www.justiceblind.com
Imagine That: A Failing Drug War
Matthew Robinson, PhD
Imagine a federal agency created in the wake of a moral
panic over a perceived problem that was blown way out of proportion relative to
the dangers actually posed.
Imagine that the agency was meant to be short-lived, yet has
been re-established by federal law every five years for nearly two decades despite
not being systematically assessed as required by law.
Imagine that every year the agency’s budget significantly
grew in spite of repeated failures that span three presidential administrations.
You would think, if such as agency were actually to exist,
that members of Congress would rail against it to assure its demise. After all, such an agency would exemplify
what many in Congress loathe most – big government, running amok and out of
control, unnecessarily in the pockets of American citizens.
The agency – the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) – does exist, and has remained unchallenged by Congress since ONDCP’s
creation in November 1988 after the crack cocaine scare of the 1980s. At the time, crack cocaine use did rise, but
was still extremely rare in the country.
One solution to the crack problem was tougher sentences for
crack dealers, including a 100:1 sentencing disparity for crack versus powder
cocaine. Another solution was ONDCP.
ONDCP, the lead agency in the federal war on drugs, was
created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 as an executive agency to “establish
policies, priorities, and objectives for the Nation's drug control program.” Its goals, though fluctuating over the years,
are to reduce illicit drug use, availability of illegal drugs, and drug-related
health consequences.
Each year, ONDCP produces its National Drug Control Strategy
to report to citizens and members of Congress how the drug war is going. Empirical evidence reported in the Strategy clearly
shows that, since ONDCP was created, most forms of drug use have not been
reduced, drugs are still widely available, and more people die every year due
to drug-related consequences. Further, efforts
to disrupt drug markets have not achieved ONDCP’s goals of increasing drug
prices or reducing purity. ONDCP has
also been unable to meet its recently stated goal of “healing drug users” – the
vast majority of people who need drug treatment do not get it.
Judged by virtually any standard, ONDCP has been a massive
failure. Yet, the budget directed by
ONDCP exceeded $19 billion in 2002 and has grown every year since (in 2003,
ONDCP changed its budgeting format to produce the appearance of drastic
spending reductions in the war on drugs, even though the money is still being
spent).
This kind of chicanery is typical of ONDCP. Our analysis of the past seven ONDCP Strategy
reports found that it is filled with exaggerations, half-truths, and sometimes,
outright lies. ONDCP focuses almost
exclusively on good news (e.g., short-term drug use declines) while ignoring and
downplaying bad news (e.g., long-term drug use increases). ONDCP selectively presents data and even intentionally
presents faulty statistics and visual graphs to prove arguments its own data
show to be false.
ONDCP stresses the theoretical importance
of eradication, interdiction, and foreign intervention for disrupting drug
markets but ignores the actual outcomes of their efforts (i.e., falling drug prices,
increased drug purity, and mostly steady availability). In terms of rising deaths due to illicit
drugs, ONDCP says nothing. In fact, beginning
with the 2003 Strategy, ONDCP stopped reporting any costs – social or
financial, attributable to the drug war.
As for why the drug war is unable to provide treatment to drug abusers, ONDCP
places the blame on those in need of treatment, claiming they are simply in denial.
If ONDCP committed itself to
honestly evaluate its drug war, it would find it to be a massive failure. Instead, we get the annual Strategy reports,
aimed not at telling the truth but instead at selling a failed policy through
White House propaganda.
In 1998, Congress required ONDCP
to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug war, when it passed the “Office of
National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act.” This law created the “Performance Measures of
Effectiveness” (PME) system, Adesigned
… to inform the drug control community about the extent to which it achieves
the ... Strategy=s goals
and objectives and to assist in the clarification of problem areas and the
development of corrective actions.@
However, ONDCP only used the PME system once, for the 1998
Strategy. ONDCP issued three reports,
whereby trends in drug use, availability, age of first use, and similar trends,
were evaluated from 1998 to 2000. Statistics
in each of the three reports show that the drug war was failing to achieve its
goals across the board – performance measures for meeting the goals of reducing
drug use, reducing demand for drugs, and reducing drug supply were all “off
track.”
So, what did ONDCP do?
It stopped using the PME system!
ONDCP, as a failing and dishonest agency that directs a
multi-billion dollar budget, should be terminated by Congress. In its place, an honest, independent agency
should be created – outside of the White House – to direct the nation’s drug
control efforts.