Drug War Lies 2007

Reactions to the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s

National Drug Control Strategy
 

Matthew Robinson, PhD

Associate Professor of Criminal Justice

Appalachian State University

Boone, NC  28608

(828) 262-6560

robinsnmb@appstate.edu

 This document is an assessment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s National Drug Control Strategy, 2007. The assessment is prepared by Matthew Robinson, co-author of Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (State University of New York Press, 2007). The book assessed previous versions (2000-2006) of ONDCP’s Strategy reports for the purpose of discovering whether ONDCP is honest in its presentation of statistical information and visual graphs with regard to the effectiveness of the drug war. This document assesses the same issues with regard to the 2007 Strategy.

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 As in previous versions of the Strategy, the 2007 Strategy:

 ·         Reports and focuses almost exclusively on short-term declines in reported use by young people, using only MTF data.

·         Claims to be balanced when it is not (the budget is clearly titled in favor of reactive and supply side tactics rather than proactive and demand side methods).

·         Reports combined drug use statistics for eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders from the Monitoring the Future (MTF) study to show declines consistent with its new short-term goals.

·         Fails to report and focus on long-term increases in reported use by people twelve years and older according to National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) data.

·         Focuses on those drugs (and visually depicts trends) where data show recent declines in use.

·         Fails to explain the significance of long-term drug use trends that have increased overall under ONDCP’s tenure (in spite of recent declines), and the meaning of high drug use rates relative to earlier time periods.

·         Advocates regulation approaches rather than prohibition to reduce prescription drug abuse.

·         Links illicit drugs to all kinds of bad outcomes, including terrorism.

·         Sells policies such as drug testing in schools using anecdotal evidence from select schools rather than evidence from national studies.

·         Speaks about the benefits of treatment but fails to adequately fund it.

·         Claims to be winning the drug war through effective drug market disruption while simultaneously failing to report the most relevant statistics.

·         Fails to present data about costs of drug use and abuse, or the drug war itself.

 
Short-term focus

 In the 2007 Strategy, as in the 2006 Strategy, ONDCP’s focus is on the successes during the Bush Administration. It asserts that the drug war under President Bush is both balanced and effective:

 The National Drug Control Strategy is a response to the situation the President found when he took office 6 years ago. Drug use had been on the rise over the previous decade and had reached a plateau. This trend had been met with ambivalence in many quarters, and the annual reports on drug use rarely made headlines. Worse, many felt there was nothing that could be done on a national level to combat drug use. Underlying this was the idea that drugs, addiction and the wide spectrum of related social ills could only be managed at best, not tackled head-on.

 The Administration’s record flies in the face of these notions. The significant declines in drug use since the President took office show that, with effective policy combining enforcement, treatment, and prevention, coupled with the support of State and local officials, and the work of faith-based and community organizations, real advances are possible (p. 1).

 In fact, the drug war under President Bush is not balanced as claimed, nor has it been particularly effective.

 
Imbalanced drug war

Two facts illustrate the imbalanced nature of the drug war.

First, a review of the number of pages devoted to each of the three ONDCP drug war goals (reducing drug use, healing drug users, and disrupting drug markets) shows that the drug war is not balanced.

For reducing use, ONDCP devotes 11 pages, five of which are “filler” (i.e., descriptions of anecdotal evidence from case studies discussed in text boxes). For healing drug users, the Strategy offers only six pages, one of which is filler. Finally, for disrupting drug markets, the Strategy devotes a full 19 pages, including a separate preface which firmly links the drug war to the war on terrorism (p. 27).

Thus, 53% of the Strategy deals with market disruption, 31% with reducing drug use, and 16% with healing drug users.

Second, a review of FY 2008 spending requests also shows the imbalanced nature of the drug war.  While the Department of Health and Human Services (with primary responsibility for research into drug abuse and treatment) and the Department of Homeland Security (with primary responsibility for enforcement and interdiction) each are to receive roughly $3.5 billion, the Department of Defense is slated to receive just under $1 billion while the Department of Education is only budgeted for $275 million. The Department of Justice, made up of agencies that are mostly reactive in nature, is budgeted to receive $2.8 billion. And the remainder of the $13 billion drug war budget is almost entirely intended for other law enforcement processes.

 Thus, most of the money in ONDCP’s FY 2008 drug war budget is truly intended for “fighting” the drug war, not for those efforts that are more cost-effective and efficacious — preventing drug use & drug abuse and for healing drug abusers through treatment. ONDCP’s Figure 12 shows the so-called “balanced” drug war.

 A review of Table 1 (“Federal Drug Control Spending by Function”) — which is not included in the Strategy report but can be viewed online — shows that 28.2% of the budget is intended for domestic law enforcement, followed by 25.4% for interdiction, 23.2% for treatment (with research dollars included), 12.2% for prevention (with research dollars included), and 10.8% for international spending. This means 64.4% of the budget is for supply side efforts while only 35.6% is for demand side efforts; and much of the 35.6% is for prevention and treatment research rather than actual prevention programs and treatment services.

 President Bush’s first budget — FY 2002 final — spent 55.1% on supply side mechanisms versus 44.9% on demand side efforts. Clearly, the drug war has become less balanced every year under President Bush.  My Figure A illustrates the growth in spending for supply side measures and the relative reductions in demand side measures.

 Figure A

 Several facts also illustrate the ineffective nature of the drug war under President Bush. But first, the good news.

 
The Good News: Declining Youth Drug Use

 Drug use among young people has fallen for several consecutive years. ONDCP’s Figure 1 shows how much use of various illicit drugs has fallen among 8^th, 10^th, and 12^th graders (combined ) between 2001 and 2006. These declines allow ONDCP to claim “A Record of Accomplishment” noting:

 … the President set ambitious goals for driving down illicit substance use in America. Using the category of past-month drug use as a benchmark, the Administration sought to reduce youth drug use by 10 percent within 2 years, and by 25 percent within 5 years. Actual youth use declined by 11 percent within the first 2 years, and now, in the fifth year, youth use has declined an astonishing 23.2 percent—just 1.8 percentage points short of the 25 percent goal (p. 1).

 It is true that most forms of drug use are down during President Bush’s time in office, and it is also true that declines have been remarkably close to the two- and five-year objectives stated by ONDCP in 2002. However, in the above claim, there is evidence of deception. The five-year decline of 23.2% in youth drug use is actually 7.2% short of the goal of a 25% decline rather than “1.8 percentage points short of the 25 percent goal.”  In other words, ONDCP fell more than 7% short of its goal. These are data from “special analysis [from researchers at the University of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future study] that combines data from all three grades” (p. 2). ONDCP’s stated objective was to reduce drug use by 25% among 8^th, 10^th and 12^th graders, and in previous versions the Strategy, ONDCP reported on these trends separately.

 More good news from ONDCP states that lifetime use of LSD has declined 62% over five years, nearly 45% for Ecstasy, 41% for methamphetamine, 40% for steroids, and 18% for marijuana (p. 1).

 Later in the Strategy, ONDCP does acknowledge rapid increases in forms of other drugs — prescription drug abuse — and ONDCP even illustrates such increases in figures for the first time ever (p. 7). Yet, ONDCP does not report such data on youth; instead it focuses on 18-25 year olds. For example: “The nonmedical use of pain relievers among 18- to 25-year-olds increased by 15 percent from 2002 to 2005” (p. 31). Since this is the same time during which youth use of various drugs fell, is it possible youth began using more nonmedical pain relievers as a form of drug substitution? ONDCP provides no evidence to assess this possibility.

 Never does ONDCP consider the possibility that young drug users have not really stopped using illicit drugs like LSD, Ecstasy or meth, but instead have merely switched to more readily available prescription drugs.  If true, this would suggest drug replacement rather than successful prevention.

 Interestingly, ONDCP’s Figure 1 also shows that alcohol use is down 13% and smoking cigarettes is down 29%.  Presumably use of these substances has fallen due to factors other than the war on drugs, since alcohol and tobacco are not included as part of ONDCP’s explicit focus and are not subject to a drug war. However, ONDCP seems to take credit for these declines as well, saying the “balloon effect” of reductions in marijuana use “could result in rising rates of youth smoking and alcohol consumption” (p. 5).

 
The Bad News

Now, for the bad news that ONDCP downplays or altogether ignores.

First, drug use among 8^th, 10^th, and 12^th graders in 2006 is still significantly higher than in 1991, the first year Monitoring the Future began surveying students in all three grades. ONDCP’s Figure 2 illustrates this fact clearly. From 1991, drug use among young people has generally trended upward.  And since the creation of ONDCP in 1988, drug use among your people is largely unchanged.

Even for drugs where recent declines have occurred (e.g., steroids), long-term trends still suggest an upward trend.  ONDCP’s Figure 4 shows current steroid use among 12^th graders. ONDCP’s note that steroid use in 2006 is 33% lower than 2004 (when Congress passed the Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004) ignores the fact that current use in 2006 is higher than 1991 and has generally trended upward since that year.

Second, the 2007 Strategy once again provides little discussion of drug use trends for adults (and no figures whatsoever). Its two- and five-year goals were stated not only for youth but also for adults. Yet, ONDCP does not report on progress toward its objectives of reducing adult drug use by 10% over two years and 25% over five years.

In the Strategy, it is clear that ONDCP knows what is occurring with adult drug use trends because it states:

 Six years into the President’s first National Drug Control Strategy, a review of trends in drug use provides important insights into what works in drug control. It also provides lessons in dealing with current challenges such as continued high rates of drug use by adults, and the continued need to target young people in prevention and intervention efforts (p. 1, emphasis added).

 It is dishonest of ONDCP to claim success in meeting its goals of reducing drug use by 10% and 25% over two and five years, respectively, when ONDCP is only assessing drug use trends for young people and not adults. Further, ONDCP’s claim that “a review of trends in drug use provides important insights into what works” is misleading. How can we know if ONDCP’s efforts work when we are only shown data on youth drug trends and not adult drug trends?

 ONDCP does mention specific statistics pertaining to adult drug use when it serves its own interests of claiming success, but it does not provide any through assessment of adult drug use trends overall.  For example, ONDCP writes:

 Although not representative of the general population, many years of results from drug testing in the workplace population … have shown significant patterns of change. For example, the number of positive tests for cocaine use, which had been rising through the mid-1990s, dropped 44 percent between 1995 and 2003 and has since leveled off. Also, declines in youth marijuana use reported in the MTF survey (a 23.2 percent drop over the past four years) coincided with a comparable decline in the number of positive tests in the adult workplace population (p. 3, emphasis added).

 ….

 Among adults, data from workplace drug testing indicate that positives for amphetamines declined 17 percent between 2004 and May 2006, and positives for methamphetamines declined 45 percent during the same period of time (p. 4)

 
Need for Treatment

 In the 2007 Strategy, ONDCP claims that: “According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), more than 19 million Americans 12 years and older are current users of an illicit drug. Approximately seven million of them exhibit the diagnostic criteria for abuse or dependence …” (p. 4).

 The actual number of users is 19.7 million users, and 6.8 million are in need of treatment, according to ONDCP.  Thus, 34.5% of illicit drug users are either drug abusers or are dependent on the drugs they use.  This means about two-thirds of drug users are not in need of drug treatment.

 As in the past, ONDCP describes users who do not yet have a problem as being in denial:

 A major obstacle to intervening and treating drug users is reaching the users who do not realize they have a problem. This group is the vast majority of drug users in America, and reaching them before they become addicted makes it more likely they will change their habits and thereby avoid the serious health and behavioral consequences of addiction (p. 8).

 
Another possibility, not considered by ONDCP, is that many drug users may never have serious consequences or problems, much like a user of alcohol can responsibly drink without negative consequences.

 Later in the Strategy, ONDCP shows a figure claiming that 20.9 million people need but do not receive treatment. Yet, the statistic includes alcohol users as well as illicit drug users (p. 22). Since alcohol abuse is beyond ONDCP’s mission, it is odd that ONDCP includes alcohol-related statistics in its Strategy.

 Treatment Still Not Available

ONDCP again attempts to appear compassionate, writing:

 … the Administration is working to expand options for treatment. The Access to Recovery Program (ATR) program at HHS is a key source of innovation in the field of addiction recovery. The program provides clients with a voucher for treatment services as well as recovery support services. The program expands treatment options to include faith and community-based providers so that clients can choose a treatment regime in which they feel they will do best (p. 24).

 Yet, ONDCP provides no statistics or figures with regard to how many people receive treatment relative to those who need it. If treatment works, as research suggests it does, why is treatment not a bigger part of the Strategy? Why is it not afforded a greater portion of the budget? Further, why does ONDCP fail to provide evidence that it has achieved its goal of providing help to drug users who need it?

Marijuana is Dangerous and Addictive

 ONDCP claims:

 NSDUH has shown that the risk for marijuana abuse and dependency in younger users now exceeds that for alcohol and tobacco use, with 26.8 percent of past-year marijuana users between the ages of 12 and 17 displaying characteristics of abuse or dependency. The rate of abuse or dependency for past-year users of alcohol and cigarettes in the same age group is 16.6 percent and 16.0 percent, respectively (p. 5).

 In fact, figures presented by ONDCP show that although marijuana users account for 74% of illicit drug users, they account for only 60% of users estimated to be drug dependent or abusers (p. 4). This suggests marijuana is less addictive than other drugs. Further, ONDCP itself admits that marijuana only produces moderate withdrawal symptoms such as “tremors, sweating, nausea, irritability, reduced appetite and sleep disturbances” (p. 21).

 Additionally, ONDCP misstates the evidence of a “gateway effect” of marijuana, stating that “using marijuana has been found to increase the risk for abuse and dependency on other drugs such as heroin and cocaine later in life” (p. 5). In fact, much research illustrates that this is a spurious relationship and is actually due to factors unique to individuals and situations that make individuals more likely to use marijuana as well as other drugs (both legal and illegal).

The “Compassionate” Drug War

ONDCP discusses prescription drug abuse in the 2006 Strategy, again pointing out that it is the second highest form of illicit drug use in the United States behind marijuana. Further, ONDCP again advocates regulation rather than prohibition to solve the problem through the “Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP).”  According to ONDCP:
“PDMPs help reduce doctor shopping and prescription fraud while ensuring patient access to needed treatment by allowing physicians and pharmacists to input and receive accurate and timely prescription history information” (p. 31).

 With prescription drug abuse, ONDCP is advocating compassionate regulation.  Yet, as in the past, ONDCP fails to consider this approach for all illicit drugs.

Drug Testing “Can Work” / Drug Courts Do Work

 The 2007 Strategy does not abandon its belief in the value of drug testing, but unlike previous versions that claim drug testing works, this one states:

 Student drug testing serves a dual purpose: it can prevent drug use while also helping identify students who need help. Student drug testing can prevent drug use because it gives students an “out:” if they want to participate in extracurricular activities, they know they will be subject to a test and can use potential testing as an excuse to refuse drugs when approached by a peer.

 Furthermore, drug testing can help create a culture of disapproval toward drugs in schools. It also helps prepare students for a job market that often requires random drug testing for employees (p. 16, emphasis added).

 ONDCP provides no evidence from national studies that show drug testing is effective. Instead, it offers anecdotal evidence from a school board in California’s Oceanside Unified School District: “Very few student athletes test positive for drugs; since the program resumed in October 2005, there has only been one positive drug test” (p. 17).

 Rather than presenting evidence that drug testing works, ONDCP claims: “Testing is a tried and true method of deterring drug use in America." It then uses evidence from mandatory testing of US military personnel returning from Vietnam in the 1970s and subsequent military testing, to suggest that drug testing in schools is effective.

 ONDCP only turns to national evidence when the national evidence supports its claims. For example, with regard to drug courts, ONDCP notes: “A recent survey of more than 120 evaluations of drug court programs showed that they outperformed virtually all other strategies that have been attempted for drug offenders within the 1 to 2 years that courts typically monitor offenders” (p. 25). Since national evidence calls into question the effectiveness of drug testing, ONDCP simply leaves it out of the Strategy.

Un)successful Market Disruption

 The 2007 Strategy yet again lays out the logic of market disruption efforts:

 Reducing the availability of drugs in the United States can cause a decline in purity or an increase in price. In such cases, initiation becomes less likely and dependence more difficult to sustain.

 ….

 The core elements of the Administration’s market-disruption strategy—eradicating illicit crops, interdicting illegal drugs, and attacking drug organizations—are designed to reduce availability by attacking the pressure points of the illegal drug market. Because of these actions, a drug trafficker’s costs will increase, which will reduce the overall profits associated with drug trafficking. Increased risk of arrest will also deter traffickers from entering the market and encourage others to leave. The biggest impact, however, is that a shrinking international supply of drugs will result in less drugs on U.S. streets (p. 8).

 However, as with past versions of the Strategy, this one also does not provide data on which to assess the efficacy of drug market disruption efforts – no data on drug prices, availability, costs to drug dealers and profits, and so forth.

 To ONDCP, market disruption should be taken on faith rather than evidence. Yet, honest policy evaluation requires access to the data.

 ONDCP even offers a “Preface to Chapter Three” before it discusses market disruption. In this, ONDCP links the war on drugs to the war on terrorism:

 Federal drug control and intelligence agencies are particularly focused on the dangerous nexus between drugs and terrorism. Currently, 18 of the 42 organizations on the State Department’s List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations are linked to illicit drug trafficking. U.S. law enforcement agencies seek to leverage the tools, expertise, authorities, and capabilities that they have successfully used to dismantle major international drug trafficking organizations to confront terrorism and other transnational security threats.

 The National Drug Control Strategy complements the National Security Strategy of the United States in this regard by directly supporting U.S. efforts to “Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization” (p. 27).

 No other part of the Strategy has its own preface. ONDCP clearly believes linking the war on drugs to the war on terror serves a necessary purpose.

Costs of the Drug War

 And what are the costs of the drug war? ONDCP is silent on this with one exception.

 The 2007 Strategy claims: “In 2002, more than 26,000 people died as a direct consequence of drug use, a figure that does not include those killed as an indirect consequence of drug-using behavior” (p. 21). This figure includes deaths due to prescription drugs, but ONDCP does not point this out.

 Further, ONDCP does not acknowledge that deaths due to illicit drugs have risen consistently under the drug war, even during periods when drug use declined. This suggests that prohibition actually makes drug use more dangerous — opposite of ONDCP’s goal of “healing drug users.”

 Costs-benefits analysis of ONDCP and the drug war cannot be accomplished without a full-presentation of the data. The Strategy — which leaves out almost all data on drug policy costs — is simply not useful for policy analysis.

 
Conclusion

 The 2007 Strategy is more of the same from ONDCP — a dishonest, incomplete report that is ill-suited to assist in a truthful assessment of the nation’s drug control efforts. While ONDCP highlights the good news in the nation’s drug control efforts — and there is good news — it continues to produce a flawed assessment of the nation’s drug war. The National Drug Control Strategy appears to be little else than a document that is intended to reinforce the dominant ideology of the drug war regardless of what the relevant data show.

Careful policy analysis can determine if the drug war is meeting its goals, as well as if the benefits of the drug war outweigh the costs. The National Drug Control Strategy is a document that cannot assist in such an evaluation.