9/11: A Review of Richard Clarke's Against All Enemies

By Matthew B. Robinson, PhD
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
Appalachian State University
robinsnmb@appstate.edu



Additional facts added in italics are from other sources than Clarke.  The text in RED deals with threats about airplanes discussed by Clarke.

The following is a bulleted review of Richard Clarke’s book, Against All Enemies.  In the review, I lay out:

∙    Clarke’s history;
∙    Clarke’s assertions about why terrorists attacked us on 9/11;
∙    Clarke’s main argument about inadequacies in the Bush Administration (and earlier Presidents) that led to 9/11;
∙    Threats/proof the Bush Administration knew about a coming terrorist attack;
∙    Proof Clarke is telling the truth about why he asked for a transfer from the Counterterrorism Security Group and that the Bush Administration was not concerned with al Qaeda;
∙    Failures before and after 9/11, as well as mistakes on that day;
∙    Details about Clarke’s opinion on Iraq;
∙    Lies discussed by Clarke; and
∙    Curious acknowledgments/assertions by Clarke about 9/11.

The book lays the blame for the terrorist attacks squarely at the feet of neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration who were so obsessed with Iraq that they ignored in your face evidence about a coming attack by al Qaeda in the US or against American interests.  Further, he blames incompetence in the FBI and CIA for 9/11.  Finally, he lays out why he thinks the Iraq war is a mistake and what we should be doing instead to protect our country from terrorism.

Clarke’s history

∙    Chair of White House Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) since 1992.  Served Presidents Reagan, Bush the first, Clinton, and George W. Bush.

∙    Member of Principals Committee with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, and Vice President Dick Cheney.

∙    Resigned from CSG out of frustration over Bush Administration refusal to take threat from al Qaeda seriously (60 Minutes reporter Rich Bonin taped a show with Richard Clarke prior to 9/11 ... the three hour interview was shown on a 17 minute segment where Clarke was asked by Bonin if it was true he requested a transfer to a new unit on cyber security.  Clarke says Bonin “wanted to run the story that I was quitting the terrorism job in frustration with the new administration’s lack of focus on al Qaeda” [p. 26]).

Why Did They Attack Us?

∙    According to Clarke: “To understand why [a new international] movement has chosen American as its target and why America failed to see the effects of its own actions, we need to remind ourselves of some events of the last twenty-five years” (p. 35).  It started in 1979, when our greatest ally in the Middle East, the Iranian government, was overthrown by radical Muslims and when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  This got us further into the two regions.

∙    President Ronald Reagan’s policy actions included confronting the Soviets in Afghanistan, putting the US military in the Persian Gulf, and strengthening Israel for a southern flank against the Soviets.  The US insertion of Marines into Beirut in 1982 led to three bomb attacks by Iranian backed Hezbollah, including one on Marine barracks where 278 Americans died.  Reagan pulled out US troops without retaliation; Clarke maintains this taught terrorists they could hit us without consequences.

∙    In the 1980s, Richard Clarke and others negotiated US military presence in Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia ... they asked for “access” agreements and the right to enhance existing facilities ... and the US moved large numbers of US contractors into Saudi Arabia.

∙    After Saddam Hussein launched a war on Iran in the 1980s, the US began working on plans to prevent an Iraqi loss.  Clarke, while at the State Department, learned that President Reagan did not want Iraq to lose to a radical, Islamist, anti-American Iranian regime.  In 1982, Reagan removed Iraq for the list of nations that sponsored terrorism.  This allowed them to request some loans from the US.  In 1983, Reagan sent a presidential envoy to meet with Saddam Hussein, and the man was now Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld!  According to Clarke, after this meeting, the US began sending intelligence to Iraq to help it not lost to Iran.  Then in 1984, the US resumed full diplomatic relations with Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt even began selling them US arms!

∙    In the 1980s, the US also got much closer with Israel.  In 1983, the Joint Politico-Military Group (JPMG), a US Israeli planning group, was formed (Clarke would become the US head of this group that worked on contingency plans to respond to a Soviet attack).  One outcome was the creation of an Israeli missile defense system and the deployment of US Patriot missiles.

∙    In 1986, the US arranged to have Kuwaiti tankers be “reflagged” with US flags so that they could be protected by the US Navy, which meant now the US Navy flocked to the Persian Gulf.

∙    The net result of these policies (that Clarke called defensive rather than offensive in nature) was to prevent Iran from gaining power and to check the Soviet power in the region.  Yet, it also resulted in inflamed feelings by some Arabs and Muslims in the region.  For some, our mere presence was enough.

∙    Our offensive effort came in Afghanistan after the Soviets invaded.  Analysis from 1985 showed the Soviet Union turning the tide in the war in their favor.  Clarke thus suggested providing the Afghani resistance fighters with US Stinger missiles, which the US smuggled in through Pakistan in 1986.  The US also arranged training of the mujahedeen in Pakistan.  With the help of the Pakistani ISI, the Afghani mujahedeen defeated the Soviet Union, forcing their withdrawal.  Although Clarke says he thinks Reagan’s Afghanistan policy was the right one, he also acknowledges that this could have “laid the seeds of al Qaeda” (p. 51).

∙    At the same time, Clarke says we made four mistakes during the Reagan era: 1) relying on the Pakistani ISI to deliver aid to Afghanistan; 2) assisting mujahedeen transport to Afghanistan and training to defeat the Soviet Union; 3) quickly pulling out from Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviets (which allowed the Taliban to rise to power);  and 4) cutting aid to Pakistan rather than helping them deal with rising fanaticism.

∙    According to Clarke, the tribal chiefs, ISI officers, and Arab volunteers from all over the world who led the Afghanis to victory included UBL and Khalid Shiekh Mohammed (the masterminds of 9/11).  The US embassy left them in charge of large areas of Afghanistan.

∙    In 1990, while President Bush (the first) was in office, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.  President Bush decided to defend the Saudi oil fields from a possible invasion by Hussein.  Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney got the mission to convince the Saudi King that they should accept US forces.  When the King met with his advisors and members of the royal family, the translator was his ambassador to the US and his nephew, Prince Bandar.  Given President Bush’s promise to withdraw US troops as soon as the threat was over or whenever the King ordered, the Saudi King agreed to let US troops on Saudi soil.  UBL, now in Saudi Arabia, was outraged at our presence there.  Added to this was his slight when the King turned down his offer to use his own men to defend the Kingdom from Hussein’s forces.  The US built a coalition to defeat Saddam Hussein and it included seven Arab countries.  In its easy victory, the US even resorted to “turkey shoots” of retreating Iraqi troops (p. 64).  According to Clarke, President Bush ordered the bombing against Iraqi troops to stop, in part because they thought the military would oust Saddam anyway after the war.  The US did not occupy Iraq because Iraq’s Arab neighbors feared a Shi’a Muslim majority would take over Iraq and set up a pro-Iranian regime.  Bush himself wrote: Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under the circumstances, there was no viable "exit strategy" we could see, violating another of our principles. Furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-Cold War world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations' mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different — and perhaps barren — outcome. -- George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (1998), pp. 489-90

∙    The US military stood by while Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard to slaughter the Shi’a, the marsh Arabs in the south, and the Kurds in the north.  Clarke thus asserts we should have eliminated the Republican Guard.  Since we did not, Saddam Hussein stayed in power and the US kept forces in Saudi Arabia to defend it and Kuwait.  The US also stayed in other Arab countries, including Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.  Saudi Arabia also bought US arms and thus American contractors traveled there to make them work.

∙    One of the Saudi dissidents who protested all this was UBL, and his family and their economic holdings were threatened.  UBL thus fled to Khartoum, Sudan in 1991 where he was welcomed by the Sudanese leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

∙    According to Clarke, then, it was the fall of the Soviet Union that led to increased hatred for the United States and ultimately the formation of al Qaeda.

Presidential Inaction / US Failure Prior to 9/11

∙    President Bush did little to nothing about terrorism prior to 9/11 ... he was obsessed with missile defense after being sworn in.

∙    President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, had almost no discussions about al Qaeda and Islamic terrorists prior to 9/11.  Compare this with President Clinton’s National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, who held dozens of meetings on al Qaeda.  According to Clarke: “He knew their names, their modus operandi, and he feared they would strike again before we could cripple their organization.  He convened the Principals in crisis mode [saying] ‘We have stopped two sets of attacks planned for the Millennium.  You can bet your measly federal paycheck that there are more out there and we have to stop them too.  I spoke with the President and he wants you all to know, this is it, nothing more important, all assets.  We stop this fucker’” (pp. 211-212).

∙    When President Bush took office, White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke briefed the new team, saying: “al Qaeda is at war with us, it is a highly capable organization, probably with sleeper cells in the US, and it is clearly planning a major series of attacks against us; we must act decisively and quickly, deciding on the issues prepared after the attack one the Cole, going on the offensive” (p. 227).  According to Clarke, Vice President Dick Cheney attended Principals meetings, something no Vice President had ever done.  Clarke assures us that Cheney was told repeatedly about the threat of al Qaeda.  Clarke says: “I hoped he would speak up about the urgency of the problem, put it on a short list for immediate action.  He didn’t” (p. 228).  Clarke also says Colin Powell was surprised at the unanimity of the perceived threat by al Qaeda among the members of the Principals Committee.  Condoleeza Rice, according to Clarke, clearly had never heard of al Qaeda before.  In fact, Rice wanted to change the mission of the Counterterrorism Security Group and decided that the position of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism would be downgraded.  Clarke says: “No longer would the Coordinator be a member of the Principals Committee.  No longer would the CSG report to the Principals, but instead to a committee of Deputy Secretaries.  No longer would the National Coordinator be supported by two NSC Senior Directors or have the budget review mechanisms with the Associate Director of OMB.  She did, however, ask me to stay on an to keep my entire staff in place” (p. 230).

∙    Clarke says that within a week of Bush’s Inauguration, he wrote to Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley asking urgently for a Principals meeting to review the threat of al Qaeda.  Rice said the Principals would not meet to discuss it until the issue had been framed by the Deputies Committee.  This led to months of delay, and the Deputies Committee met in April for the first time.  When Clarke gave his plan to take on the Taliban, al Qaeda, and UBL, Paul Wolfowitz (Donald Rumsfeld’s deputy at the Defense Department) said: “Well, I just don’t understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden.”  After being told by Clarke that al Qaeda posed a direct threat to the US, Wolfowitz responded: “Well, there are others that do as well, at least as much.  Iraqi terrorism for example.”  Clarke replied: “I am unaware of any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed at the United States ... since 1993, and I think FBI and CIA concur in that judgment ...” CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin said: “Yes, that is right Dick.  We have no evidence of any active Iraqi terrorist threat against the US.”  Wolfowitz then said: “You give bin Laden too much credit.  He could not do all these things like the 1993 attack on New York, not without a state sponsor.  Just because FBI and CIA have failed to find linkages does not mean they don’t exist” (pp. 231-232).  A compromise was eventually reached to study more on al Qaeda before any action was taken.  The delay continued into the spring of 2001 ... other issues took precedence over terrorism, including the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto environment agreement, and Iraq, and so Clarke asked to resign.  He said: “Perhaps I have become too close to the terrorism issue.  I have worked it for ten years and to me it seems like a very important issues, but maybe I’m becoming like Captain Ahab with bin Laden as the White Whale.  Maybe you need someone less obsessive about it” (p. 234).

∙    Clarke was to begin his new job on October 1st, and Clarke maintains he was intent on pushing hard on al Qaeda to get a Bush Administration policy in place before he left.  He and his deputy Roger Cressey rewrote the Pol-Mil Plan as a draft National Security Presidential Decision document for the President’s signature with the goal of eliminating al Qaeda.  He and CIA Director George Tenet wanted to push Bush to focus on al Qaeda.  Bush said to Rice that he wanted to stop swatting at flies with al Qaeda and eliminate them once and for all.  Rice thus asked Clarke how the document was preceding in the Deputies Committee and Clarke said he could have it ready in two days.  Rice said she would set up a meeting, and time just passed without it.  Meanwhile, George Tenet said that the CIA was getting more and more threats and more and more evidence that an attack was rapidly approaching.  In late June 2001, Tenet said to Clarke: “It’s my sixth sense, but I feel it coming, This is going to be the big one” (p. 235).  Yet, more and more intelligence suggested that the attack was going to be in Israel or Saudi Arabia, but Clarke suspected otherwise based on the Millennium threats.  So Clarke emailed Condoleeza Rice that al Qaeda was trying to kill Americans and wanted to have hundreds of dead in the streets of America.  He also convened a meeting of the CSG in July to ask each agency to put itself on full alert.  The FBI was asked to send a warning to all 18,000 police agencies, the State Department was asked to send a warning to all the US embassies in the world, the Defense Department was alerted to go to Threat Condition Delta, and the Navy was asked to move its ships out of Bahrain.  The FAA was instructed to send a special security warning to the airlines and airports and to set up special security at the ports of entry.  Clarke was animated: “You’ve just heard that CIA thinks al Qaeda is planning a major attack on us.  So do I.  You heard CIA say it would probably be in Israel or Saudi Arabia.  Maybe.  But maybe it will be here.  Just because there is no evidence that says it will be here does not mean it will be overseas.  They may try to hit us at home.  You have to assume that is what they are going to try to do.  Cancel summer vacations, schedule overtime, have your terrorist reaction teams on alert to move real fast.  Tell me, tell each other, about anything unusual” (p. 236).

∙    Of course, there was evidence they were planning to attack us in the United States.  And Clarke acknowledges that the CIA knew there were al Qaeda terrorists in the US, and the FBI knew there were Arabic people taking lessons at flight schools, including some asking strange questions about crashing planes.  Clarke says “red lights and bells should have been going off.  They had specific information about individual terrorists from which one could have deduced what was about to happen” (p. 237).

∙    The first Principal’s Committee meeting did not occur until September 4, 2001, one week to the day prior to the attacks of 9/11, a meeting that had been requested by Clarke on January 25, 2001!  Clarke gave the Principals a choice and said they could treat al Qaeda as a nuisance or as a real terrorist threat.  He said to Rice that she should imagine herself in her own shoes when in the very near future al Qaeda had killed hundreds of Americans.  “What will you wish then that you had already done”? (p. 237).  According to Clarke, the Principals Committee meeting was largely a non-event.  No one disagreed with Clarke and Tenet about the threat posed by al Qaeda.  Yet, Donald Rumsfeld noted there were other terrorist concerns such as Iraq.

∙    Part of the FBI’s problem was it felt its hands were tied.  The Attorney General’s Guidelines required agents to have probable cause of criminal activity before they could monitor a mosque or attend a student group, or even print pages from a web site.  According to Clarke: “The Attorney General’s Guidelines were initially adopted in the wake of the Watergate era scandals of the early 1970s.  During that period it had been revealed that the FBI had kept files on people and groups for no reason other than J. Edgar Hoover’s whim.  To correct that kind of abuse, the Justice Department put the FBI in a straitjacket and they were still in it” (p. 216).  If I read this correctly, it suggests to me that J. Edgar Hoover had a hand in the attacks of 9/11.  It is because of past abuses that current investigators could not gain access to vital information that may have stopped the attacks of 9/11.  Ironically, the US has passed laws after 9/11 such as the USA PATRIOT Act that allow new abuses to occur.  The FBI also had poor computer systems and way too few translators of Arabic and Farsi and Pashto.

∙    9/11 attacks were only one day after the assassination of the leader of the Northern Alliance leader Massoud by a group of Arabic men posing as news reporters wanting to interview the leader but who instead blew themselves up in his presence (a similar assassination attempt was made against President Bush in Sarasota Florida on September 10th!).  The CIA was reluctant to help the Northern Alliance for it thought it was no match for the Taliban, so perhaps it was unaware???  CIA Director Tenet was obsessed with al Qaeda, according to Clarke, but members of Congress did not take it seriously.

∙    The CIA took months to tell the FBI that known terrorists were in the country, and the FBI failed to find them or alert the FAA or even America’s Most Wanted about them.  Further, the CIA for years failed to acknowledge al Qaeda for what it was, instead choosing to see it as a “Veterans of Foreign Wars for Arabs” (p. 96).  The CIA also could not track UBL effectively ... CIA assets in Afghanistan could only tell them where UBL had been days earlier ... even when information came in about his immediate whereabouts, getting the info. up the chain of command to authorize attacks took time ... Clinton was presented with three opportunities to launch attacks on UBL, but “there was reason not to fire the missiles” each time.”  Twice, CIA Director George Tenet recommended against the attacks due to unreliable information, and once Tenet and Clarke recommended against it based on satellite photos of the alleged camp (p. 200).  On only one occasion was UBL actually at the location where it was said he was, and that location was close to a hospital that would have been damaged by a missile attack.  Clarke suggested bombing all the terrorist training camps but the idea was rejected in part because the US was already bombing Iraq regularly and in part because of the poor quality hut targets.

∙    White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke developed a plan to attack al Qaeda in January 2001 but never was allowed to brief the President on it and there was no meeting until September 4, 2001 where Clarke talked to Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, and Secretary of State Colin Powell.

∙    Richard Clarke, FBI agent John O’Neill, and others believed strongly al Qaeda cells were in the US and tried to get the FBI to look for them.  The CIA knew that al Qaeda was planning attacks for the Millennium, and considered possible targets here.  In fact, Ahmed Ressam was caught entering the US by an alert US Customs officer.  In his car were explosives and a map of the Los Angeles International Airport that he planned to attack.  The investigation led to an arrest of a man in Pakistan and another American who had lived close to the airport.  Yet, the FBI did not look for them and denied they were here.

∙    FBI agent John O’Neill, who was obsessed with al Qaeda, resigned from the FBI out of frustration that the FBI would not more actively target al Qaeda and its funding sources and presence in the US.  Ironically, O’Neill had taken the job of Director of Security at the World Trade Center in the week prior to 9/11 and was killed on that day.

∙    Presidents Reagan, Bush the first, and Clinton also made mistakes, mostly not responding to attacks (Beirut bombings, Pan Am 103, USS Cole).

∙    According to Clarke, President Clinton did go after Iraq after Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate President Bush the first.   The US targeted Iraqi intelligence for an attack and “A stark warning would be passed to the Iraqis, threatening dire consequences for an further terrorism against the United States” (p. 82).  We also killed innocent civilians when missiles fell short, including the leading female artist of the Arab world.  Clarke says these efforts worked: “Subsequent to that June 1993 retaliation, the US intelligence and law enforcement communities never developed any evidence of further Iraqi support for terrorism directed against Americans.  Until we invaded Iraq in 2003" (p. 84).

∙    Although Clinton did not respond to the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia in 1993, Clarke asserts Clinton was let down by the military there, for the Pentagon rejected a plan to capture the Somalian leader Aideed earlier.  Clinton did sign Presidential Decision Directive 39 “US Policy on Counterterrorism” which reiterated the “no concessions policy” violated by President Reagan when he traded arms for hostages in Iran, and called for offensive and defensive actions to “reduce terrorist capabilities” and to “reduce vulnerabilities at home and abroad.”  The coordinated policy would involve law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic tools (p. 92). 

∙    President Clinton was very concerned with terrorism and took action, including steady increases in counterterrorism funding.  Clarke even asserts that Clinton shut down the threat of Iran.

∙    According to Clarke, Clinton’s focus turned to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the mid 1990s.  Yet, even our troops were not protected from such hazards in the 1990s (and still are not today).  No agency took the threat to Americans from such attacks seriously, says Clarke.  The Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) also ran ten programs under Clinton, aimed at catching & punishing terrorists (FBI), disrupting terrorist groups (CIA), obtaining international cooperation against terrorism (State Department), preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (CIA and Defense Department), management of consequences of terrorist attacks (Health & Human Services and FEMA), security for transportation (Department of Transportation), protection of infrastructure and cyber systems (FBI and Commerce Department), continuity of government, discovering and disrupting cells in the US (FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Services, and Treasury Department), and protecting Americans overseas (Defense Department and State Department).  Clinton’s efforts also included: providing funding for training and equipment for public health departments, hospitals, fire departments, and emergency services units; buying vaccines and medicines and stockpiling them around the country; more funds for departments to address terrorism; exercise drills across the country to practice for attacks; economic sanctions against UBL and al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban; a politico-military plan (Pol-Mil Plan) for al Qaeda; and even putting a hit out on UBL; launching missile strikes against target in Sudan; the State Department put pressure on the Taliban to close the terrorist training camps; and Clinton developed a three part plan to get the Taliban to cooperate (retaliate if attacked, ask Saudi Arabia and UAE to terminate diplomatic relations and cut off aid, and seize all assets of the Taliban in the US).  Finally, Clinton authorized the use of the Predator to find UBL in 2000.  Clarke also reports that US agencies, especially the CIA, opposed his idea to send an armed Predator in to kill UBL.  Even CIA Director George Tenet opposed the idea, saying: “It would be a terrible mistake for the Director of Central Intelligence to fir a weapon like this” (p. 222).  Clarke also asserts that neither the CIA nor the FBI would say conclusively that the USS Cole was bombed by al Qaeda, meaning President Clinton could not order attacks on al Qaeda camps even though Clarke wanted to do this.

∙    During the Clinton Administration: UBL was “discovered” as a major terrorist threat ... the White House pressured the CIA to create a UBL unit which discovered al Qaeda cells in 50 countries; jihadists were expelled from Bosnia through the Dayton Accords ... the US threatened Bosnian President Izatbegovic with a termination of military aid and a cessation of all aid if he did not evict the mujahedeen; Clinton requested a Pentagon plan to launch US special forces against al Qaeda facilities in Sudan in 1995; Clinton requested a Pentagon plan to snatch UBL in 1996 and 1997; and Clinton approved every snatch order requested by the CIA, Justice Department, or Defense Department (including of Mir Amal Kansi, who killed a CIA officer in Virginia and boarded a plane to Pakistan to flee).

∙    Yet, during the Clinton presidency, Ramzi Yousef was allowed to escape the US after attacking the World Trade Center in 1993.  He also was let in the country with no passport or documentation whatsoever and merely given a citation to appear before an immigration magistrate.  Also during this time, Omar Abdel Rahman, the “blind Shiekh,” was allowed to operate openly in the US (even though he was on the State Department lookout list, he got a visa in Sudan to come to New York from Egypt).

∙    In 1995, the US Congress refused to pass a counterterrorism bill, led by Republicans such as Orrin Hatch and Tom Delay.

∙    The CIA did not snatch Khlaid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 who had already been indicted in New York in 1996 for his role in the first World Trade Center bombing and the planned Bojinka plot, when it was known he was in Doha, Qatar working for the Water Ministry.  He was tipped off by Qatari officials before FBI team could capture him.

∙    In 1998, during the Clinton years, al Qaeda declared war on the US, yet we did not respond with war on them.  Clinton did say he wanted to get rid of al Qaeda once and for all but Pakistan would have to allow our planes to fly over its country to attack in Afghanistan.  Targets chosen for bombings included al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and facilities in Sudan that UBL had invested in.  Clinton pulled off one target from the list due to its non-military or offensive value to al Qaeda, but left on the Shifa chemical plant that the CIA had linked to al Qaeda and to a unique chemical weapons compound found in the sand outside.  Pakistan saw our ships and alerted the ISI.  75 missiles were fired and they took two hours to get there and no senior leaders were killed.  Media attention in the US was very negative and accused Clinton of trying to divert attention away from Monica Lewinsky scandal.

∙    American agencies also did a lousy job of disrupting terrorist funding in the US during the Clinton years, including little activity or awareness with regard to major hawalas in the US.  Even the Congress did not take money laundering seriously.

Threats/Proof the Bush Administration Knew About a Coming Terrorist Attack

∙    The World Trade Center was attacked in 1993 by people affiliated with al Qaeda and numerous warnings came into US intelligence showing al Qaeda had designs to finish the job.  Further, other attacks in the US and abroad showed an al Qaeda presence in the US and a willingness and ability to hit us at home.  For example, in 1992, a Pakistani named Mir Amil Kansi shot and killed three people in Virginia while waiting to enter CIA headquarters (al Qaeda was formed by UBL with assistance from the Pakistani intelligence services – the ISI).  Also, al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole, two US embassies in Africa, assassinated the Jewish Defense League leader Rabbi Meir Kahane (by al Qaeda agent El Sayyid Nossair in 1992), supporting Somalian leader Aideed (where the “Black Hawk Down” incident occurred in 1993).

∙    CIA Director George Tenet’s Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs) mentioned al Qaeda 40 time prior to 9/11.

∙    Clarke gave National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice a checklist in June 2001 of what to do in case the United States was attacked by terrorists.

∙    In 1995, Clarke asked the FAA to ground all US flights over the Pacific because of a terrorist threat against airliners.  This “Bojinka Plot” was discovered by Philippine police responding to a fire in an apartment building in Manilla.

∙    In 1996, while preparing for the Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, Clarke asked the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta FBI Field Office and the head of FAA security, “What if somebody blows up a 747 over the Olympic stadium, or even flies one into the stadium?”  Admiral Cathal Flynn, head of FAA security, replied, “... we could ban aircraft from over the stadium during the events ...”.  The FBI agent also added: “Don’t let them hijack an aircraft in the first place.”  (pp. 106-107).  The preparations made to prevent this kind of attack became the “Atlanta Rules.”  These rules were used in several CSG designated “National Security Special Events.”  Clarke says: “The Secret Service and Customs had teamed up in Atlanta to provide some rudimentary air defense against an aircraft flying into the Olympic Stadium.  They did so again during the subsequent National Security Special Events and they agreed to create a permanent air defense unit to protect Washington.”  The Treasury Department did not want to pay for the permanent air defense unit so it was not established (p. 131).

∙    In 1996, President Clinton established new security mechanisms at the nation’s airports.  They included not allowing passengers to board planes without government issued photo ID that matched the name on the ticket, increases in random passenger and cargo searches, a temporary ban on parked cars near terminals, and temporary discontinuation of curbside check-in.  Also Vice President Al Gore would head a Commission on Aviation Safety and Security that would recommend permanent changes to airport security.  According to Richard Clarke this Commission “requested and got funding for programs involving baggage screening, carry on luggage checks, passenger profiling, screener training, research on aircraft hardening, and to hire more FAA security agents.”  It did not “agree to recommend that the federal government assume the role of airport passenger and luggage screening ... It was clear even at the time that the Gore Commission had not been sufficiently ambitious about the job of airport security and passenger screening” (p. 130).

∙    Richard Clarke set up a program on Transportation Security (to implement the recommendations of the Gore Commission on Aviation Safety and Security) and a program to look for terrorist cells in the US, along with eight others.

Proof Clarke is Telling the Truth about Why He Asked for a Transfer from the CSG and that the Bush Administration Was Not Concerned with al Qaeda

∙    Former Bush Administration Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill’s book The Price of Loyalty asserts that President Bush was focused on Iraq and regime change in Iraq early in his first term and that he was not at all concerned with al Qaeda or UBL.

∙    The next three successors as White House CSG Counterterrorism Czar to Richard Clarke also quit in frustration ... first, Wayne Downing (a retired four star Army general and leader of Special Operations Command), quit within months out of frustration to the Bush Administration’s “continued bureaucratic response to the threat” posed by terrorists (p. 240); second, John Gordon (a commander of nuclear armed missiles in Wyoming, CIA deputy, and the first Commander of the National Nuclear Security Administration) and Randy Beers (Deputy Assistant Secretary, National Security Council Director, Assistant Secretary of State, and Special Assistant to the President, who also worked for Presidents Reagan, Bush the first, and Clinton) both also quit.  Clarke says Beers told him, “I think I have to quit ... They still don’t get it.  Instead of going all out against al Qaeda and eliminating our vulnerabilities at home, they wanna’ fucking invade Iraq again.  We have a token military force in Afghanistan, the Taliban are regrouping, we haven’t caught bin Laden, or his deputy, or the head of the Taliban.  And they aren’t going to send more troops to Afghanistan to catch them or to help the government in Kabul to secure the country.  No, they’re holding back, waiting to invade Iraq.  Do you know how much it will strengthen al Qaeda and groups like that if we occupy Iraq?  There’s no threat to us now from Iraq, but 70% of the American people think Iraq attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center.  You wanna’ know why?  Because that’s what the Administration wants them to think!” (pp. 241-242).  Oh, and Randy Beers, after he quit, went to work for the campaign of John Kerry, as Kerry’s top planner and consultant on national security issues.

∙    Bob Woodward’s books, Bush at War and Plan of Attack, assert that Bush started planning for the war on Iraq immediately.

               
Mistakes on 9/11

∙    Shortly after 9am, Richard Clarke was told that there was already an open call to NORAD, and that there was also an open call to Navy Captain Deborah Lower, the director of the White House Situation Room, who was with President Bush.  So, if people in the White House were talking to NORAD and President Bush’s Situation Room, why did they not know there was an attack against the US and why did they not immediately launch fighters to respond?  Also, how can Bush claim he did not learn of the attacks until later?

∙    Further, the FAA was on the line with White House right away, too.  And according to them, they knew Flight 11 and Flight 175 were both hijacked.  So, why did they not send fighters to get Flights 11 and 175?

∙    According to Dick Myers, Otis Air Force base launched two fighters toward New York and Langley Air Force Base in Virginia was trying to get two fighters up, and this was in the middle of the exercise Vigilant Warrior.  According to Myers, combat air patrol (CAP) should have been achieved by 9:43 am.  So, why did the combat air patrol not occur until about 11 am?

∙    The White House knew it needed fighter escorts for the President and Air Force One right away.  So, why did the fighter escorts not arrive for about two hours?

∙    The FAA told Clarke that Flight 93 over Pennsylvania was a potential hijack (which would later crash), as well as Delta Flight 1989 (which was not hijacked).  So, why did they not send fighters to get Flight 93?

∙    When Richard Clarke was given the passenger manifests from the airline, he was told by the FBI: “We recognize some names, Dick.  They’re al Qaeda.”  Clarke responded: “How the fuck did they got on board then?” (p. 13).  Exactly, how could known al Qaeda members get on board planes in the US?  Why weren’t they on a no-fly list?  According to Clarke, the CIA just forgot to tell anyone about them!

∙    Clarke then told the FBI they needed to make sure they did not let anyone affiliated with the attacks leave the US, like they did after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  So, why did the Bush Administration let a group of bin Ladens leave the US shortly after 9/11, even though all air traffic was grounded at the time?

Mistakes After 9/11

∙    The US was slow to put ground forces in Afghanistan where al Qaeda was, and allowed them to escape ... we knew Tora Bora was a good place to hide for al Qaeda leaders and we had photographed it and mapped its caves, yet we did not stop UBL from going there and escaping ... UBL is still at large, as is the leader of the Taliban ... Afghanistan is still unstable ... warlords affiliated with the Taliban and mujahedeen are still in power in most of Afghanistan.

∙    America should have established a security presence in Afghanistan but did not, so Hamid Kharzi was given little authority outside of the capital city of Kabul.  Plus our economic and development aid to the country was slow and inadequate.  Heck, we even forgot to include them in the 2004 budget one year forcing Kharzi to come to the US and request money!

∙    al Qaeda has grown since 9/11 ... recruitment of al Qaeda is up ... there were more terrorist attacks in the 30 months after 9/11 than before it!  In June 2004 the State Department claimed that attacks were down but it had to withdraw its annual report on terrorism and re-release it when it found its numbers were inaccurate – terrorism had actually increased!

∙    The US response to al Qaeda was slow and small, according to Clarke.  He says Bush “began by again offering the Taliban a chance to avoid US occupation of their country and, when that failed, he initially sent in only a handful of Special Forces.  When the Taliban and al Qaeda leaders escaped, he dispatched additional forces but less than one full division equivalent, fewer US troops for all of Afghanistan than the number of NYPD assigned to Manhattan” (p. 245) ... no US troops gave chase of the Taliban when they fled ... we relied on the Northern Alliance to do this for us.  Not until November 25 (seven weeks after we started our war there) did we US insert ground forces (one Marine unit) to take and hold a former al Qaeda and Taliban facility near Kandahar.  This did not include any effort to seal the border with Pakistan or cut off the al Qaeda escape routes.

∙    The US has been slow to respond to real threats at home, instead we have merely created more agencies.  For example, the Department of Homeland Security forced the combination of 22 agencies and does not even include the FBI or CIA! ... we are still unprepared to coordinate knowledge of planes traveling to known targets!  President Bush originally opposed the creation of this agency (when it was proposed by Joseph Lieberman, Al Gore’s Vice President candidate) but switched positions later and renamed the bill the Homeland Security bill.

∙    The color coded threat warning system is a complete joke and only is used to forth random, non-specific threats.  Analyses also demonstrate the threats have been used politically.

∙    Clarke says Attorney General John Ashcroft badly mismanaged the handling of civil liberties with the USA PATRIOT Act being used to deny even American citizens their Constitutional rights.

∙    The Bush Administration short-changed money to first-responders and they cut money for community policing grants, as well.

∙    Iraqi reconstruction was not well planned or carried out. 

∙    Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ignored military advice regarding the occupation, ignoring the claim by Army Chief of Staff Eric Shineski who claimed we needed at least 200,000 troops to secure Iraq and then forcing him to retire after he went public ... Further, Paul Wolfowtiz testified to Congress that he could not imagine it would take as many troops to occupy Iraq as it did to conquer it ... Four-star General Anthony Zinni, formerly responsible for all troops in the Middle East, charged the Pentagon leadership with dereliction of duty.  American troops have insufficient body armor, HUMVEES, and not even enough troops.  We also dismissed all of Saddam Hussein’s former military from duty, as well as mid-level and high-level Baathist government officials, thereby making Iraq a less secure country.  Further, National Guard and reserve units are being overused overseas, leaving the US less protected and families broken up.

∙    Iraq is exactly what al Qaeda wants ... Clarke claims: “The ingredients al Qaeda dreamed of for propagating its movement were a Christian government attacking a weaker Muslim region, allowing the new terrorist group to rally jihadists from many countries to come to the air of the religious brethren” (p. 136).

∙    The US has also ignored Iran, Pakistan (both of which are threats and have supported al Qaeda), and we still have good relations with Saudi Arabia in spite of its support of al Qaeda.

∙    The US has alienated and dismissed Muslims and we have tried to force democracy on people by using violence.  We have done little to improve relations with Muslim countries and their people.

Iraq

∙    Clarke calls the Iraq war a major national mistake and an “unnecessary tangent.”  He says Iraq posed no threat to the US.  The right war, according to Clarke, was “to fight for the elimination of al Qaeda, to stabilize nations threatened by radical Islamic terrorists, to offer a clear alternative to counter the radical ‘theology’ and ideology of the terrorists, and to reduce our own vulnerabilities at home” (p. 239).  Clarke already had laid out a plan to do this, but it never did reach President Bush.

∙    Clarke claims President Bush made Iraq the “central front in the war on terror.”  He says: “He turned it from a nation that was not threatening us into a breeding ground for anti-American hatred.” (p. xviii).

∙    Clarke claims that after 9/11, President Bush was explicitly not concerned with international law.  After Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said war could not be pre-emptive, Bush said: “No!  I don’t care what the international lawyers say.  We’re going to kick some ass!” (p. 24).

∙    In the early morning hours of 9/12, the day after the attacks, Clarke walked into a White House meeting expecting to talk about “what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term.”  Instead, he “walked into a series of discussions about Iraq.”  According to Clarke, he had heard from friends in the Pentagon that word was we would be invading Iraq some time in 2002!  Clarke claims that on 9/12, Paul Wolfowitz insisted the attacks were too coordinated to have been conducted without a state sponsor, and that Iraq had to be involved.  In fact, Wolfowitz made the same argument in April 2001 at the first Bush Administration Deputies meeting on terrorism, saying that the first attack on the World Trade Center also was assisted by Iraq.  By that afternoon, according to Clarke, Donald Rumsfeld also was talking about Iraq.  Rumsfeld said there were no decent targets in Afghanistan and that Iraq had better targets.  President Bush said we needed to change the government of Iraq, not just bomb it! (pp. 30-31).

∙    President Bush also directed Clarke on September 12th: “Look, I know you have a lot to do and all ... but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything.  See if Saddam did this.  See if he is linked in any way.”  Clarke responded that al Qaeda attacked us the day before and Bush replied: “I know, I know but ... see if Saddam was involved.  Just look.  I want to know any shred.”  Clarke said he would look again, but then pointed out: “But, you know, we have looked several times for state sponsorship of al Qaeda and not found any real linkages to Iraq.  Iran plays a little, as does Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, Yemen.”  Bush replied: “Look into Iraq, Saddam” (p. 32).  A meeting the next day looked into the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda and found that there was no cooperation between the two.  A memo was drafted and sent to President Bush.

∙    Paul Wolfowitz, then assistant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, insisted all along that Iraq also attacked us in 1993 the first time the World Trade Center was attacked.  In spite of overwhelming evidence against the convicted bomber Ramzi Yousef, Wolfowitz followed the logic of American Enterprise Institute writer Laurie Mylroie that the real attacker worked for Saddam Hussein and was safely in Baghdad.  Clarke insists he wanted there to be evidence linking the first attack to Iraq, so that a war on Iraq might even be justified, but no such evidence exists.

∙    Ironically, according to Clarke, it is Iran that played a role in the 9/11 attacks and that funds and encourages attacks against us.  Iran also funds Hezbollah, who historically has attacked US ally Israel.  In 1995, when Vice President Dick Cheney was CEO of Haliburton, Cheney opposed US sanctions against Iran!

Lies

∙    President Bush claimed on numerous occasions, as did other members of his Administration, that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda, yet the 9/11 Commission concludes there is no evidence of this link.

∙    President Bush claimed on numerous occasions, as did other members of his Administration, that war on Iraq was a last resort, yet he began planning for the Iraq war early in his first term.

∙    President Bush relied on Iraqi exiles such as Ahmed Chalabi for intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and paid them millions of dollars for it, even though much of it turned out to be false.  In fact, Bush admitted on ABC News to Diane Sawyer that he invaded Iraq because Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990! (see p. 266!)\

Curious Acknowledgments / Assertions by Clarke

∙    Was al Qaeda somehow involved in the Oklahoma City bombing?  Both Terry Nichols and Ramzi Yousef had been in the same city of Cebu in the Phillippines on the same day.  And Nichols bombs were ineffective until after his trip there.  Nichols also called Cebo long after his wife had returned home and members of al Qaeda attended a radical Islamic conference in Oklahoma City a few years prior to the Oklahoma City bombings.

∙    President Bush objected to the creation of a 9/11 Commission

∙    Michigan Air National Guard fighters were sent to Pennsylvania toward United Flight 93

∙    Vice President Dick Cheney kept hanging up the open line on the crisis conference on 9/11.

∙    World Trade Center building 7 housed the Mayor’s command post and the Secret Service field office.

∙    President Bush’s concern following 9/11 was immediately the economy.  According to Clarke, Bush said: “I want the economy back, open for business right away, banks, the stock market, everything tomorrow ... As soon as we get the rescue operations done up there, shift everything to fixing that damage so we can reopen” (p. 24).

∙    Box cutters were found strapped to the seats of another grounded airplane.