions by the Saudi embassy   by Tim Russert on the television show, Meet the Press.  Later the FBI said the story was in fact correct that both men had been cleared after both men had been interviewed in Saudi Arabia in the presence of Saudi government officials!  Graham then asked the Director of the FBI Robert Mueller for access to the FBI agents who interviewed them, and he said the Attorney General would have to give permission.  First, the meeting was scheduled, then postponed, the rescheduled, and finally cancelled forever.  Ashcroft simply never called back when Graham repeatedly asked his permission.