9/11: Problems with the Official Story” Who Really Did It

By Matthew Robinson, PhD
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice
Appalachian State University
robinsnmb@appstate.edu

The Saudi and Pakistani governments are considered among our greatest allies in the war on terror.  Further, the Bush and bin Laden families go way, way back in business.  Yet, there is disturbing evidence that high members of the Saudi Royal family and high level officials in the Pakistani intelligence services played significant roles in the 9/11 attacks.

So, keep in mind the following statement by President Bush when considering the information in this document: “Either you are with us, or you are against us.  From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”  By this standard, some would argue that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are “against us.”  Yet, President Bush said: “As far as the Saudi Arabians go, they’ve been nothing by cooperative … Am I pleased with the actions of Saudi Arabia?  I am.”  Are Saudi Arabia (and Pakistan) worthy of this praise and status as America’s allies in our “war on terror”?

At the very least, we already know that:

1)      UBL and 15 of the  19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia!

2)       The hijackers entered the US using the Visa Express program, a program that was begun in May 2001 and ended in July 2002.  The program allows any Saudi to obtain a US visa through a travel agent instead of appearing at a consulate in person.  Five hijackers use this program to enter the US within the next month! (al-Mihdhar, Alomari, Al-Hazmi, al-Ghamdi, and Banihammad.  In May 2002, Abdullah Norman, a US employee of the consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, says he took money and gifts to provide fake visas to foreigners.  He pleads guilty.  Former visa officer Michael Springmann says the Jeddah  office is notorious for giving visas to terrorists to train in the US.  Jeddah is from where 15 of the 19 hijackers entered the US. All of the 15 Saudi hijackers should have been rejected due to irregularities in their applications.

3)       The so-called “Saudi rules” are discovered on September 14, 2001 where Saudi students are allowed to enter the US with only cursory or no background checks.  Some flight schools issue paperwork that allows students to obtain visas at US embassies or consulates.

 But, there is more, implicating both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  If the names identified below are known to the mainstream media, why have US officials not insisted on a thorough investigation of the mean actually involved in 9/11?

 
Saudi Arabia: The Basics

•  After UBL helped the mujahedeen defeat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1980s, he was greeted in Saudi Arabia as a hero.  But after being highly critical of the Saudi Royal family for letting the US military occupy Saudi lands during the first Gulf War, UBL was expelled.  It is alleged that UBL then blackmailed the Saudi government by threatening to bring terrorism against Saudi Arabia if they did not support his al-Qaeda network.  Many of the Saudi princes also sympathize with UBL and the cause of al-Qaeda.  They like the fact that UBL was promoting their religion in Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  Journalist Greg Palast asks: “Since US intelligence was … likely informed [of a meeting between Saudi Royals to discuss how to pay off UBL] the question becomes why didn’t the government immediately move against the Saudis?”
  

• Saudi Arabia begins sending money to al-Qaeda in 1991 and becomes its largest donor in 1996.  NSA intercepts in 1996 show a corrupt regime that is alienated from the country’s people.  Allegedly, the Royal family is afraid and thus pays al-Qaeda to assure it will not get attacked.  UBL and the Saudi Royal family that rules the government share a common belief in Wahhabism, a version of Islam that is fundamentalist and expansionist in nature.  Saudi Arabia logically would support UBL because it has historically supported efforts to expand Wahhabism outside of the Kingdom, including through terrorism.
  

• Although media reports of Saudi funding of al Qaeda terrorism are hard to come by, Saudi billionaire Khallid bin Malfouz is identified as a supporter of UBL in October 2001 by a French intelligence report dealing with the largest Muslim bank in the world, BCCI, long suspected of funding terrorism around the world.  In October 2001, the US finally freezes Saudi assets that the UN had urged in March 2001.  In July 2002, a briefing to a top Pentagon advisory group, the Defense Policy Board created by Richard Perle, says: “The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-solider, from ideologist to cheerleader … Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies.”  The group suggests giving the Saudis an ultimatum to stop backing terrorism of face seizure of its oil fields and its assets invested in the US.  The briefing concludes: “Grand strategy for the Middle East: Iraq is he tactical point.  Saudi Arabia is the strategic point.  Egypt the prize.”  Finally, in August 2002, relatives of 9/11 victims file suit against Saudis, including the Binladin Group, three Saudi princes, (including Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, Yassin al-Qadi, and Khlid bin Malfouz), as well as eight Islamic foundations and charities and seven international banks.
  

• In 1994, Mohammed al-Khilewi – the first Secretary at the Saudi Mission to the UN, defects from Saudi Arabia to the US and seeks political asylum.  He brings 14,000 internal government documents showing the Saudi Royal family’s corruption, human-rights abuses and financial support for terrorists.  He meets with two FBI agents and an Assistant US Attorney and the agents refuse the documents.
  

• May 1997: Saudi Arabia officially recognizes the government of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Pakistan and UAE do the same later.  These are the only three nations that do so on 9/11.  The Taliban housed UBL and al-Qaeda, which attacked the United States on 9/11.
  

• In June 1999, an unknown Saudi sends money to Mounir el Motassadeq, an associate of hijackers Atta and al-Shehhi, as well as would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh for a new mosque in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.

 
Saudis Involved in 9/11: Naming Names!

•  Former Senator and Co-Chair of the “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” Bob Graham summarizes the Saudi connection involving several people.  These individuals are numbered below, 1-10.
  

• 1) Omar al-Bayoumi is a Saudi spy who worked for the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation headed by Prince Sultan prior to coming to the US (denied by the FBI – see p. 11).  According to Graham, his job was to keep an eye on Saudis in San Diego, especially college students engaged in activities that might threaten Saudi Arabia.  Al-Bayoumi vouched for hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhdar (so that they would be accepted into the community and its mosque).  Al-Bayoumi may have even picked up the two hijackers from LA (see p. 12).  He denies it and claims he met the two men in a Middle Eastern restaurant just miles from the airport.  Al-Bayoumi claimed the two men did not like it in Los Angeles and so he told them if they would like to move to San Diego they should just call him.
  

• His salary is approved by 2) Hamid al-Rashid, a Saudi government official whose son Saud is connected to al-Qaeda. His monthly stipend comes from Ercan (which contracted with Dallah Avco Aviation, a Saudi government contractor owned by 3) Saleh Kamel, who is a member of the “Golden Chain” that provides money to UBL and al-Qaeda regularly).  It gave him $3,000 per month for a project in Saudi Arabia while he lived in the US.  According to the evidence, al-Bayoumi showed up for work once and the supervisor wanted to fire him.  The supervisor was told that if he was not kept on the payroll, Ercan’s contract would be terminated.  When the company tried to fire him, it got a letter from 4) Mohammed Ahmed al-Salmi, the Director General of Civil Aviation, which said it wanted al-Bayoumi’s contract renewed as quickly as possible.  Al-Bayoumi’s monthly stipend for this job was $2,800 with allowances of $465 a month.  After inviting al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar to San Diego and getting them places to live, his monthly allowance rose to $3,700.  They stayed at that level until al-Hazmi left for Arizona.
  

• Saad al-Habeeb is paid to buy a building in San Diego for a Kurdish mosque in 1998, but only if al-Bayoumi is hired as the building manager.  He rarely shows up for work and before he can be replaced, he moves to Britain in July 2001.  It is alleged that al-Bayoumi came to the US to set up the mosque to launder money and to set up the terrorism cell in San Diego to carry out the 9/11 attacks.  In its 1998-1999 FBI counterterrorism inquiry into him, the FBI learns al-Bayoumi has contacts with people under investigation.  The 9/11 Commission concludes that he has “access to seemingly unlimited funding from Saudi Arabia.”
  

• Before picking up the two hijackers, al-Bayoumi met privately with an official from the consulate’s section on Islamic and cultural affairs, 5) Fahad al-Thumairy, who was also a prayer leader at a local mosque in LA.  Graham says of al-Thumairy: “With a number of suspected terrorist ties, he was no friend of the United States.  In fact, in May 2003, the United States would revoke al-Thumairy’s diplomatic visa, ban him from the United States, and put him on a plane back to Riyadh” (p. 12).  Graham summarizes the events: “That a suspected Saudi spy would drive 125 miles to a meeting at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, where he would meet with a consular officer with suspected terrorist ties, and then drive another seven miles to the one Middle Eastern restaurant – out of more than 134 Middle Eastern restaurants in Los Angeles – where he would happen to sit next to two future terrorists, to whom he would happen to offer friendship and support, cannot credibly be described as a coincidence” (p. 13).  Less than a week after their supposed chance meeting, al-Bayoumi received a call from Nawaf al-Hazmi.  He and al-Midhdar decided to move to San Diego and stayed at al-Bayoumi’s place until they could find their own.
  

• From January to May 2000, al-Bayoumi had a large number of phone conversations with Saudi officials in LA and DC. See the official account of all of this, according to the US government (pp. 168-169!)  A week later, al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar found an apartment at the Parkwood apartment complex, almost directly across the street from al-Bayoumi.  Al-Boyoumi secured the apartment for the two hijackers and paid the first two months rent for them.  Al-Bayoumi arranged a party for them to introduce the two hijackers to the Saudi community in San Diego.  Al-Bayoumi videotaped his guests, as part of his surveillance job.  Al-Bayoumi also invited the two men to his mosque, the principal mosque for Saudis in the San Diego area.
  

• There they met 6) Mohdar Abdullah ... Al-Bayoumi and Modhar Abdullah helped the two hijackers get driver’s licenses, car insurance, credit cards, and social security cards.  He also helped them locate flight schools.  Modhar Abdullah was urged by al-Bayoumi to befriend al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar in San Diego.  He was arrested later for lying to a US immigration officer and was deported.  He also admitted to having befriended hijacker Hani Hanjour.
  

• They also met 7) Anwar Aulaqi, who would become their religious leader (Aulaqi is suspected of being the first person the two hijackers shared their plans with in the US).  They became so close that when the two hijackers left for Virginia, Aulaqi followed.  He may have driven Hanjour to New Jersey where he bought his ticket for American Flight 77.
  

• They also met Abdussatar Shaikh there, a retired English professor from San Diego State University.  When al-Midhdar left the US in April 2000, al-Hazmi noticed that Shaikh had posted on the Mosque bulletin board that he had quarters in his home for a committed young Muslim.  So al-Hazmi moved into his house.  According to Graham, “Shaikh was on the payroll of the San Diego office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an agency asset.  His job was to monitor the Saudi community in San Diego and report to the FBI any suspicious behavior he observed” (p. 20).  As Graham says, incredibly, “Two future terrorists, both of whom would later be placed on the government’s watch list, were living under the nose of an FBI informant, and one would later actually live with him, yet the informant was never asked to draw more information from them, get closer to them, or gain their confidence” (pp. 20-21).
  

• Al-Bayoumi also helped Hani Hanjour and introduced him to the community. Al-Bayoumi is later arrested in Britain with the names and phone numbers of two Saudis in the Islamic Affairs Department at the Saudi embassy in London, as well as jihadist literature.  Saudis push for his release and he goes back home after a week, the longest the can be held without charges under English antiterrorism laws.  According to reports, the FBI did not share information that could have had him held longer.
  

• In April 1998, 8) Osama Basnan writes to Saudi Arabian Prince Bandar (Saudi Ambassador to the US) to get money for surgery for his wife.  He got a check for $15,000 but then needed more, so his wife made a separate request.  She appealed to the Ambassador’s wife, 9) Princess Haifa al-Faisal, and the Ambassador is Prince Bandar, and began getting checks every month between $2,000 and $3,000 to Majeda Dweikar, the wife of Osama Basnan.  She signs some of the checks over to Manal Bajadr, the wife of Omar al-Bayoumi.  So, this money went to al-Hazmi and al-Midhdar!  Graham says “to follow that stream of income is to trace a line from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the wife of one spy, to the wife of another, and ultimately to the hands of two plotting terrorists” (p. 168).  The al-Bayoumis and Basnans lived at the Parkwood Apartments at the same time as two of the 9/11 hijackers helped by al-Bayoumi and prior to that lived in another complex together.  Both wives were also arrested together for shoplifting in April 2001.
  

• Basnan’s passport is stolen in Houston, Texas on April 25, 2002, the same day that Saudi Princes Abdullah, al-Faisl, and Bandar are in Texas to meet with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in Crawford, Texas.  Because the entourage passed through Houston, it is possible that Basnan met with them. Basnan is later arrested for visa fraud and deported to Saudi Arabia after he admitted he used fake documents to stay in the US.  In his possession was the phone number of the Saudi Embassy in London (In 1993, the FBI received reports that Basnan had hosted a 1992 party in DC for Omar Abdul Rahman, the “Blind Sheikh” who is now in prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and a plot to blow up the tunnels leading to Manhattan.  The FBI did not investigate the reports!)
  

• Hijacker al-Hazmi worked for a San Diego business whose manager was being investigated by the FBI for terrorism.  A CIA memo dated August 2, 2002 concluded there is “incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi government.”
  

• On September 10, 2001, three hijackers (Hanjour, al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi) stayed at the same hotel as a Saudi official 10) Salem Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, who is also the Director of the SAAR charity that is suspected of terrorism ties.  Hussayen had come to the US to visit charities that have since been linked to terrorism (such as the Global Relief Foundation, World Muslin league, International Islamic relief Organization, and the Islamic Assembly of North America).  His nephew Sami Omar Hussayen ran a web site affiliated with the Islamic Assembly of North America that called for suicide attacks with planes.  After 9/11, the older Hussayen is interviewed by the FBI but feigns a seizure during the interview and is taken to the hospital where the doctor says nothing is wrong with him.  He leaves for Saudi Arabia after the flight ban is lifted and is made head of two mosques in Saudi Arabia

 
Saudis: What Happened to These People?

• In March 2004, an AP story said both al-Bayoumi and Basnan had been cleared as possible intelligence agents, yet the FBI told Graham that the story was not true and that no one had yet been cleared.  Meanwhile, Prince Bandar uses the story as evidence that the allegations are false when he is asked about $27 million in suspicious transactions by the Saudi embassy   by Tim Russert on the television show, Meet the Press.  Later the FBI said the story was in fact correct that both men had been cleared after both men had been interviewed in Saudi Arabia in the presence of Saudi government officials!  Graham then asked the Director of the FBI Robert Mueller for access to the FBI agents who interviewed them, and he said the Attorney General would have to give permission.  First, the meeting was scheduled, then postponed, the rescheduled, and finally canceled forever.  Ashcroft simply never called back when Graham repeatedly asked his permission.
  

•  Mohdar Abdullah, who al-Bayoumi urged to befriend al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar in San Diego, was ultimately arrested for lying to US immigration officials.  He served a six-month sentence and was deported.
  

• In October 2002, FBI agent Steven Butler who handled Abdussattar Shaikh (the FBI informant who rented rooms to Nazaw al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar) testified to the 9/11 Joint Congressional Inquiry.  He says he had been tracking Saudi money that had been landing in the hands of the hijackers but his supervisors took no action on it.  The FBI tries to stop him from testifying and orders him not to talk to the media.  The investigation of al-Bayoumi and Basnan is closed in spite of evidence Saudi Royals sent money to hijackers.
  

• The US begins investigation into Saudi Arabia after the Joint Congressional Inquiry for alleged Saudi assistance in the 9/11 plot.  The FBI interviews Omar al-Bayoumi in Saudi Arabia and in the presence of government officials.  The FBI concludes al-Bayoumi was not involved.
  

• In March 2004, German intelligence reports that two private Saudi companies – The Twaik Group and Rawasin Media Productions – are linked with suspected al-Qaeda cells in Germany, and have connections to the Saudi Arabian intelligence agency and its chief Prince Turki bin Faisal.  The Twaik Group deposited $250,000 into bank accounts of Mamoun Darkazanli, who had close ties to the 9/11 hijackers from Hamburg, Germany. US counterterrorism officials and members of the 9/11 Commission say privately that Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for attacks by cutting secret deals with the Taliban and UBL.  9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerry says: “All we’re doing is looking at classified documents from our own government, not from some magical source.  So we knew what was going on, but we did nothing.”  Yet, the 9/11 Commission concludes: “There is no convincing evidence that any government financially supported al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.”

 
Saudis: The bin Ladens and the Royals

•  Two bin Laden brothers, Abdullah and Omar, are affiliated with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).  The FBI investigates them from February to September 1996.  Abdullah was the US director of WAMY and lived with Omar in Falls Church, Virginia.  WAMY’s office address is 5613 Leesburg Pike.  Four of the 9/11 hijackers lived at 5913 Leesburg Pike at the same time the two bin Laden brothers are there.  Pakistan already banned WAMY and India and the Philippines also said WAMY is involved in terrorism.  Some US officials also have not doubt (and testified to the 9/11 Commission) that WAMY has helped carry out terrorist attacks.  The US begins a new investigation of WAMY after 9/11 and after the bin Ladens leave the US.
  

• In the summer of 2001, Saudi crown prince Abdullah allegedly met with senior Army officials and ISI Director Mahmood in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Omar to warn them that the US was going to attack.  He tries to have UBL sent to Saudi Arabia to have him acquitted on charges in order to protect him.  It is also alleged that Saudi Royal family members met with UBL after the attacks.
  

• In September 2002, a search of a home of five al-Qaeda suspects (including Ramzi bin al-Shibh) had bin Laden family members’ passports
  

• The capture of al-Qaeda member Abu Zubaida reveals Saudi links.  In March 2002, he is tricked into thinking he has been handed over to the Saudis.  Under the influence of sodium penothal, he tells the interrogators to call Prince Ahmed bin Abdul-Aziz, a nephew to he Saudi King.  He gives them phone numbers from memory and says Abdul-Aziz will tell them what to do.  He also names Pakistani air force chief Mushaf Ali Mir, Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al-Faisal, Prince Sultan bin Faisal, Prince Fahd bin Turki, and says all of them helped him transfer money to al-Qaeda.  He says in 1996, he attended a meeting with UBL and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that promised him protection, weaponry, and supplies in return for not being attacked.  He also says both governments were told the US would be attacked on 9/11 but not given the details of the attacks.  Every person except for Prince Turki died mysteriously from July 2002 through February 2003.  One died of a heart attack at the age of 43.  The next day, while on the way to his funeral, another died.  One week later, another died of thirst in the desert.  Seven months later, another died in a plane crash.

• Saudis including bin Ladens are allowed to fly to leave US after 9/11 (See Thompson, pp. 286-288 for examples)
  

• President Bush classified 28 pages of 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report, all dealing with role of Saudi Arabia in terrorism (including 9/11 attacks).  These were written about by Senator Bob Graham of Florida, head of Senate Intelligence Committee (Intelligence Matters: The CIA, FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America’s War on Terror).  Graham said to the U.S. Senate, Oct 23, 2003: “I just feel strongly that when the 9/11 commission – that is the inquiry by our Intelligence Committee – was completed and the effort was released, to have 28 pages censored or classified and to be told the American people can't see it leads me to ask the question, Why? Why?  If there was another government – and all the indications are there was another government – involved in providing support for the terrorists who attacked this country, the American people have a right to know it.  They have a right to know who it was, what were the circumstances, why, how do they justify that.  The Saudi Government has asked that this information be declassified and released.  The Saudi Government has asked that.  Most of the speculation, of course, is the questions about Saudi support of terrorism ... But the Saudi Government has asked this be declassified so they can respond to it in public.  There is no basis, no good reason for this to remain censored and classified ... 95 percent of it does not deal with national security or our national security interests, and would not compromise our interests.”
  

• Why? The bin Laden and Bush families go way back.  For example, in 1988, Saudi investors invested in George W. Bush’s failed oil business – Harken – which has never performed work outside of Texas.  Harken later wins a contact in the Persian Gulf and starts doing well financially.  Two investors are Salem bin Laden (UBL’s oldest brother) and Khalid bin Mahfouz (who has a 20% stake in BCCI).  In 1992, James Bath, Salem bin Laden’s representative to the US, is investigated by the FBI for his connections to George W. Bush.  In January 2000, President Bush the first meets with bin Laden family members on behalf of the Carlyle Group (they also met in 1998).  Bush denies the meeting until a thank you note is found.
  

• The Carlyle Group and bin Laden brothers are in the US on 9/11 at a conference.  On of the guests of honor is UBL’s brother, Shafig bin Laden.

 Pakistan: The Basics

• 1993 -- Photos of KSM were discovered with associates of future Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaf Sharif
  

• 1994 – The ISI creates the Taliban and helps them begin to conquer Afghanistan.  Former White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke also alleges that they help them form connections with al-Qaeda.  One expert with extensive CIA ties claims the CIA assisted the ISI in creating the Taliban.
  

• In 1996, Pakistani military officers agree in Afghanistan to protect UBL for being on the Taliban’s side in the war for Afghanistan.  UBL, Abu Zubaida and Mushaf Ali-Mir (who becomes the chief of Pakistan’s air force in 2000) meet there.  UBL moves to Kandahar, the center of the Taliban’s power.  The ISI also helps UBL with needed medical treatment in March 2000 and July 2001.  It is also reported that UBL has medical treatment in a military hospital in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on September 10, 2001!  It is reported that he is guarded by Pakistani military forces and treated by a secret team of doctors.  In late December 2001, new Afghan Interior Minister Younis Qanooni claims the ISI helped UBL escape from the country.
  

• From 1999 through 2001, when the UN imposed two sets of sanctions on the Taliban (the latter of which limit travel by senior Taliban officials, freeze UBL’s and the Taliban’s assets, close down Ariana Airlines, and impose an arms embargo against the Taliban), Pakistani military assistance continues.  The ISI helps the Taliban get around the UN sanctions.  In June 2001, it is reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been secretly funding the Taliban by paying Pakistan for its logistical support to Afghanistan.  By this time, the Taliban is completely dependent on Pakistani aid.  The ISI later (September through November 2001) helps the Taliban defend against US attacks by providing them with weapons and helping fighters get from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
  

• In July 1999, ISI head Hamid Gal warns Taliban leaders that the US in not planning to attack in order to get UBL, and that when we do he will give them 3 or 4 hours waning, like he did in 1998.
  

• In July 1999, at a dinner in New York City overlooking the World Trade Centers, US government informant Randy Glass records a conversation with arms dealers and ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas.  Abbas is trying to buy a shipload full of weapons stolen from the US military to give to UBL.  Abbas points to the WTC and says: “Those towers are coming down.”  He also makes two other threats against the WTC and says “Americans are the enemy … We would have no problem with blowing up this entire restaurant because it is full of Americans.”  The meeting takes place in front of FBI agents and parts of the conversation are shown on TV in 2003.  ISI Director Mahmood is replaced under US pressure in October 2001 based on the belief by many in US intelligence that the ISI knew in advance of the 9/11 attacks.  Yet it was President Musharaf who had replaced the then ISI leader Brig Imtiaz in 1999/2000 with Lieutenant General Mahmood Amed who helped him take over the country in October 1999 in a coup.
  

• On September 19, 2001, it is rumored that ISI officials including General Mohammed Youssef, head of the ISI’s Afghanistan Section, travel to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi sympathizers including Prince Abdullah and Prince Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, the head of Saudi intelligence.  Supposedly the meeting was meant to neutralize UBL so that the Taliban could remain in control of Afghanistan.

 Pakistan: Follow The Money

•  Terrorist Saed Sheikh who had been imprisoned in India for kidnapping until the end of 1999, used kidnapping money of Indians to fund 9/11.  He does this with the help of Atab Ansari, another prisoner and Indian gangster.  After being released from prison, he lives in Kadahar, Afghanistan where he meets Taliban leader Mullah Omar and UBL.  He then travels to Pakistan and is given housing by the ISI.  He even travels openly to Britain to visit family at least twice.  While in Afghanistan, he helps train terrorists and assists the 9/11 hijackers.  In August 2001, he wires money to the hijackers, including $100,000 to Mohamed Atta.  This money was part of $830,000 in ransom money received from kidnapping an Indian shoe manufacturer in India.  The money went to Aftab Ansair in Dubai, UAE, and then to Sheikh.  Also between September 8-11, 2001, the hijackers are sent money from someone in the UAE using the alias Mustafa Ahmed, Mustafa Ahmad, and Ahamad Mustafa.  He transfers money to Mohammed Atta in Florida from a branch of the al Ansari Exchange in Sharjah, UAE.  Atta, al-Shehri, and al-Shehhi transfer some of the money back on September 9.  Mustafa then transfers the money to his Visa card and flies from the UAE to Karachi, Pakistan on 9/11 using a Saudi passport.  He then makes six ATM withdrawals and hides in Pakistan.  Mustafa turns out to be Saeed Sheikh, who is the financial manager of UBL.
  

• According to the testimony of John Pistole, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (delivered to a congressional committee), the investigation “has traced the origin of the funding of 9/11 back to financial accounts in Pakistan, where high-ranking and well-known al-Qaeda operatives played a major role in moving the money forward, eventually into the hands of the hijackers located in the US.”
  

• Atab Ansari is arrested in Dubai, UAE in February 2002 and deported to India.  He admits his ties to the ISI and Sheikh.  Sheikh turns himself into the ISI around the same time after his family is held by Pakistani police.  He is named as the killer of Daniel Pearl by the Pakistani police.  They also name the terrorist group he belongs to, Jaish e-Mohammed.  He is convicted of Pearl’s murder in July 2002 and is sentenced to hang.  He is also indicted in the US in March 2002, but it did not mention his funding of the 9/11 attacks.  Secretary of State Colin Powell also denies any ISI link to Pearl’s murder. (January 2002 -- Sheikh and KSM kidnap and ultimately kill Daniel Pearl, who had been working on stories about the Pakistani ISI and al-Qaeda).

Pakistan: Taking a Hint from the US

• ISI Director Mahmood Ahmed travels to DC in April 2000 and is told to give a warning to the Taliban that people who support al-Qaeda will be treated as our enemies.  He also visits DC from September 4-11, 2001 to meet with Pentagon officials and the National Security Council, as well as CIA Director George Tenet, as well as others.  At the moment of the 9/11 attacks, Mahmood is having a breakfast meeting with Bob Graham and Porter Goss, the chairmen of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, who will later co-chair the 9/11 Joint Congressional Inquiry
  

• From September 11-16, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage pressure Mahmood to cooperate with the US and he supposedly agrees.  On September 13, the airport in Islamabad is shut down for one day due to threats against its strategic assets.  On September 14, Pakistan pledges its support of the US and the airport is reopened. (In September 2001 after the 9/11 attacks Musharaf meets with his most senior officers and decides to pledge his country’s support for the US in its war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  Four of his officers oppose him, including ISI Director Mahmood, Lieutenant General Muzaffar Usmani, Lieutenant General Jamshaid Gulzar Kiani, and Lieutenant General Moahammed Aziz Khan.  All four are removed from office over the next month).
  

• January 2002 -- Pakistan begins arresting extremists, but nearly half are released within the month and almost all within one year

 
Pakistan: Proof of Their Involvement?

•  An unnamed senior staff member of the 9/11 Commission says Pakistan collaborated with al-Qaeda and Taliban, including helping al-Qaeda set up their infrastructure.
  

• Capture of al-Qaeda member Abu Zubaida reveals Pakistani links.  In March 2002, he is tricked into thinking he has been handed over to the Saudis.  Under the influenced of sodium penothal, he tells the interrogators to call Prince Ahmed bin Abdul-Aziz, a nephew to he Saudi King.  He gives them phone numbers from memory and says Abdul-Aziz will tell them what to do.  He also names Pakistani air force chief Mushaf Ali Mir, Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al-Faisal, Prince Sultan bin Faisal, Prince Fahd bin Turki, and says all of them helped him transfer money to al-Qaeda.  He says in 1996, he attended a meeting with UBL and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that promised him protection, weaponry, and supplies in return for not being attacked.  He also says both governments were told the US would be attacked on 9/11 but not given the details of the attacks.
  

• March 2003 -- KSM is captured in area of Pakistan filled with ISI officials, near ISI headquarters
  

• In June 2004, US counterterrorism officials and members of the 9/11 Commission say privately that Pakistan helped set the stage for attacks by cutting secret deals with the Taliban and UBL.  9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerry says: “All we’re doing is looking at classified documents from our own government, not from some magical source.  So we knew what was going on, but we did nothing.”  Yet, the 9/11 Commission concludes: “There is no convincing evidence that any government financially supported al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.”