9/11: Facts of the 9/11 Commission and the Official Story of What Happened
    By Matthew B. Robinson, PhD           
    Associate Professor of Criminal Justice       
    Appalachian State University
     robinsnmb@appstate.edu          

This document summarizes the official story of what happened on 9/11, according to the independent “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.”  I’ve also added facts about President Bush’s opposition to the establishment of this “9/11 Commission” and apparent efforts to hinder it, as well.  The bulleted points dealing with the facts of the 9/11 Commission are all from mainstream media sources and have been widely reported.

Additional facts added in RED are from other sources than the 9/11 Commission

9/11 Commission Facts:

∙    Created by Public Law 107-206 on November 27, 2002 (“National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States”)

∙    Purpose was “to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks ... is also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks.” http://www.9-11commission.gov/

∙    Bi-partisan (Democrats and Republicans – 10 members)

∙    Reviewed 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed 1,200 individuals in ten countries

∙    Held 19 days of hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses

∙    Relied on secondary evidence of those detained by US (e.g., Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay Cuba) as not allowed to interview them. ... It has since been reported that President Bush gave the 9/11 Commission access to two prisoners for interview purposes (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – KSM, the “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who originally was to be a hijacker but because of difficulty learning to fly became a supporter and organizer of the hijackers).

∙    The 9/11 Commission did not examine contrary and “curious” evidence about planes at WTC and Pentagon nor did they ask many, many, many, many critical questions

∙    Issued report on July 22, 2004 ... The 9/11 Commission concludes 19 men hijacked 4 planes and crashed 3 of them into their intended targets, the last of which was crashed by the hijackers once they knew they could not reach DC (intended target was the U.S. Capitol building)Other Facts Concerning President Bush’s Opposition and Obstruction of the 9/11 Commission:

∙    President Bush refused to ask for or order creation of 9/11 Commission – relented on November 27, 2002 (13 months after attacks)

∙    After giving in, President Bush named Henry Kissinger as Chairman (November 29, 2002), who stepped down December 13, 2002 due to potential conflicts of interest.  ... The man appointed by Congressional Democrats to help Kissinger (George Mitchell) also had conflicts of interest.  George Mitchell’s lobbying firm represented the UAE and Yemen and a wealthy Saudi, Mohammed Hussain al-Almoudi, who is under investigation for alleged terrorism involvement.    After Kissinger stepped down, Bush named former NJ Governor Thomas Keane to head 9/11 Commission.  He is Director at Amerada Hess (petroleum company and a partner in Hess-Delta, an oil exploration and development venture).  Hess's partner in joint venture is Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia.  Two of Kean's Hess-Delta business partners investigated since 1999 due to suspected ties to Al Qaeda (Mohammed Hussein al Amoudi and Khalid bin Mahfouz).  Both men originally accused in a $1 trillion lawsuit, filed on behalf of families of the victims of September 11, as alleged financiers of Al Qaeda (no evidence suggests a connection of these men to 9/11).  Several commission members also had potential conflicts of interest, due to close ties to the airline and defense industry!
 
∙    When President Bush eventually agreed to the 9/11 Commission, he refused to testify to it, instead agreed to “visit with” it but only with the Vice President, not under oath, with no media present & no recording, in a closed session ... and only for one hour!

∙    President Bush refused to ask or order his National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to testify to the 9/11 Commission, but finally gave into pressure (but still demanded no other current White House officials testify)

∙    President Bush refused to grant or support more money for the 9/11 Commission before finally giving in (original amount was $3 million, versus $6 million for 1996 gambling commission and $50 million for space shuttle Columbia crash in 2003) ... the 9/11 Commission ultimately spent $12 million
   
∙    President Bush refused to grant or support deadline extension for the 9/11 Commission before finally giving in

∙    President Bush refused to grant access to all Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs) ... the 9/11 Commission had to resort to subpoenas to get documents!

∙    Then White House top lawyer Alberto Gonzalez (and now Attorney General) called the 9/11 Commission members prior to testimony of Richard Clarke, Chair of White House Counterterrorism Security Group in the Clinton Administration.  The two members he called badgered Clarke and accused him of being inconsistent in his story.

∙    President Bush only released 25% of requested Clinton-era documents

Important Details about Fighter Response On and Around September 11, 2001:

∙    The United States was protected by the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

∙    NORAD had 14 fighters on permanent alert sites in the United States.

∙    Four of these fighters were in the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), including two at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (SOUTH of Washington DC) and two at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts (EAST of New York).

∙    Scrambled fighters should thus have flown NORTH from Langley to DC and WEST from Otis to New York).

∙    Fighters should have been able to reach Washington DC and New York from these bases within 10-12 minutes of being airborne.


The Planes – Flight by Flight Analysis:

1)    American Flight 11: Boston, MA to Los Angeles, CA

2 Pilots, 9 attendants, 76 passengers, 5 terrorists (Mohammed Atta, Abdul Aziz al Omari, Satam al Suqami, Wail al Sheheri, and Waleed al Sheheri)

Mohammed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari first flew from Portland, ME to Boston, MA

Atta selected in Portland by computerized prescreeing system (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreeing System, or CAPPS) for special security measures – checked bags held off plane until confirmed he had boarded (let him on with weapons)! – Failure #1, Let hijackers on with weapons).  In the two bags of Mohamed Atta are a handheld electronic flight computer, a simulator procedures manual for Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft, two videotapes related to air tours of Boeing 757 and 747 aircraft, a slide-rule calculator, a copy of the Koran, his passport, will, international driver’s license, a religious cassette tape, airline uniforms, a letter of recommendation, education related documents, and a note to other hijackers about how to mentally prepare themselves (this note is found in his bag, in the wreckage of Flight 93, and in a car parked in the parking lot of Washington Dulles Airport.)

Between 6:45 and 7:40 a.m., they boarded, as did Satam al Suqami, Wail al Sheheri, and Waleed al Sheheri.

Satam al Suqami, Wail al Sheheri, and Waleed al Sheheri selected in Boston by CAPPS system for special security measures – checked bags held off plane until confirmed he had boarded (let them on with weapons!) – Failure #2, Let other hijackers on with weapons)

Flight scheduled to depart at 7:45 am ... Took off at 7:59 am

Hijacked at 8:14 am based on inability to contact plane

Hijackers stabbed people, sprayed some irritant in first-class cabin, forced passengers to back of plane and claimed they had bomb (8:19 am – Betty Ong contacted American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, NC via AT&T air phone to report emergency aboard flight ... call lasted 25 minutes ... reported stabbing, non-responsive cockpit, and inability to breathe because of irritant ... said she thought they were being hijacked ... officials reportedly did not believe her and suggested it might instead be a case of air rage)

8:20 am – FAA memo suggests that around this time hijacker Satam al Suqami shoots passenger Daniel Lewin, a former member of the Israel Defense Force’s Sayeret Matkal, a top-secret counter terrorism unit.

8:20 am – IFF (identify friend or foe) beacon signal turned off

8:20 am – veers dramatically off course

8:20 am – Flight attendant Amy Sweeney calls Boston’s Logan Airport and speaks to American Airlines flight service manager Michael Woodward.  She says: “Listen, and listen to me very carefully. I’m on Flight 11.  The airplane has been hijacked.”  She says she cannot contact the cockpit and does not believe the pilots are flying the plane any more.  She also reports that two first class flight attendants have been stabbed, that a business class passenger has had his throat slit, and that the hijackers showed her a bomb.

8:21 am – turned off transponder (transmits identifying signal to controllers)

8:21 am – plane now way off course and attempt by Boston flight control to contact plane unsuccessful

8:21 am – American Airlines employee alerted manager of American Airlines operations center in Fort Worth, TX ... everything being said by flight attendant Sweeney is being relayed simultaneously to American Airlines headquarters via Nancy Wyatt, supervisor of pursers at Logan Airport.  The conversation between Wyatt and managers at American Airlines is recorded.  They say: “Don’t spread this around ... Keep it close ... Keep it quiet ... and Let’s keep this among ourselves.” Failure #3, American Airlines knew at 8:21 am and did not contact NORAD.  Nor did they tell their pilots or other airlines.

8:23 am – dispatcher tried to contact cockpit, unsuccessful

8:25-8:32 am – Boston Center started notifying chain of command of hijacking

8:26 am – Ong reported plane flying erratically and it then turned South toward NY City!  NEADS reportedly could not see the plane on its radar

8:28 am – Boston Center called Herndon Command Center (FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center) to advise of hijacking heading to New York airspace.

8:29 am – dispatcher contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center – already aware of the problem (because hijackers had contacted them inadvertently trying to talk to the passengers ... sent message over air traffic control channel instead of cabin public-address channel ... 8:24 transmission said “We have some planes.  Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay.  We are returning to the airport ...”

8:32 am – Herndon Command Center alerted Operations Center at FAA headquarters of hijacking ... so FAA knew of hijacking between 8:24 and 8:32.  Failure #4, FAA knew at 8:24-8:32 am and did not contact NORAD.  Nor did they tell their pilots or other airlines.  FAA did NOT contact National Military Command Center in Pentagon (NMCC) to request fighter escort!

8:34 am – Boston tried to contact military directly through FAA’s Cape Cod facility and former site in Atlantic City that had been phased out ... lead pilot of Otis, Lt. Colonel Timothy Duffy, claims he is given an advance warning to get ready to scramble before the official notification because of the call from Boston flight control at 8:40 am.

8:34 am – Two fighters from Atlantic City base are on a bombing run over the Pine Barrens near Atlantic City.  They are eight minutes from New York City but are not alerted to the hijacking.  Failure #5, Fighters not sent by NORAD to intervene

8:34 am – Ben Sliney, FAA’s National Operations Manager, learns of the “we have some planes” announcement made at 8:24 am shortly around this time

8:35 am – President Bush’s motorcade leaves for the Emma Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida from the Colony Beach and Tennis Resort

8:37 am – Boston reached North American Air Defense Command’s (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to alert of hijacking (first notification of any hijacking ... 13 minutes after plane nonresponsive).  Failure #6, Boston Center does not contact NORAD until very late.  8:37 am is 13 minutes after the hijackers announced their hijacking, 16 minutes after the transponder was turned off, 17 minutes after IFF is turned off, and 23 minutes after radio contact was lost

    FAA: Hi.  Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here.  We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out.

    NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?

    FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.

Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins, regional Missions Crew Chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise, says she and everybody else thought this was part of the exercise.  NORAD Commander Major General Larry Arnold in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida also thinks this is part of the exercise!  Failure #7, NORAD thinks real hijackings are part of an exercise

8:37 am – United Flight 175 is told to look for Flight 11 and finds it, is told to stay away from it (but is not told it is hijacked).  Failure #8, Airplanes are not told about hijacking

8:38 am – NEADS ordered two F-15s at Otis Air Force base in Falmouth, MA to battle stations (188 miles from New York) – can fly at least 1,000 kts or 17 miles per minute (or 11 minutes from New York) ... could have reached New York between 8:49 - 8:55 am at fastest speeds but fighters did not get ordered up until 8:46 am ... the six-minute interval between the unofficial scramble order requested by Boston center and the official scramble order given by NEADS has not been explained ... also the nine minute gap between when NORAD was notified and when it scrambled the fighters up has not been explained.  Failure #9, NORAD delays sending up fighters to intervene

8:41 am – American Airlines operations center told that air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and that it was headed for Kennedy airport in New York City ... had flight on radar and thought it was descending

8:44 am – report from plane of rapid descent ...

    “Something is wrong.  We are in a rapid descent ... we are all over the place ... We are flying low.  We are flying very, very low.  We are flying way too low ... Oh my God we are way too low.”

8:45 am – American Airlines activates its emergency command center but does not alert other pilots of hijacking.  Failure #10, American Airlines does not tell pilots about hijackings even though it knew of hijackings for 24 minutes

8:46 am – crashed into North Tower of WTC ... 10,000 gallons of fuel, traveling at 470 mph, strikes 93rd through 98th floors.  No one above crash line survives and 1,360 people die.  Only 72 die below the crash line and 4,000 survive.  Both towers are slightly more than half full at time of crash.  Observation deck is not yet open for tourists.

8:46 am – Otis fighter jets ordered up

8:53 am – jets airborne (7 minutes after first crash and 7 minutes after scramble order) and ordered to military-controlled airspace off Long Island ... in holding pattern from 9:09 to 9:13 am when they are told to assume combat air patrol over New York and they did (10 minutes after second crash) ... supposedly headed toward United Flight 175 instead ... they do not reach New York City airspace until 9:25 am (32 minutes after take-off) ... Andrews Air Force fighters (Washington DC) are 207 miles away from DC over North Carolina and are ordered back to Andrews.

2)    United Flight 175: Boston, MA to Los Angeles, CA

2 Pilots, 7 attendants, 51 passengers, 5 terrorists (Marwan al Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Sheheri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi)

All screened through walk-through metal detector ... anyone who set off detector would have had to been screened with a hand wand where screener MUST identify metal item causing the alarm.  All carry-on bags screened through X-Ray machine to identify and confiscate weapons and other prohibited items.  Nothing suspicious indicated by screeners of these men.  Failure #11, Let hijackers on with weapons

NONE selected by CAPPS

Between 7:23 and 7:28 a.m., they boarded

Flight scheduled to depart at 8:00 am ... Took off at 8:14 am

8:42 am – reported hearing suspicious transmission from another plane

Hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46 ... last transmission comes at 8:42 am (5 minutes after being told to look for Flight 11).

Used knives, mace, and threat of a bomb (all reported by at least one passenger and/or flight attendant) ... Stabbed flight crews and killed both pilots

8:44 am – pilots from other planes notice Flight 175 emergency signal (ELT or emergency locator transmitter)

8:45 am – NORAD claims it is alerted at this time that Flight 175 has been hijacked ... the 9/11 Commission says it did not occur until 9:03 am when NEADS was notified by New York Control.

8:46 am – New York City controller Dave Bottoglia suspects hijacking based on lost transponder signal and sudden descending airliner.  It is heading for Delta Flight 3215 and he alerts the plane which misses Flight 175 by less than 200 feet.

8:47 am – changed beacon codes twice within one minute (used to allow controllers to track plane with radar) ... transponder signal stops for 30 seconds and then is turned back on to another signal not designated for a plane that day

8:49 am – United headquarters is alerted that Flight 17 is missing but NORAD is not notified.

8:50 am – plane makes U-turn and starts heading north toward New York City

8:51 am – change noticed by controller and flight deviated from assigned altitude

8:52 am – traffic controllers began trying to contact plane (unsuccessfully) (5 minutes after first crash)

8:52 am – flight attendant called United office in San Francisco reporting hijacking with deaths on board ... United’s Chicago system operations center receives call from San Francisco airline maintenance center who got call from female flight attendant that Flight 175 was hijacked.  The message is passed on to United headquarters immediately.  United knew of hijacking at 8:52am.  Failure #12, United does not notify NORAD

8:52 am – Mike McCormick, head of New York flight control center watched Flight 175 for 11 minutes as it approached the Word Trade Center.  He said he knew what was going to happen and yet he did not alert NORAD.  Failure #13, Flight controllers do not notify NORAD 

8:53 am – controller contacted another and said “we may have a hijack” and could not find plane ... discussions show NORAD has not been contacted yet

next few minutes – moved flights out of way of unknown aircraft

8:55 am – controller notified manager that she believed flight was hijacked ... regional managers refused to be disturbed because they were discussing hijacked aircraft (American Flight 11 which has already crashed)

8:58 am – flight turned toward New York City

8:58 am – controller told another “we might have a hijack over here, two of them”

9:00 am – phone call from passenger about plane’s intent ...

    “It’s getting bad, dad.  A stewardess was stabbed.  They seem to have knives and Mace.  They said they have a bomb.  It’s getting very bad on the plane.  Passengers are throwing up and getting sick.  The plan is making jerky movements.  I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane.  I think we are going down.  I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building.  Don’t worry, dad, if it happens, it’ll be very fast.  My God, my God.”

9:00 am – United dispatcher Ed Ballinger alerts planes regarding crash into World Trade Center.  Flight 175 does not respond.  Ballinger was handling 16 flights, including Flights 175 and 93, both of which crash on 9/11.  His call to Flight 93 would have been more urgent to bar the door had he known what American Airlines and the FAA already knew. 

9:01-9:02 am – manager from New York City called Herndon Command Center

    “We have several situations going on here.  It’s escalating big, big time.  We need to get the military involved with us ... We’re, we’re involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.”

This was the only notice FAA or its Herndon Command Center received after the hijacking prior to second crash.  Failure #14, FAA alerted very late of second hijacking

9:01-9:03 am – New York control and American Airlines watch Flight 175 go into the World Trade Center

9:03 am – crashed into South Tower of WTC (17 minutes after first crash) ... strikes 78th  through 84th floors.  About 100 die in the initial impact and 600 in the tower die.  All but four worked above the impact site.  Most had evacuated the tower after the first tower was hit.  Total death toll from the two towers is estimated at 2,819.

At this time, President Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were in the dark about attacks.  Bush said he was not told until after the second crash but the FAA opened a telephone line with the Secret Service sometime after 8:46 am.  Rice did not even know NORAD had scrambled jets after the hijacked planes.  President Bush and Vice President Cheney both said they thought it was pilot error or some kind of accident.

9:03 am – NEADS finally alerted by Boston Center (21 minutes after hijacking, 17 minutes after suspected of being hijacked, and 11 minutes after United Airlines knew)

    Boston Center: “Hey ... you still there?”

    New England Region: “Yes, I am.”

    Boston Center: “... as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that ‘we have planes.’  Now, I don’t know if it was because of the accent, or if there’s more than one, but I’m gonna’, I’m gonna’ reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick.  Okay?”

    New England Region: “Appreciate it.”

    Unidentified Female Voice: “They have what?”

    Boston Center: “Planes, as in plural.”

    Boston Center: “It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s another one aimed at the World Trade Center.”

    New England Region: “There’s another aircraft?”

    Boston Center: “A second one just hit the Trade Center.”

    New England Region: “Okay.  Yeah, we gotta’ get, we gotta’ alert the military real quick on this.”

9:03 am – NEADS alerted of second crash into WTC

After the second plane hits the World Trade Center at 9:03 am, Atlantic City fighters are ordered to land and be refitted with air-to-air missiles.  Yet, the fighters are not launched until more than an hour after the second crash, are sent to Washington DC, and do not arrive there until about 11 am.

9:05 am – Boston Center confirmed for FAA Command Center and New England Region that hijackers on American flight 11 said we have planes (41 minutes after transmission).  And New York City Center closed down NYC airspace

9:05 am – Boston Center instructed controllers to inform all aircraft of NY events and to heighten cockpit security and asked Herndon Command Center to issue similar warning nation wide.  No evidence they acted on the request.  Failure #15, FAA does not tell pilots to strengthen cockpit doors

9:08 am – mission crew commander at NEADS decided to hold fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan (where they stay until 9:13 am)

9:09 am – backup fighters (for Otis fighters) ordered to battle stations at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia (7-9 minutes from DC)

9:13 am – Otis fighters 115 miles away from New York City, set course for Manhattan ... arrived at 9:25 am (12 minutes to travel or 9.58 miles per minute, 575 miles per hour, or 56% of capable speed).  Failure #16, Fighters travel very slowly for Manhattan.

Otis fighter pilots says they went “full-blower” (at or near full speed at 1,875 mph) and “supersonic, which is kind of nonstandard for us.”  One says his orders are to go directly to New York City and establish combat air patrol.  Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, says they fly “like a scalded ape” topping 500 mph.  NORAD time line says the fighters arrived in New York City 18 minutes later at 9:11 am instead of the 10-12 minutes it should have taken them.  9/11 Commission says the fighters did not get to New York City until 9:25 am.

The Otis pilots (e.g., Major Daniel Nash) say when they near New York City, they see smoke from the buildings.  NORAD says they are 71 miles away when Flight 175 hits the World Trade Center.  Lt. Colonel Timothy Duffy says he was 60 miles out when he saw the smoke.  A Newark, New Jersey Flight Controller, Bob Varcadapane says he remembers two F-15s getting to New York City just moments after the crash.  Yet, the 9/11 Commission reports they did not get to New York City near 9:03 but were instead 100 miles away and heading Southwest instead of Wet toward New York City.

3)    American Flight 77: Washington DC Dulles to Los Angeles

2 pilots, 4 attendants, 53 passengers, 5 hijackers (Khalid al Mihdhar, Majid Moqed, Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Salem al Hazmi)

Khalid al Mihdhar, Majid Moqed, and Hani Hanjour selected by CAPPS

Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi selected for extra security by airline’s customer service rep at the check-in counter because one brother did not have photo ID nor could he understand English and because both were suspicious -- checked bags held off plane until confirmed he had boarded (let them on with weapons!).  Failure #17, Let hijackers on with weapons

Mihdhar and Moqed entered security checkpoint at 7:18 am ... both of them set off alarms!  In second metal detector, Mihdhar did not set off alarm and Moqed did!  Screener wanded him and he passed!

Others passed except Nawaf al Hazmi who set off alarms in both metal detectors, but then passed the hand wand inspection.  His carry-on bag was swiped for traces of explosives and passed.  Video tape shows an unidentified item in back pocket, clipped to its rim.

Screening expert reviewed tape (at request of 9/11 Commission) and he described work of screeners as “marginal at best.”  Screener should have resolved what set off the alarms!  Failure #18, Incompetent airport security

It is clear that security at airports was inept!  CAPPS selections could have stopped the attacks, especially with failed security passes, alarm bells ringing, and one with no passport and did not speak English .  Yet, Argenbright Security, the company working all of the airports used in the attacks, reportedly hired illegal immigrants and people with criminal records.

All aboard by 7:50 a.m.

Flight scheduled to depart at 8:10 am ... Took off at 8:20 am

8:51 am – last routine communication to tower

Hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54 am

Used knives and box cutters and moved all passengers to back of plane (according to at least one passenger)

8:54 am – flight deviated from assigned course and turned south (8 minutes after first crash).  No one is asked to look for the plane when it disappeared from radar.

8:56 am – transponder turned off and primary radar contact with plane lost ... repeated tries to contact plane unsuccessful ... Indianapolis flight controller has not been told of any other hijacked planes even though other centers have been told at 8:25 am.  Failure #19, FAA failed to notify all centers of hijacked aircraft.  American Airlines headquarters and Pentagon’s NMCC are notified that Flight 77 is off course with no radio or transponder but NORAD is not notified.  Failure #20, Neither American Airlines nor Pentagon contact NORAD about additional hijacking.  This is 10 minutes after the crash of American Flight 11 and 35 minutes after American knew of the hijacking of Flight 11.

8:56 - 9:05 am – Flight 77 disappears from radar due to technical issues but no other centers are asked to look for it.  Failure #21, No effort to contact flight centers to locate Flight 77.

8:56 - 9:24 am – NMCC is actively deliberating but NORAD is not notified

9:00 am – American Airlines Executive VP Gerard Apley learned communications lost ... second American flight in trouble ... ordered all American Airlines flights in Northeast to remain on the ground ... NORAD not notified.  Failure #22, American Airlines again does not contact NORAD about additional hijacking.  This is 14 minutes after the crash of American Flight 11 and 39 minutes after American knew of the hijacking of Flight 11.

9:00 am – FAA, American, United realized multiple hijackings ... did NOT warn other airlines (see p. 455 – FAA knew Flight 11 was hijacking 11 minutes after it was taken over and Flight 175 9 minutes after it was taken over).  Failure #23, Neither FAA not United contact NORAD about additional hijacking.

According to White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke, shortly after 9am, he was told that there was already an open call to NORAD, and that there was also an open call to Navy Captain Deborah Lower, the director of the White House Situation Room, who was with President Bush. [So, if people in the White House were talking to NORAD and President Bush’s Situation Room, why did they not know there was an attack against the US and why did NORAD not immediately launch fighters to respond?  Also, how can President Bush claim he did not learn of the attacks until later?].

Clarke also says that the FAA was on the line with White House right away, too.  And according to them, they knew Flight 11 and Flight 175 were both hijacked. [So, why did they not send fighters to get Flights 11 and 175?]

9:00 am – Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that Flight 77 was missing and probably had crashed

9:05 am – Flight 77 reappears on radar but is not noticed.  No other controllers or centers are asked to search for flight. [see failure #21]

9:05 am – FAA controllers at Boston Center requested that Herndon Command Center get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for the cockpit ... (no evidence action was taken).  FAA personnel testified it was duty of air carriers to tell their pilots about security risks, not the FAA’s.  Failure #24, FAA failed at its basic function on 9/11 to “provide a safe, secure, and efficient global aviation system that contributes to national security and the promotion of U.S. aviation.”

No evidence that American warned its pilots ... United’s warning came at 9:19 am.  Failure #25, American Airlines does not warn its pilots about hijackings.

9:08 am – Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft and West Virginia State Police to see if any reports of downed aircraft

9:09 am – Indianapolis Center reported to FAA regional center of lost contact with flight (13 minutes after lost contact and 6 minutes after second crash! – FAA headquarters did not get call until 9:25 am!) ... American Airlines headquarters has known since before 9:00 am.  Failure #26, American Airlines does not call FAA headquarters about lost contact with another plane.

9:10 am -- After learning it was missing a plane (flight 77), American suspended all flights nationwide.  This is 49 minutes after American knew of hijackings. 
United did same shortly thereafter.  Failure #27, American Airlines waits too long to ground all flights.

9:10 am – Washington Control, which is aware of the previous hijackings and crashes, sees Flight 77 with no radio, no transponder, and alerts no one.  Failure #28, Washington Control does not alert anyone about finding Flight 77.
                       
9:12 am – American Airlines alerted about hijacking of plane by family of passenger (26 minutes after first crash) ... Indianapolis Control is still unaware of the hijacking

9:15-9:25 am – White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke is finally told of hijackings.  When Richard Clarke was given the passenger manifests from the airline, he was told by the FBI: “We recognize some names, Dick.  They’re al Qaeda.”  Clarke responded: “How the f@ck did they got on board then?” (p. 13). [Exactly, how could known al Qaeda members get on board planes in the US?  Why weren’t they on a no-fly list?]  According to Clarke, the CIA just forgot to tell anyone about them, which is one of many failures prior to 9/11!

Between 9:16 and 9:26 am – Barbara Olson called husband Ted Olson (Solicitor General of US) and reported hijacking

Ted Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General Ashcroft

Barbara Olson called her husband back and said they were flying over houses ... was told by husband of previous two crashes

United warning to planes begins at 9:19 am when dispatcher began notifying 16 transcontinental flights ... this is 27 minutes after United knew of the hijacking.  This warning was in time to stop the hijacking of Flight 93 unless a hijacker was already in the cabin of the plane prior to this time.

    “Beware any cockpit intrusions.  Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.”

9:18 am – FAA notifies all flight control centers to watch for planes disappearing from radar or making unauthorized changes to flight path

9:20 am – Indianapolis Center learned of other hijackings and wondered if Flight 77 had not crashed after all ... Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 was missing

9:20 am – United Airlines orders no new takeoffs in US

9:20 am – FAA sets up teleconference, including Defense Department.  This is almost one hour after Boston Center notified other centers of the first hijacking.  Failure #29, FAA waits one hour to set up teleconference.

9:21 am – One Langley pilot Major Dean Eckmann, says he got scramble order at this time. Another pilot says it occurred at 9:24 am (not at 9:09 am as the 9/11 Commission claims).  Failure #30, Scramble order to fighters occurs very late.

9:21 am – Command Center, FAA field facilities, and American Airlines began looking for Flight 77, fearing it had been hijacked

9:21 am – Command Center notified Dulles terminal control facility of missing plane

9:21 am – FAA called NEADS (thinking American Flight 11 was still in air ... 35 minutes after crash) ... scrambled jets at Langley and said would use Otis jets to catch Flight 11 heading to DC (was really Flight 77) ... order issued at 9:23 am ... jets could have been there in 10-12 minutes ... NORAD says it was alerted regarding a possible Flight 77 hijack at 9:24 am, but the 9/11 Commission says NORAD learned of it by chance at 9:34 am when it contacted Washington control to ask about Flight 11.  NORAD is never notified by the FAA about Flight 77 ... Flight controllers had known Flight 77 was off course with no radio and transponder for 25 minutes!  Failure #31, NORAD is never directly informed about Flight 77.

9:25 am – Command Center notified FAA headquarters of situation

(FAA radar equipment had tracked Flight 77 for 8 minutes and 13 seconds [between 8:56 am and 9:05 am] but radar was not shared with controllers at Indianapolis due to technical issues ... Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around ... it traveled undetected for 36 minutes on course heading due east for DC ... FAA learned it 16 minutes earlier and American knew it 25 minutes earlier.  Failure #32, Technical glitch prevented tracking of Flight 77.

9:25 am – FAA Command Center ordered nationwide ground stop.  Failure #33, FAA waits too long to order ground stop.

9:27 am – Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice are told a plane is heading to Washington DC and is 50 miles out.  The 9/11 Commission says this was at 9:32 am.

9:29 am – autopilot of American 77 was disengaged ... aircraft was 7,000 feet and 38 miles West of Pentagon

9:30 am – Langley fighters airborne (9 to 21 minutes after scramble, depending upon the source) ... NEADS decided to keep Otis fighters over New York (7 minutes after order to go to DC) ... heading of Langley fighters adjusted to send them to Baltimore area (between reported plane and Capitol) ... New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani contacts White House at 9:58 am and asks for fighter protection over New York City.  He is told by Chris Henrick, deputy political advisor to President Bush, that “The jets were deployed 12 minutes ago [9:46 am] and should be able to defend you against further attack.”  This is consistent with claims by acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers and a NORAD spokesperson that no fighters were scrambled anywhere until after the Pentagon was hit.  This would also explain why the fighters were not there until about 10 am!  Failure #34, NORAD is very slow to launch fighter aircraft on 9/11.

9:32 am – object tracking at high rate of speed heading eastbound picked up by Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control ... within 30 minutes of DC and controllers thought it was a military flight ... another report says it is only noticed when 12 to 14 miles out.

9:34 am – NEADS contacted FAA’s Washington Center and asked about American Flight 11 ... was told of American Flight 77 (first notice to military that this flight was also missing ... FAA
never asked for help from military about Flight 77)

9:34 am – Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and Dulles controllers advised Secret Service of unknown aircraft heading in direction of White House (5 miles west-southwest of Pentagon taking a 330 degree turn ... at end of turn at 2,200 feet and pointing toward Pentagon and downtown Washington ... pilot advanced throttles to maximum power and dove toward Pentagon)

Reagan National controllers sent an unarmed National Guard C130H cargo aircraft (had just taken off to Minnesota) to identify and follow it

[media reports say that at 9:35 am – Fight 77 is too high to hit the Pentagon (7,000 feet up going 400 mph) on its initial pass over, so it makes an impossible turn and flies near restricted space around the White House.  It makes a downward spiral, turning almost a complete circle and dropping 7,00 feet in 2 ½ minutes]

9:36 am – FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS to relay discovery about unidentified aircraft heading to DC ... NEADS took immediate control of airspace to clear path for Langley fighters

    Boston: “Latest report: Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House ... six, southwest.  Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.”

    NEADS: “Okay, we’re going to turn it ... crank it up ... Run them to the White House. (NEADS commander, who was speaking, learned that Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean.)  “I don’t care how many windows you break ... Damn it ... Okay.  Push them back.”  Failure #35, NORAD sends fighters due East over the ocean instead of toward Flight 77.

Why East?
1)    No target location given and no distance to the target (contradicts earlier claim about sending them to Baltimore)
2)    Generic flight plan prepared to get aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly led them to believe they were ordered to fly East!
3)    Lead pilot and local FAA controller assumed instruction to go “090 for 60" (fly due East for 60 minutes) superseded original scramble order.

9:37 am – Flight 77 almost hits fireman Alan Wallace on the ground of the Pentagon.  The plane was 25 feet off the ground and going 460 mph.  He calls to report a 757 Boeing or 320 Airbus passenger plane crashing into the Pentagon.

9:37 am – crashed into Pentagon ... Langley fighters were 150 miles away!

Numerous witnesses report seeing cargo plane flying very close to Flight 77 (see p. 423, Thompson)

9:38 am – reported by cargo plane

    “... looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, sir.”

10:38 am – Andrews fighters that had been over North Carolina reach Washington DC
Failure #36, Andrews fighters, ordered back to base at 8:53 am, arrive in Washington, DC too late

4)    United Flight 93: Newark, NJ to Los Angeles
           
2 pilots, 5 attendants, 33 passengers, 4 hijackers (why not 5 – Mohamed al Kahtani refused entry to US by suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Orlando International Airport in August)

Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah

Ahmad al Haznawi selected by CAPPS, his bag tested for explosives and then loaded on plane

Nothing suspicious recalled by screeners.  Failure #37, Let hijackers on with weapons

All boarded between 7:39 and 7:48 am

Supposed to depart gate at 8 am but delayed by heavy morning traffic ... Took off at 8:42 am (4 minutes before first crash) ...

9:18 am – FAA notifies all flight control centers to watch for planes disappearing from radar or making unauthorized changes to flight path

9:19-9:26 am – United Airlines tells pilots to secure cockpit doors.  Controller Ed Ballinger has already been doing this for several minutes.  It could have and should have acted sooner based on what FAA and airlines already knew, if the information had been shared.

Flight 93 received warning at 9:24 am (37 minutes after first crash and 21 minutes after second crash) ... “Beware of cockpit intrusion.  Two aircraft in New York hit Trade Center buildings.”  Warning comes 32 minutes after United knew Flight 175 was hijacked.  ... additional informal message also sent by Ballinger to Flight 93 at 9:00 am

9:24 am – scramble order given to Langley fighters by NEADS (pilot Major Dean Eckmann says it came at 9:21 am and the 9/11 Commission says it came at 9:09 am).

9:26 am – response from pilot to cockpit warning

    “Ed, confirm latest message please.  Jason.”

9:25 am – FAA bans all takeoffs in US ... includes military flights too except for a limited number that are allowed to fly (no details are given by FAA).

9:27 am – last normal transmission from plane

Hijacked at 9:28 am ... dropped 700 feet suddenly ... around this time a call from a passenger indicates hijackers have gun, bomb

11 seconds into descent calls from cabin received ... “Mayday” amid struggles in cockpit ... someone screamed “Hey get out of here – get out of here – get out of here!” ... Cleveland Flight Control notifies no one of sudden drop, sounds of screams, and inability to contact plane.  Failure #38, Cleveland Control does not notify anyone about problems with Flight 93.

9:28 am – White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers talk on phone and Myers says “We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but ... Otis has launched two birds toward New York.  Langley is trying to get two up now.”  Myers tells Clarke that combat air patrol can be over city in 15 minutes, by 9:43 am.  [So, why did the combat air patrol not occur until about 11 am?]

9:29 am – Pentagon Command Center begins conference call which lasts 8 hours.  Call starts 30 minutes after second tower is hit.  Failure #39, Pentagon is slow to start conference call on 9/11.

9:30 am – United Airlines orders planes in the air to land, American Airlines does so at 9:35 am

9:30 am – Langley fighters are airborne and can reach Washington DC in 6 minutes.  Even traveling at 700 mph, less than half of the maximum speed for F-16s, they could have arrived before Flight 93, which crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37 am.  Yet, they are diverted over Atlantic Ocean and reach DC 30 minutes later.  Some reports claim they supposedly did this to abide by peacetime noise restrictions.

9:30 am – Richard Clarke asks for shoot down order but does not get it for 30 more minutes.

9:32 am – announcement made to passengers

    “Ladies and Gentlemen.  Here the captain, please sit down and please keep remaining sitting.  We have a bomb on board.  So, sit.”

Aircraft turned around and headed East (44 minutes after first crash)

Cleveland Control cannot contact plane and passes on information to FAA

9:34 am – word of hijacking reached FAA headquarters (had opened line of communication with Herndon Command Center with instructions to poll all suspected flights)

According to Richard Clarke, the FAA told him that Flight 93 over Pennsylvania was a potential hijack, as well as Delta Flight 1989 (which was not hijacked). [So, why did they not send fighters to get Flight 93?].

9:34-10:08 am – Command Center tracked Flight 93 and gave frequent updates to FAA headquarters even when lost transponder signal at 9:41 am

9:35 am – Rising and falling Flight 93 does not answer attempts to contact plane

9:36 am – Flight 93 turns around and files new flight path to Washington DC

9:36 am – Cleveland Center asked Herndon Command Center if military had launched fighter aircraft to intercept aircraft ... said they would make call if needed ... Herndon Command Center told Cleveland that FAA had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue.  Failure #40, FAA insists on following protocol during an emergency which slows contact of NORAD.

9:37 am – passenger describes bomb on board

9:37-9:45 am – Richard Clarke orders combat air patrol over all major cities ... NORAD gives order at 9:49 am but bases have been calling NORAD earlier asking for permission to send up fighters.  Failure #41, NORAD does not respond to repeated requests for fighter response.

9:39 -- another transmission from plane indicated a bomb on board and that plane was returning to airport so people should stay seated

At least ten passengers and two crew members made calls to share vital information about hijackers – stabbed passengers and pilots and flight attendant ... one said hijacker had gun (no gun or bomb found or trace of either) ... five calls described intent of passengers to revolt ... they voted to act and acted

9:41 am – Flight 93 transponder signal is turned off and speed fluctuates widely

9:42 am – Herndon Command Center learned a plane had struck Pentagon ... Command Center ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at nearest airport

9:42 am – passenger reports hijackers say they have a bomb

9:43 am – combat air patrol should be over Washington DC according to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers

9:44 am – NORAD suspects Delta Flight 1989 has been hijacked but does not scramble aircraft after it

9:45 am – passenger tells of plan to take over plane and that they are being guarded with hijacker with bomb

9:45-9:55 am – White House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke initiates continuity of government plan and shot down order may have been given at this time ... 9/11 Commission says not until 10 am

9:46 am – Herndon Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United Flight 93 was now 29 minutes out of Washington, DC

9:47 am – passengers tell of plan to do something

9:49 am – Herndon Command Center suggested someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance (13 minutes after Cleveland Center mentioned it)

    FAA Headquarters: “They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.”

    Command Center: “Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?”

    FAA Headquarters: “Oh, God, I don’t know.”

    Command Center: “Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna’ have to make probably in the next ten minutes.”

    FAA Headquarters: “Uh, ya’ know everybody just left the room.”
Failure #42, FAA employees are completely incompetent

9:49 am – NORAD commander directs all fighters nationwide to battle stations fully armed but most fighters do not get into the air until 10:45 am.  Failure #43, NORAD fighters are incredibly slow into the air nationwide.

9:53 am – FAA headquarters informed Command Center that deputy director for air traffic services was still talking about scrambling fighters ... this is 19 minutes since FAA headquarters knew of hijacking

9:53 am – hijackers discuss fear of retaliation

9:54 am – passengers call regarding plan to retaliate

9:57 am – passenger revolt began ... a sustained assault

9:58 am – wind is heard on the plane’s tape recording, a passenger calls from the bathroom and reports an explosion and white smoke

9:58-10:00 am – pilot made many attempts to thwart the revolt ... sounds recorded included loud thumps, crashes, shouts, breaking glass and plates

10:00-10:03 am – transponder is turned back on

10:00-10:03 am – hijackers start to talk about putting the plane down

    Hijacker: “Is that it?  Shall we finish it off?

    Another hijacker: “No, not yet.  When they all come, we finish it off.”

    Passenger: “In the cockpit.  If we don’t we’ll die!”
   
    Passenger: “Roll it!”

    Hijacker: “Allah is the greatest!  Allah is the greatest!”

    Hijacker: “Is that it?  I mean, shall we put it down?”

    Another hijacker: “Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”

    Hijacker: “Allah is the greatest!  Allah is the greatest!”

10:00-10:06am – silence on voice recording, and strange sounds are heard, including mechanical sound and loud winds

10:01 am – local pilot sees plane rocking back and forth three or four times

10:01 am – The FAA issues a scramble order in Toledo, Ohio, and two F-16 fighters head toward Flight 1989 ... in air only 16 minutes later!

10:02 am – recording in cockpit ends!  No voices are heard in last 1-4 minutes, only wind.
   
10:03 am – Pentagon NMCC learns of hijacking, but NORAD is still not told (FAA had told the Secret Service, who told the White House, who told NMCC – but not NORAD).  Failure #44, NORAD is never told of Flight 93.

prior to 10:06 am – Flight 93 breaks up in air because burning and falling debris was reported by witnesses and four debris fields are found within 6-8 miles of crash site ... the plane may have broken up due to flying to fast and low (design limits are 287 mph when flying below 10,000 feet!)

10:03 am – plane crashed, only 20 minutes from Washington, DC ... evidence from earth vibrations from a US Army seismic study suggest the plane did not crash until 10:06 am!  The FAA puts the crash time at 10:07!  Yet, no NTSB investigation is done!

10:06 am – President Bush asks if plane is shot down or if it crashed

10:07 am – NEADS is finally told of hijacking by Cleveland flight control

10:08 am – report from Command Center to FAA headquarters that a plane spotted black smoke coming from ground in Pennsylvania ... the plane that discovered the smoke was the same National Guard cargo plane that saw American Flight 77 crash into Pentagon 27 minutes earlier

10:10 am – Langley fighters arrived over DC (40 minutes after take off) and NEADS mission crew commander instructed jets “negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over nation’s capital (did not know Flight 93 had crashed) ... clearance reaches NEADS at 10:31 but is not passed on to pilots.  Failure #45, NORAD does not give shoot down order to fighters.

10:10-10:15 am – Based on report that Flight 93 is heading toward Washington DC, Vice President Cheney gives shoot down order

10:17 am – Command Center advised FAA headquarters that plane had crashed

10:30 am – Vice President Cheney orders another shoot down based on mistaken report of airplane which turns out to be helicopter

10:31 am – NORAD orders broadcast of shoot down order but NEADS does not pass it on to planes.  Failure #46, NEADS never passes on shoot down order.

10:38 am – Andrews fighters that had been over North Carolina reach Washington DC

2 pm – fighter pilot says he was told at this time that Flight 93 was shot down by an F-16.